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INTRODUCTION
From its  founding,  University  College  London  (UCL) has  played  a  key
role  in  defining-and  critiquing-the  traditional  model  of the  attorney-
client  relationship.  In  this article,  I will  argue  that  this  rich  history  has
much to teach us about the evolving  relationship  between  large companies
and their primary outside law firms as we ponder the likely consequences  of
the current financial crisis.
I will do so by challenging the unstated assumption underlying one of the
most widely quoted statements  in legal ethics, made by one of UCL's most
important  founding  fathers,  Lord Henry Brougham.  There  is  arguably  no
more  quoted,  or in the minds of many  lawyers beloved, understanding  of
the  duties  owed  by  an  advocate  to  his  or  her  client  than  Brougham's
legendary  speech  in  defense  of Queen  Caroline.  Speaking  on the floor  of
*  Lester  Kissel  Professor  of Law  and  Faculty  Director  of  the  Program  on  the  Legal
Profession  and the Center  on Lawyers and the Professional  Services Industry, Harvard Law
School.  This  chapter  was  originally  presented  as  the  Current Legal  Problems  Lecture  at
University  College  London  in  March  2008.  A  version of this  paper  was published  in  62
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.  478 (2010).  I thank Lucy Page and the rest of the terrific people at
Oxford University  Press for  giving me permission to reprint the article  here.  The piece has
been updated slightly to reflect certain events that have transpired since the original version
was  finalized  for publication.  In addition, I wish to thank  Colm  O'Cinneide for arranging
the lecture  and for  his outstanding  comments on my  initial draft.  I also  wish to  thank the
faculty and students who attended that event for their helpful comments.  I would also like to
thank  faculty  and  students  at  Yale  Law  School,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center,
University  of California  at  Hastings  College of Law,  Stetson  University  College  of Law,
University of Iceland Faculty  of Law,  University of Stockholm Faculty  of Law,  University
of Vancouver Faculty of Law, and my home  institution of Harvard Law  School for helpful
comments when I presented  versions of the chapter at these  institutions.  John  Coates, Ben
Heineman,  Robert Mnookin,  Mari  Sako, Bill  Simon, Detlev Vagts,  and  Ben Zipursky  also
provided  invaluable  feedback  on  prior  drafts.  Chris  Assise  and  Jason  Silverstein  gave
terrific research  support and feedback on prior drafts.  Finally, I wish to thank my colleagues
on the Harvard Law  School Corporate  Purchasing Project,  Michele Beardslee,  John  Coates,
Young-Kyu Kim, Ashish Nanda, and Sean Williams, for their outstanding work in helping to
produce the data from that project discussed below.  The phrase "team of rivals"  is used with
apologies to Doris Keams Goodwin and her book of the same title, which examines  how the
political  rivals  that  made  up  Abraham  Lincoln's  wartime  Cabinet  succeeded  in  working
closely  together  to  bring  the  American  Civil  War  to  a  successful  conclusion,  and  to  the
current  President,  Vice  President,  and  Secretary  of State of the United  States,  who  some
have referred to as comprising  a modem-day "team of rivals."
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the  House of Lords  in  1820,  Lord Brougham eloquently  stated what many
still believe to be the essence of the lawyer's role:
"[A]n  advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows  but one person  in all
the  world, and that person  is his client.  To save that  client by  all means
and  expedients,  and  at  all  hazards  and  costs  to  other  persons,  and,
amongst them,  to himself,  is his  first  and  only duty;  and  in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which
he may bring upon others.  Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of the  consequences, though it should be
his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion." '
For almost two centuries, these  words have stood as the embodiment of the
ideal of zealous  advocacy that  lawyers  owe  to  their clients.2  But of late,
there have  also been many  who have questioned whether  such  an extreme
standard  of  partisanship-ignoring  the  "alarm,"  "torment,"  and
"destruction"  of others-is  the proper  standard  for lawyers  to  take  in  all
circumstances. 3  Specifically,  I  and  others  have  argued  that  whatever  the
value  of Brougham's  conception  in  the  context  in  which  he  made  his
famous  claim-i.e.,  the representation  of an  individual  criminal  defendant
facing  the  unchecked  power  of  the  King  in  circumstances  where  the
defendant's  head  was  quite  literally  on  the  line-this  understanding  has
much less to recommend  it when we  consider how corporate  lawyers ought
to  conceive  of  their  duties,  particularly  in  the  area  of  regulatory
compliance.
4
Today,  these  concerns  are especially  salient.  As the  spotlight  of blame
shines  its accusatory  light on the cast of characters  involved  in the current
economic meltdown, it is only a matter of time before the inside and outside
lawyers  who  represented  the  banks  and other  financial  institutions  we  are
currently  bailing  out  will  be  called  upon to  take  their  turn  in  the  dock.5
1. See Monroe  H. Freedman,  Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19  GEO.  J.
LEGAL ETHICS  1213,  1215 (2006)  (quoting 2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821)).
2.  Id. (discussing the many admiring references  to Brougham's quote).
3.  William  Simon was among  the first to mount this critique, see generally William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:  Procedural  Justice and Professional  Ethics, 1978  WiS.
L.  REV.  29, but  there  have  now been  many others.  See generally DAVID  LUBAN,  LAWYERS
AND  JUSTICE: AN  ETHICAL STUDY  (1988);  DEBORAH L. RHODE,  IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING  THE  LEGAL  PROFESSION  (2000);  Robert  W.  Gordon,  The  Independence  of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV.  1 (1988).
4.  See generally David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count:  Regulating Lawyers After
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S.  CAL.  L. REV.  1145  (1993).  For the classic  argument that  the criminal
defense  context  may  be  ethically  distinct  from  the  other  work  lawyers  do,  see  Richard
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.  RTS.  1, 6 (1975).
5.  The  unfolding controversy  over the  role that lawyers  for  both Bank of America and
Merrill  Lynch  played  in  the  failure  to  disclose  to the  shareholders  of either company  the
billions of dollars  in bonuses that  Merrill  intended to pay out prior to the merger of the two
institutions may  very well  be just the opening  salvo  in this line  of attack. See SEC Actions,
http://www.secactions.com/?p=1430  (Aug.  25, 2009, 3:36  EST) (reporting that "[a]ccording
to  the  SEC,  it  was  the  advice  of the  lawyers  that  resulted  in  the  shareholders  of both
companies  not  being  told  about  the  billions  of dollars  in  bonuses  approved  for  Merrill
employees when they voted on the acquisition of the broker by the bank").  If the blistering
opinion  by  Judge  Jed  Rakoff  rejecting  the  proposed  settlement  in  the  Bank  of
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When they  do,  it is  unlikely enforcement  officials  or the  public  will have
much  sympathy  for  an ethic  that  appears  to  command  lawyers  for these
powerful clients  to proceed "reckless of the consequences"  even if it means
casting  "the  country  in  confusion"-let  alone  bankruptcy.  Given  the
current mood, there may be little the bar can do to avoid this "unhappy fate"
this  time  around.  But as  we  prepare  to  enter  into  a  brave  new  world in
which  all  corporate  actors-lawyers  included-will  almost  certainly  face
increased  scrutiny,  I  want  to  suggest  that  the  profession  and  those  we
purport to serve would do well to consider whether there is something more
fundamentally wrong with applying Brougham's conception of the lawyer's
role  to  the  corporate  context  than  the  conflation  of  the  standards  of
advocacy  appropriate to the criminal  context with those that should govern
in civil or regulatory matters.
At the heart of Brougham's  understanding  of the  lawyer's  role stands  a
simple  but  powerful  assumption:  that  the  attorney-client  relationship  is
essentially one  of agency.  Of course a lawyer "knows but one person in all
the world"  and is required  to promote that person's interests "by  all means
and  expedients  and  at  all  hazards  and  costs  to  other  persons,"  even  "to
himself,"  Brougham would likely say.6  These are simply the duties that an
agent  owes  to  his  or  her  principal. 7   Lawyers  are  doing  no  more-and
should be entitled to do no less-than others who are engaged by principals
to protect their interests and pursue their goals.8
It is this traditional idea that I intend to question here.  I do  so in the spirit
of another one  of UCL's great founders,  Jeremy Bentham, whose auto-icon
I had the pleasure of communing with when I  delivered this paper in UCL
in March 2008.9
America/Merrill Lynch bonus case is any indication, the corporate bar could be  in for a very
bumpy  ride  indeed.  See Zachery  Kouwe, Judge Rejects  a Settlement over Bonuses, N.Y.
TIMES,  Sept.  15,  2009,  at Al  (reporting that  "[g]iving  voice  to  the anger and frustration  of
many  ordinary  Americans,  Judge  Jed  S.  Rakoff  issued  a  scathing  ruling"  rejecting  the
settlement).  On February  21,  2010, Judge  Rakoff approved  a  $150  million settlement,  but
nevertheless  criticized  the settlement heavily. See SEC v. Bank of Am.  Corp., Nos. 09 Civ.
6829,  10 Civ.  0215,  slip op. at  14 (S.D.N.Y.  Feb.  22, 2010) ("While better than nothing,  this
is half-baked justice at best.").
6.  Freedman, supra note  1, at  1215.
7.  See L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY  L.J.
909, 913-14  (1980)  (characterizing  the  attorney-client  relationship  as  primarily constituted
by agency  law).
8.  See Randolph E. Paul,  The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25  ROCKY MTN.  L. REv.  412,
418 (1953)  (arguing that "[t]he job entrusted to [the tax lawyer] by his client is to use all his
learning  and  ability to protect  his  client's rights"  and that the  lawyer's  "notions  of policy,
and his personal  view of what the  law should be,  are irrelevant").  Indeed, since  lawyers are
not  only  "agents"  but  also  "fiduciaries,"  their  obligation  to  pursue  the  interests  of their
client-principals  is arguably  even  stronger  than agents  who  represent clients  in more arms-
length  contexts.  For an account of the  heightened obligations  of fiduciaries who  purport to
act  for  their principals  in situations  of trust and  confidence,  see  Tamar Frankel,  Fiduciary
Law, 71  CAL. L. REv. 795, 797-802  (1983).
9.  Jeremy  Bentham's  "auto-icon"  is  in  fact  his  own  mummified  remains, which  are
housed  in  a  large  plate-glass  case  in  the  Thane  Library  of Medical  Sciences,  University
College London.  For a full discussion of the creation of Bentham's auto-icon, see  C. F. A.
2010] 2069FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
Throughout his  life, Bentham wrote  many brilliant commentaries  on law
and legal ethics.  In  1827, he delivered an especially devastating critique of
the  social utility  of the  attorney-client  privilege.  Bentham argued that  the
privilege  was  both  unnecessary  to  protect  the  innocent  (since  any  good
lawyer should be able to persuade an innocent person that giving the lawyer
all  the  facts  would  increase  the  client's  chance  of being  acquitted)  and
socially pernicious  with respect to the guilty (who would not be candid with
their  lawyers  and  therefore  receive  less  effective  legal  representation,
thereby  making  it  more  likely  that  they  would  be  convicted-which  is
exactly what society should want!).' 0  It is in the spirit of this skeptical gaze
that  I want  to  examine  the  traditional  claim  that  the  corporate  attorney-
client relationship is best understood as being one of agency.
Specifically,  I will argue  that  for all of its  intuitive  appeal,  the  agency
model  is  no  longer  a  helpful  template  for understanding  the  relationship
between corporations  and their outside  firms.  Instead, expanding  on ideas
that I first put forward in  1998,11  I will argue that the relationship  between
these  large  and  sophisticated  clients  and  their  increasingly  large  and
sophisticated  outside  counsel  is  better  conceptualized  as  a  new  kind  of
strategic  alliance  or partnership-or, to borrow  a phrase that has been used
to  describe  the  long-term  strategic  partnerships  between  Japanese
automakers  and  their  suppliers,  a new  kind of "legal  keiretsu"1 2-than  as
the typical agent-principal  relationship envisioned by Brougham.
My  claim  is  both  descriptive  and  normative.  Descriptively,  after
spending  most  of the  1980s  and  1990s  acquiring  in-house  expertise  that
allowed  them  to  break  apart  the  bilateral  monopolies  that  traditionally
characterized  the relationship between  companies and their primary outside
law  firm  and moving  toward  a  spot-contracting  model  for procuring  legal
services,  a growing  number  of corporate  clients  have  reversed  course  and
dramatically reduced the number of law firms that they use, particularly  for
high-value  work.  At the  same  time, the  law  firms that  serve  these  clients
are  consolidating  as well-both through  mergers  and  acquisitions  of rival
firms  and by  seeking  new  ways  to  consolidate  and  expand  the  work  that
they do for their best clients.  As a result, clients  and firms are increasingly
entering into complex interdependent relationships that resemble the kind of
Marmoy, The  "Auto-Icon" of Jeremy Bentham at University College, London, 2 MED.  HIST.
77,  77-86  (1958),  available at  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1034365/
pdf/medhist00183-0005.pdf.  Bentham remained thoughtfully  silent with respect to my thesis
so he bears no responsibility  for what follows.
10.  7 JEREMY BENTHAM,  The Rationale of Judicial  Evidence, in THE  WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 473-75, 477, 479 (John Bowring ed.,  London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co.  1843).
11.  See generally David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers?
Some Lessons  from the Diversity Wars, 11  GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 855  (1998).
12.  For  a  general  background  on  keiretsu,  see  Ronald  J.  Gilson  &  Mark  J.  Roe,
Understanding the  Japanese Keiretsu:  Overlaps  Between  Corporate Governance and
Industrial  Organization,  102 YALE L.J.  871 (1993).
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strategic alliances that these  same  companies have entered into with many
of their other suppliers. 13
These  changes,  and  the  forces  that have  produced  them,  in turn  raise
important challenges for the legal profession's ability to fulfill its normative
commitments  to  clients  and to  the public.  Due  in  large  measure  to  the
growth  of in-house  legal  departments,  corporate  clients  today have  a  far
greater  ability  to  hold  their  lawyer-agents  to  full-throated  standards  of
partisan  advocacy  than  any  client  could  have  dreamed  of  during
Brougham's  day.  Paradoxically,  however, the  spot-contracting model  that
exemplifies  this  new  power  often  has  failed  to  deliver  the  full  range  of
benefits  in terms of either quality or price that the in-house lawyers who led
this charge believed that it would.  This failure to deliver on the promise of
market control has in turn led many of these clients to move from the "logic
of power,"  which  emphasizes  the  ability  of stronger  actors  to  gain  by
coercing  their exchange  partners  into  an asymmetric  distribution of value,
to  a  "logic  of  embeddedness,"  which  emphasizes  the  importance  of
reciprocity and mutual trust for the production of joint gains. 14  As a result,
these companies  and their primary firms are more  likely to utilize  strategies
that  emphasize  "voice"  rather than  "exit"  to  resolve  problems  that  arise
during  the  relationship-although,  as  we  will  see,  exit  always  remains  a
credible threat. 15
This  new  logic,  however,  arguably  threatens  the  ability  of  outside
counsel  to  function  as  public-regarding  gatekeepers. 16  Although  these
concerns  are legitimate,  I will  argue that  the  logic  of embeddedness  is no
more corrosive  of public-regarding values than the logic of power that now
typifies  the  relationship  between  companies  and  their  outside  firms.
Indeed,  this  logic  has  the  potential  to  be  significantly  less  corrosive-
13.  For an excellent  description  and analysis of the characteristics  of these  increasingly
important  relationships,  see  Ronald  J.  Gilson,  Charles  F.  Sabel  &  Robert  E.  Scott,
Contracting  for  Innovation:  Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm  Collaboration, 109
COLUM.  L.  REV.  431  (2009).  I return  to  Gilson et al.'s  analysis of the  characterization  of
these relationships  below.
14.  See  generally Ranjay  Gulati  &  Maxim  Sytch,  Dependence Asymmetry  and Joint
Dependence  in  Interorganizational Relationships:  Effects  of  Embeddedness  on  a
Manufacturer's Performance in Procurement Relationships, 52  ADMIN.  ScI.  Q.  32  (2007)
(discussing the difference between the "logic of power"  and the "logic  of embeddedness").
15.  See  Susan  R.  Helper  &  Mari  Sako,  Supplier Relations in Japan and the  United
States:  Are  They  Converging?, MIT  SLOAN  MGMT.  REV.,  Spring  1995,  at  77,  77-84
(discussing  the  difference  between  "voice"  and  "exit"  strategies  in  customer-supplier
relationships  in  the  automobile  industry).  For  the  classic  formulation  of the  difference
between voice and exit,  see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,  EXIT, VOICE, AND  LOYALTY:  RESPONSES
TO DECLINES  IN FIRMS,  ORGANIZATIONS,  AND  STATES (1970).
16.  Reinier Kraakman was the first to apply the term "gatekeeper"  to describe  this aspect
of the  lawyer's  role  and, more  importantly,  to  explore  the  factors  that influence  whether
lawyers  will  be able to  play this  role  effectively.  See Reinier  H. Kraakman,  Gatekeepers:
The Anatomy of a  Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2  J.L. ECON.  &  ORG.  53  (1986);  see
also JOHN C.  COFFEE,  JR.,  GATEKEEPERS:  THE PROFESSIONS  AND  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE
(2006).  The idea that lawyers  should be "officers  of the  court"  with responsibilities  to the
public  purposes  of the  law, however,  is  as  old as  the profession itself. See generally, e.g.,
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court,  42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989).
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particularly  if we  move away  from ethical  and regulatory  structures  based
on  a  principal-agent  model  that  serves  only  to  entrench  the  ability  of
powerful  corporate-principals  to  impose  their  will  on  increasingly
vulnerable  lawyer-agents.  Indeed as a wag like Bentham might say, current
market  conditions  have  largely  turned  the  traditional justification  for  the
agency  model  on its head.  By withholding  information  and manipulating
incentives,  sophisticated  corporate  clients  now have the power to pressure
their lawyers  into  taking  risky  or unethical  actions that  threaten  to  throw
their law firms  "into confusion" in the  form of legal peril or financial  ruin.
"Innocent"  lawyers  who do  not want to participate  in such actions  have  no
recourse  other than  to  resign--or  be  fired.  At  the  same  time,  "guilty"
lawyers  who  have  no  interest in  standing up to  client pressure  are given  a
pass  on  the  ground  that  they  are  not  responsible  for  the  ends  of  the
representation  and  are required to follow the client's direction so long as  it
is technically  within the  letter of the  law.  A  model  of the  attorney-client
relationship  that  recognizes  that both  clients  and  lawyers  have  reciprocal
obligations  of  disclosure,  forbearance,  and  fair  dealing  of  the  kind
characteristic  of  strategic  alliances,  I  will  argue,  provides  a  better
foundation for dealing with these increasingly important problems.
The rest of this Essay  proceeds  in five  parts.  Part  I  briefly sets  out the
traditional  agency  model  of the  attorney-client  relationship  and  explores
how that model  has  always  been  in tension with  the  claim  that corporate
lawyers  should  also  act  as  gatekeepers  who  protect  and  promote  public
norms.  Part  II  tracks  the  evolution  of  the  corporate  attorney-client
relationship  with  respect to these two  competing  dimensions through three
stages of development:  the traditional Golden Age  marriage, characterized
by  bilateral  monopolies  reinforced  by  information  asymmetry  between
clients  and  lawyers  and  an  oligopolistic  cartel  among  firms;  the  divorce
(circa  1989),  typified by  spot-contracting  brought  about  by  the growth  of
sophisticated  in-house  legal  departments;  and  the  development  of what  I
will  call  a  legal  keiretsu,  characterized  by  "convergence"  of law  firm
relationships by  companies,  "consolidation"  among  firms,  and  integration
and  information  exchange  both  within  and  across  organizational
boundaries,  reinforced by  a surprising amount of turnover  among  in-house
lawyers.  Part  III  then  explores  the  implications  of this  third  stage  of
development  for clients,  lawyers,  and the public.  Although  there  are risks
for  each  of these  constituencies  in  the hybrid  model  of cooperation  and
competition  that characterizes  the new logic of embeddedness  that informs
these  new  strategic  alliances,  there  are  also  important  benefits-benefits
that  arguably  minimize  the  traditional  tension  between  the  client-service
and  gatekeeping  parts  of the  corporate  lawyer's  role.  These  potential
benefits, however,  will only be realized if the public-regarding  potential  of
these new legal keiretsus is reinforced by appropriate ethical and regulatory
support.  Part  IV  therefore  begins  the  process  of identifying  ethical  and
regulatory  changes  that can  promote  the potential  of these  new  strategic
alliances  while  limiting  their  dangers.  Part  V  concludes  by  briefly
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identifying questions  for future research,  particularly  in light of the  current
economic  crisis.  Although  I  concede that the  ultimate implications  of the
global  slowdown  for  the  relationship  between  large  companies  and their
principal outside law firms have yet to be determined,  initiatives such as the
American  Corporate  Counsel  Association's  Value  Challenge  suggest  that
the new economic  environment may very  well accelerate the move toward
the kind of partnering model I describe.
I.  CAN AGENTS BE GATEKEEPERS?
Even at the time Lord Brougham uttered his famous paean to partisanship
in  1820,  it was well established that the client-centered duties he celebrated
did not comprise the full measure of the lawyer's role.  In addition to being
faithful  agents  who  pursued  their  client's  interests,  lawyers  have
traditionally  also been expected to  be "officers  of the court"  who  promote
and uphold the public  purposes  of the  legal framework. 17  For most of the
profession's history,  the  bar has  portrayed  these  twin obligations  as being
entirely  consistent  and  harmonious.  Lawyers  promote  the  public  good,
according  to this standard view, by zealously advocating for the interests of
their private clients "within the bounds of the law."18
However,  the  public  and,  more  specifically,  enforcement  officials  have
grown increasingly less sanguine  about this alleged congruence.  Beginning
with a string of high profile enforcement  actions  in the 1970s,  the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC),  for example, has pressed lawyers  to take
their  public  duties  to  investors  more  seriously  when  advising  corporate
clients  on  complying  with  federal  securities  laws. 19  In  the  1980s  and
1990s,  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  and  the  Office  of  Thrift
Supervision  joined  the  chorus,  bringing  multimillion  dollar  enforcement
actions  and  law  suits  against  prominent  law  firms  for  advocating  too
zealously  on behalf of their corporate  clients  in a manner that contravened
17.  See Gaetke,  supra note  16,  at 41-43.  As Robert Gordon  emphasizes,  this ideal was
inherited from  the traditions of the English bar and has been a part of the legal profession's
self-understanding  since the  18th century. See generally Robert W. Gordon,  "The Ideal and
the Actual in the Law":  Fantasies  and Practices  of  New  York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in
THE  NEW  HIGH  PRIESTS:  LAWYERS  IN POST-CIVIL  WAR  AMERICA  51,  51-74  (Gerard  W.
Gawalt ed.,  1984).
18.  The  following statement  in the  old Model  Code  typifies  this view:  "The  duty of a
lawyer, both to his client and to the  legal system,  is to represent  his client zealously  within
the  bounds  of the  law."  See  MODEL  CODE  OF  PROF'L  RESPONSIBILITY  EC  7-1  (1982)
(footnotes omitted).  The Model  Rules adopted in  1983  take a much more nuanced view  of
this connection.  Although claiming  that "[a]  lawyer's  responsibilities  as  a representative of
clients,  an officer of the legal  system and a public citizen are  usually harmonious,"  the rules
also  concede  that  "[i]n  the  nature  of  law  practice  . . . conflicting  responsibilities  are
encountered"  among the lawyer's  various duties "while  [also]  earning a satisfactory  living."
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT  pmbl. (1983).
19.  See  COFFEE,  supra note  16,  at  202-16;  Lewis  D.  Lowenfels,  Expanding Public
Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers:  An  Analysis of the New  Trend in Standard of Care
and Priorities  of Duties, 74 COLUM.  L. REV.  412 (1974);  L. Ray Patterson,  The Limits of the
Lawyer's Discretion and the Law of Legal Ethics:  National  Student  Marketing  Revisited,
1979  DUKE L.J. 1251.
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applicable  legal constraints.20  Although prosecutions  against lawyers  in the
wake of Enron  and other related corporate  scandals  in 2001  have been less
numerous-and,  it should be noted, less successful-there  is nevertheless a
growing  consensus that  it is no longer plausible  to  assume that the private
interests of corporate clients will always, or even usually, be congruent  with
the public purposes  of the  legal framework,  or that reputational  incentives
alone will always be sufficient to bridge this divide.21
Coming  up  with  viable  means  for  reinvigorating  the  lawyer's
gatekeeping  role,  however,  has proven  to be  substantially  more  illusive-
and controversial.  Reformers  have tended to concentrate on two strategies:
normative  strategies  designed  to remind  lawyers that  they  do  in  fact have
duties to the legal  framework that are  as, if not more, important  than their
private  duties  to  clients,  and  enforcement  strategies  that  hold  lawyers
accountable  for  assisting-or  in  some  cases  for  not  preventing-client
misconduct.22  Both  of these  strategies  have achieved  important  results-
indeed,  I  have advocated both  in the past  and  will do  so again  here.  But
with few exceptions,  those who have advocated  these  strategies  have  done
so  without challenging the underlying  characterization  of the lawyer-client
relationship  as grounded  in the principles  of agency  law that arguably  has
helped to  create the tension between  the lawyer's  private and public duties
in the first instance.
23
It is hardly surprising that the agency model has remained strong, even as
Brougham's overzealous  characterization of it has  lost favor.  Clients,  after
all,  hire  lawyers to  pursue their projects  in  their name  and  on their behalf.
In  addition,  clients  are  generally  held  accountable  for  their  lawyer's
conduct.24   Given  these  background  characteristics,  it  is  difficult  to
conceive of a plausible  account of the attorney-client relationship  that  does
not view the lawyer in some significant sense as the client's agent.
Nevertheless,  the reality of the corporate  attorney-client  relationship  has
always  been more  complex than the simple  agency model  would  suggest.
To  be  sure,  corporations  have  always  tried to  ensure  that outside  counsel
20.  See COFFEE,  supra  note  16, at 213-15.
21.  See  id.  at  4  &  n.9  (criticizing  Judge  Frank  H.  Easterbrook  for  assuming  that
reputational  concerns  will  automatically  make  gatekeepers  such  as  lawyers  conform  to
public norms).
22.  For an example  of a strategy that relies on changing the norms of legal practice, see
William H.  Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101  HARV. L. REv.  1083  (1988).  See
also Gordon, supra note  3.  My  own prior work has  tended to emphasize enforcement.  See
generally, e.g.,  David B. Wilkins,  Who  Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105  HARV.  L. REv.  799
(1992)  (arguing  for promoting public-regarding  gatekeeping  by  increasing  enforcement  of
existing public duties).
23.  David  Luban  has  been  one  such  exception.  See LuBAN,  supra note  3,  at 324-26
(arguing  that  the  relationship  between  public  interest  lawyers  and  their  clients  is  better
understood as one between "political comrades"  than one of agency).
24.  See,  e.g.,  Link  v. Wabash  R.R. Co.,  370  U.S.  626,  634  (1962)  ("[E]ach  party  is
deemed  bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent  and is considered to have  'notice  of all  facts,
notice of which  can be charged  upon the attorney."'  (quoting  Smith v. Ayer,  101  U.S. 320,
326 (1879))).
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follow their instructions  and deliver high quality legal services that advance
the company's objectives.  And law firms have always worked hard at least
to appear  to be  satisfying  these  expectations.  But  since  Paul  Cravath  and
his partners first put together the prototype of the modem large  law firm in
the waning decades of the  19th century, the actual balance  of authority and
decisionmaking responsibility between  companies and their outside counsel
has departed  significantly  from the standard agency account.  Elite lawyers
never  conceived  of themselves,  to borrow  Anthony  Kronman's  pejorative
but  nevertheless  evocative  phrase,  as  "deferential  servants"  who  merely
carry  out the client's  bidding.25  Instead,  these  early lawyers  aspired to be
wise counselors, or "lawyer-statesmen"  to borrow another Kronman phrase,
who  played  a  key  role  in  shaping  their  clients'  goals  and  in  mediating
between  these  private  ends  and  the  public  purposes  of  the  legal
framework. 26  By  the  so-called  "Golden  Age"  of the large  law  firm  in the
middle  decades of the  20th century,  this "Whiggish  ideology"  had become
the accepted understanding of the corporate lawyer's role.27
In the next part, I  will explore  how market conditions in the last decades
of the  20th  century  made  it increasingly  difficult  for  lawyers  to  play  this
gatekeeping role-to the extent that they were actually  serving this function
before.28  For  present  purposes,  however,  I  want  to  highlight  how  the
agency  model  has  contributed  to  this  decline.  By  characterizing  the
relationship  between  corporate  lawyers  and  their  clients  as  fundamentally
one of agency, the standard account systematically marginalizes,  and indeed
delegitimizes,  a lawyer's allegiance to this broader public role.  Rather than
being  viewed  as  "trusted  advisors"  who  help  to  shape  their  clients'
objectives  in  ways  that ultimately  serve  both  the clients'  and  the  public's
long-term goals, lawyers who seek to  influence client ends  are chastised as
''moral  policemen"  who  constrain their  clients'  "first  class  citizenship"  by
"arrogating  to  themselves"  decisionmaking  authority  that  should  belong
exclusively  to their  client-principals. 29  The  result  has  been  an increasing
tendency  among  even  the most public-regarding  segments  of the corporate
bar  to  embrace  what  Robert  Gordon  calls  "schizoid  lawyering"  in which
25.  See  ANTHONY  T.  KRONMAN,  THE  LOST  LAWYER:  FAILING  IDEALS  OF  THE  LEGAL
PROFESSION  15  (1993).
26.  Id.
27.  See ERWIN  0.  SMIGEL,  THE WALL  STREET LAWYER:  PROFESSIONAL  ORGANIZATION
MAN?  343-44  (1964).  For the  connection  between  this account  of lawyer professionalism
and the noblesse oblige traditions of the early Whig party,  see Gordon, supra  note  17.  The
scare quotes  around "Golden Age,"  as Marc  Galanter wryly notes, are to remind  us that the
period  in question was  only golden  for those  with the right race, gender, and religion to be
admitted  to the  club.  See  Marc  Galanter,  Lawyers  in the Mist:  The  Golden Age of Legal
Nostalgia, 100  DICK.  L. REv.  549,  555  &  n.28  (1996).  I have  made  a  similar critique  of
Kronman.  See  David  B.  Wilkins,  Practical Wisdom for Practicing  Lawyers:  Separating
Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV.  L. REv.  458 (1995)  (book review).
28.  See Gordon, supra note  17  (acknowledging  that lawyers  have probably never  lived
up  to their  stated ideals  about professional  independence,  but citing examples  in which  the
bar promoted projects that were not in the short-term interests of their corporate clientele).
29.  See  generally, e.g.,  Stephen  L.  Pepper,  The  Lawyer's  Amoral Ethical Role:  A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,  1986  AM.  B. FOUND. RES. J.  613.
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practitioners  confine  their  public  commitments  to  their  own  (increasingly
scarce)  private  time,  while  accepting  uncritically  the  instructions  of their
private clients unmediated by any attention to public ends.30
Moreover,  as  I argued in  1998,  "the  agency model  of the lawyer's  role
assumes that all ethical obligations flow from the lawyer-agent to the client-
principal. '31  Clients have  only rights, not obligations.32  To be sure,  these
rights  may  be  limited  by  a  lawyer's  correlative  obligations  to  the  legal
framework  and,  on  occasion,  even  by  "the  lawyer's  own  interest  in
remaining  an  upright  person  while  earning  a  satisfactory  living. '33  As
important  and  as controversial  as  these  limitations  may  be, however,  they
do not  disturb  the basic  framework  in  which  clients  have  no  obligations,
save  for  their  duty  to  pay  for  the  services  they receive. 34  As  corporate
clients have  become increasingly  sophisticated about  their legal needs  and
interests-and  increasingly  capable  of  pressing  their  outside  counsel  to
pursue these  self-defined ends-the  inattention to the obligations  of clients
sanctioned  by  the  agency  model  has  made  it  increasingly  difficult  to
conceive of a plausible gatekeeping role for lawyers.
Before  we  proclaim  the  lawyer-statesman  lost  forever,  however,  it  is
important  to  remember  that  market  conditions  are  by  their  very  nature
dynamic.  In recent  years,  these conditions  have been  shifting back in  the
direction of a  more  collaborative relationship  between  companies  and  law
firms.  Understanding  this  shift,  I  will  argue,  highlights  the  need  for  a
corresponding  reinterpretation  of the  way  in  which  we  conceive  of  the
normative obligations of both lawyers and clients.
II.  FROM SPOUSES TO VENDORS TO PARTNERS
Over the  last century  the corporate  attorney-client  relationship  has  gone
through  three distinct,  albeit  overlapping, phases.  The  following  sections
present  a  stylized  description  of  each  of  these  periods.35   Although
important  elements  of the agency  model  are  presented  in  all  three,  none
30.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 22-23.
31.  See Wilkins, supra note  11,  at 855-56.
32.  See L. Ray Patterson,  The Function of a Code of  Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAMI  L. REV.
695,  699-700  (1981)  (arguing  that the Model  Code  implies "that  lawyers  have  only  duties
(not rights) in relation  to clients,  and that clients  have  only rights  (not  duties)  in relation  to
lawyers").  Patterson goes on to argue against this understanding. Id.
33.  MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983).
34.  See  Wilkins,  supra note  11,  at  855-56  (discussing  the  limited  duties  that  client-
principals owe to their lawyer-agents).
35.  It  is important to note  that each of these periods  is more  complex than these simple
synopses  suggest.  Specifically,  in each period particular companies and law  firms deviated
from  the  general  tendencies  I describe  in  some,  or  in  some  cases  all,  of their respective
attorney-client  relationships.  This  is  particularly  true,  as  I  note  below,  of what  I  have
characterized  as the "divorce"  period  in which even  ardent advocates  of breaking  apart the
bilateral  monopolies  that  characterized  the  earlier  period  also  recognized  the  value  of
"partnering"  with  their  most  important  outside  firms  on  their  most  important  matters.
Notwithstanding  this  important  gloss,  however,  most  knowledgeable  observers  would
concede that the overall ethos of this period was to move toward a spot-contracting model of
the attorney-client relationship  characterized by the mantra that "we hire lawyers not firms."
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conforms to the underlying assumptions upon which Lord Brougham's full-
throated defense of the lawyer-as-agent  model was based.
A.  The Marriage: The Trusted-and Unaccountable-Advisor
As  indicated  above,  corporate  lawyers  have  always  sought  to  be more
than  simply agents  to  their  powerful  clients.  Instead, Wall  Street lawyers
and  their  counterparts  in  other  cities  fashioned  a  role  for  themselves  as
trusted advisors  who would guide their clients  through the  complex web of
problems  at the intersection of law and business.  As  legal historian Robert
Gordon  explains,  although  "[n]ominally  representing  .. .corporations,
banking  houses,  or  committees  of  security  holders  in  bankruptcy
proceedings,"  this  new  breed  of  practitioners  "invented  for  themselves
liaison roles  in building  or rebuilding the  financial  structures  of American
corporations  that ensured the prosperity  of the largest New York City  law
firms and came to seem indispensable to their clients." 36
As a result, companies and their principal  law firms developed  deep  and
enduring  relationships  that  extended  to  every  aspect  of the  company's
business.  Until well into the  1960s,  it was not uncommon, for example,  for
a  single law  firm to  handle all of the legal business  for its major clients-
from slip  and fall cases to  "bet the company"  litigation (to the extent such
cases  existed  during  this  period)  and  important  acquisitions  or  other
structuring transactions. 37  Indeed, many law firms were located in the same
buildings that housed  the  offices  of their  primary client,  typically  a bank,
and  it  was  not  at  all  unusual  for these  long-standing  business  ties  to  be
cemented through personal  friendships and even marriages.
As Ronald Gilson  argues,  however, there  were  factors other than  social
ties that helped to perpetuate  this state of affairs.  In addition to the glue that
undoubtedly comes from being members  of the same small  elite circle,  the
deep  and  enduring  relationships  between  corporations  and  their  outside
counsel  were  also  reinforced  by  pervasive  information  asymmetries
between  even  the largest  company and  their outside  counsel.38  Beginning
with  the New Deal  and  accelerating  through the  "rights  revolution"  of the
1960s,  the law governing  corporate  conduct became  increasingly  complex,
subjecting  corporations  to  a  bewildering  array  of new  regulations  and
potential  liabilities.  Few businesses,  however, had any significant  internal
expertise  to  help them  decipher  and navigate  these  new  legal risks.  As  a
result, even sophisticated business executives  were  likely to defer to outside
36.  Gordon, supra note  17,  at 59 (citing 1 ROBERT T.  SWAINE,  THE CRAVATH FIRM  AND
ITS  PREDECESSORS  1819-1947, at 369-71  (1948);  HENRY W. TAFT, A CENTURY  AND A HALF
OF THE NEW YORK BAR 191-201  (1938)).
37.  See  MARC  GALANTER  &  THOMAS  PALAY,  TOURNAMENT  OF  LAWYERS:  THE
TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE  BIG  LAW  FIRM  34  (1991)  (describing  the  enduring  relationship
between  companies  and  firms during  the  "Golden  Age"  and  quoting clients  as  stating that
"outside  counsel has been with us for many, many years" or that they  "have never given any
thought to hiring another"  firm).
38.  See generally Ronald J. Gilson,  The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A  Demand
Side Perspective,  49 MD. L. REv. 869 (1990).
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counsel to assess the company's  legal risks  and to define and implement an
appropriate legal strategy.39
Given  these  information  gaps,  Gilson  concludes,  corporations
traditionally  found  it  efficient  to invest  in  long-term  relationships  with a
full-service  outside firm  that  acted  as  both  "diagnostician"  of the  client's
legal needs  and  as reliable  "referring agents"  (often to another member  of
the  same  law  firm)  to  ensure  that  the  client's  problems  were  handled
correctly.  These  long-term  relationships,  in  turn,  created  economic
disincentives  to  lawyer  switching  that  gave  lawyers  de  facto  power over
even the largest corporate  clients.40
To these  structural  aspects  of the  attorney-client  relationship  during  the
Golden  Age, Robert  Gordon adds an important normative  dimension.41'  In
addition  to  their  superior  knowledge  of  the  law  and  long-term  client
relationships  that  discouraged  switching,  lawyers  during  the Golden  Age
had the  added advantage  of the widespread belief among both lawyers and
clients  in the autonomy  of law  itself.  Notwithstanding  the  "legal  realist"
critique  raised  by  left-leaning  law  professors  in  the  1930s,  law  schools,
courts,  lawmakers,  and  popular  culture spoke  of law primarily  as  a  set of
formal rules separate and distinct from politics or even morality.
During the Golden  Age,  lawyers  used  this power in  a variety of ways.
Some of these ways  undoubtedly benefited their corporate clients and were
therefore consistent with the spirit of the agency model.  The long-standing
relationships  between  senior  partners  and  corporate  CEOs,  for  example,
undoubtedly  allowed the  former to gain in-depth  knowledge of the  latter's
business and to counsel the company in a manner consistent with its overall
strategy  and  goals.  At the same  time, precisely because they were  located
in  independent  firms,  these  trusted  advisors  were  also  able  to  give  their
clients the benefit of their experience  gained from representing other clients
with similar problems.
42
In addition,  the  stability of these  lawyer-client  relationships  also  helped
to ensure that the valuable knowledge accumulated by senior lawyers would
be  passed  on  to  the  next  generation.  Clients  were  literally  passed  down
from  senior  partners  to  their  most  promising  protg6-who  had  already
worked on the client's matters  for several  years before assuming their new
role.43  Even junior  associates  were  likely to  be  well trained, both  in the
particulars  of the  client's  work,  having  worked  on  a variety  of problems
under the close  supervision of more  senior  lawyers,  and more generally  in
the  broad  range  of legal  problems  a client  might  confront,  having  rotated
39.  Id.
40.  GALANTER  & PALAY, supra note 37, at 34-36.
41.  See generally Gordon, supra note 3.
42.  See  SMIGEL,  supra note 27,  at 343-44 (arguing  that as  the law governing  corporate
conduct  "proliferated  and  increased  in  importance"  corporate  clients  increasingly  valued
firms with the experience  to interpret the new legal order).
43.  Id.  at  107-08  (describing  how  "chosen"  associates  "are  treated  like  heirs"  and
groomed  to take over the firm's important client relationships).
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through  the  various  areas  of  the  firm's  practice  before  settling  into  a
particular specialty.
44
These  same  structural  and  attitudinal  features  of  the  lawyer-client
relationship between companies and firms during the Golden Age, however,
also  increased the ability of law  firms to  act as gatekeepers.  As  Professor
Gilson  argues,  high  switching  costs  allow  lawyers  to  "shelter[]  the  . . .
gatekeeping  function  from  the  pressure  of  client  demand. '45  Even  if a
company knew that it disagreed with the advice given by outside counsel,  it
would  still have  to  choose  to  incur both  the cost of bringing  another  law
firm up to speed and the  loss of the relationship-specific  capital of its prior
counsel if it decided to move work from one law firm to another.  Although
some  companies  were  willing  to  bear  this  expense,  many  others
undoubtedly  simply agreed to follow  their original lawyer's  advice,  even if
at  some  level  corporate  managers  would  have  preferred  to  pursue  other
options.  The fact that  even Golden Age law firms  had large enough client
portfolios  to  ensure  that  "no  one  client  provide[s]  enough  income  to
materially  or  consciously  influence  the  law  office's  legal  opinion"  also
helped  to  ensure  that  firms  were  well  positioned  to  see  themselves  as
"'represent[ing]'  the  law"  with  a  duty  to  "separate  themselves  from  the
client."
46
From  the  perspective  of the  lawyer's  role  as  an  officer  of the  court
entrusted  with  safeguarding  the administration  of justice, the fact that  law
firms in the Golden Age were well positioned to constrain arguably harmful
client  conduct by  exerting  their market  power  is a good  thing.  From the
perspective of the agency model,  however, this result  is significantly more
problematic.  If, as Lord Brougham argued,  an advocate  should know "only
one person  in the world" and pursue that client's interests  single-mindedly,
even if it risks "throwing the country into confusion," then anything short of
counseling  a  client  to  engage  in  conduct  that  is  clearly  criminal  or
fraudulent  should  be  a  required  part  of the  agent's  role.47  To  be  sure,
lawyers during the Golden Age continued to assert that there was in fact no
conflict  between  these  two  positions.  "Independent  legal  opinion,"  as
Erwin Smigel  glowingly reported,  "is  perhaps  the commodity  [law  firms]
offer,  and the  primary  commodity  for  which they  are  paid." '48  As  these
44.  Id. at 52 (describing  how law  firms regarded the "practice of law in the early  years in
the  nature  of an  internship"  and  promised to  provide  young  associates  with  both  "broad
general experience"  as well  as specific  grounding in the problems of particular clients).
45.  Gilson, supra  note 38,  at 899.
46.  SMIGEL,  supra  note 27, at 344.
47.  See generally, e.g., Pepper, supra note  29 (advocating this position).  The  constraint
that  a lawyer  may  not "counsel  ...  or assist a client,  in conduct  that the lawyer  knows  is
criminal  or  fraudulent"  comes  from  MODEL  RULES  OF  PROF'L  CONDUCT  R.  1.2(d)  (1983).
Revealingly,  Stephen  Pepper  argues  that  in  order  to  maximize  the  autonomy  of client-
principals,  lawyers  should be required  to construe  even this standard constraint  narrowly by
giving  clients  access to  the lawyer's  "legal  realist"  understanding  of the  law as  little  more
than  the price  of the sanction  discounted by  the probability of enforcement.  Pepper,  supra
note 29, at 624-28.
48.  SMIGEL, supra note 27, at 343.
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halcyon days for law firms drew to a close, however, it became increasingly
clear  that  many  corporate  clients  did  not  share  the  view  that  public
gatekeeping duties were entirely congruent  with their rights as principals to
control the scope and direction of the representation.
Moreover,  as legal  costs continued to skyrocket, many  corporate  clients
began to suspect that their "trusted  advisors"  were engaged  in violations of
their agency  duties that extended  far beyond  failing to push to (or beyond)
the  limits  of the  law.  Whether these  clients  looked at  staffing  decisions
(increasingly  large  teams  of  lawyers  being  thrown  against  every  new
problem),  wasteful  or  duplicative  effort  (associates  writing  extensive
memos  to the  file  on problems  that  might never arise  or having to  review
basic  facts  every  time  a new  lawyer joined  the team),  or  downright  price
gouging ($1  a page  for Xeroxing or first class travel at the client's expense),
companies began to feel that firms were using their market power to pad the
partners'  pockets  at their  expense.  Given these  discoveries, the  traditional
one-line bill "for services rendered" no longer seemed very appealing.
Indeed, many clients began to notice  that their once  staid law firms  were
taking on a distinctly entrepreneurial  tone.  Law firms grew rapidly in both
size  and  scope  during  the  1970s  and  1980s.  At  the  same  time,  these
institutions  shed  many  of  the  gentlemanly  norms  that  had  traditionally
governed  relations  among  these  institutions  and  began  openly  and
aggressively competing for both talent and clients.49
Clients,  in  turn,  both  reacted  to-and  helped  to  spur-these
developments  by  aggressively  seeking  ways  to  reduce  their  steadily
escalating  legal  bills.  As  with  many  necessary  but  expensive  services,  a
growing number decided that it would be cheaper to "make"  legal services
internally rather than to "buy" them on the open market.
B.  The Divorce:  "We  Hire  Lawyers Not Firms"
By  1990  when  Gilson chronicled  the  market  inefficiencies  that allowed
lawyers  during  the  Golden  Age  to act as  gatekeepers  with respect  to their
corporate  clients,  it was  already  apparent  that  the  cozy  relationships  that
facilitated  this  phenomenon  were  going  the  way  of  the  dinosaur.
Throughout the 1980s corporate clients moved aggressively  to close each  of
the three  major information  asymmetries  that rendered  them vulnerable  to
strategic  manipulation-whether  for  benign  purposes  or  otherwise-by
their outside lawyers.  The mechanism by which clients have accomplished
this  goal  is  simple.  Instead  of  relying  on  outside  firms  to  meet  their
diagnostic  and  referral  needs,  corporations  began  internalizing  these
functions  by  building  sophisticated  and  extensive  in-house  legal  staffs.50
The  result,  as  Gilson observed  in  1990,  has been  "a  dramatic reduction  in
49.  See GALANTER & PALAY, supra  note  37, at 52-59.
50.  See  Robert  Eli  Rosen,  The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional  Judgment and
Organizational  Representation, 64  IND. L.J. 479, 483-84 (1989).
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the  switching  costs  facing  clients  and  an  elimination  of lawyers'  market
power."51
If Paul Cravath has become the public exemplar of the law firm as trusted
advisor,  then  the General  Electric  Company's  (GE)  long-time  chief legal
officer  Ben  Heineman  is  the  symbol  of the  modem  general  counsel  who
helped  to  unravel  the  close  connection  between  law  firms  and  corporate
clients  that  Cravath  pioneered.52  When  Heineman  took  over  the  legal
department  at  GE  in  1989, he  moved systematically  to break  up  the  long-
standing  relationships  that  the  company  traditionally  maintained  with  its
principal law  firms.  Working with the express  blessing of GE's legendary
CEO  Jack  Welch,53 Heineman  recruited  a cadre of talented  lawyers from
prestigious  law  firms to work  in GE's  legal  department  and then  charged
them  with  seeking  out  and  eliminating  unnecessary  legal  costs  while
improving  the  quality  of  the  services  the  company  received.  By  the
conclusion  of Heineman's  tenure as General  Counsel in 2006, GE had over
1000 lawyers in its legal department--enough  to rank  it among the twenty
largest law firms in size if it had been a freestanding entity.  These lawyers,
in  turn,  substantially  altered  the  relationship  between  inside  and  outside
counsel  and  their  respective  roles  in  providing  legal  services  to  large
companies.
Specifically,  in-house counsel at GE, and the many companies that began
to emulate its policies, took over much of the work that had previously been
51.  See Gilson, supra note 38, at 903.
52.  The banner headline  over the cover story  in Corporate Counsel magazine  in which
Heineman  describes  his  role  during  this  period  captures  this  pride  of  place:  "In  the
Beginning."  See Ben W.  Heineman, Jr.,  In the Beginning, CORP.  CouNs., Apr.  2006, at  84,
84-89.  In the interest of full disclosure,  Heineman  is a Senior  Distinguished Fellow at the
Harvard  Law  School  Program  on  the  Legal  Profession.  It  is  precisely  because  of this
affiliation  that I am particularly  grateful  for his  graciousness  in response  to my decision  to
use him as the stylized exemplar of the tendency among general counsel during this period to
move  toward  a  more  spot-contracting  model  of  the  attorney-client  relationship.  As
Heineman  has  made  clear  in  our conversations  about  this  project,  GE  always believed  in
partnering  with  its outside  counsel  on  important  matters  and that  most of the  company's
relationships  with  its primary  outside firms were both  collegial  and  productive.  I have  no
doubt that this is true, as it undoubtedly  was for many other companies  and firms.  However,
as Heineman also  concedes, the locus of these  relationships  was at the  level of the "matter"
and not  the "firm"-and that the company's primary  goal was to secure  the best lawyer for
the work regardless of where that lawyer was housed, whether inside GE's legal department
or in  a  firm  that  the  company  may  or may  not  have  used  before.  It  is this  emphasis  on
finding the best "horse  for the course"  that I believe characterizes  the dominant ethos of this
period.
53.  As Heineman emphasized  in an e-mail communication to me, business leaders play a
crucial role in determining the nature and scope of a company's relationship to its lawyers-
both  inside  counsel  and  outside  firms.  "Inside  counsel  really  are  much,  much  more
concerned about their relationship  with the Business than  they are with outside counsel," he
notes.  The fact that Welch wanted lawyers  who  were intimately familiar with GE's culture
and practices provided the key motivation for growing the company's  in-house capacity.  See
E-mail from  Ben W.  Heineman, Jr. to author (Apr.  16,  2009)  (on file  with author).  I return
below  to why  business  leaders  might  also want their outside  counsel  to  have  this  kind  of
familiarity and how  this  is affecting the  creation of a new relationship  between  companies
and firms.
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sent to outside  lawyers while also taking control over the process by which
legal  work  that  continued  to  go  to  firms  was  sourced,  priced,  and
managed.54  Law firms were made to compete for work in "beauty contests"
or "bake  offs"  in which  the winners  were required  to  reduce  their normal
fees  and  to consent to  exacting  supervision  over virtually  every  aspect  of
the services to be performed.55  Not surprisingly, GE was the company that
took  this  trend  to  its  logical  limit  when  in  2003  its  subsidiary  GE
Commercial  Finance  required  firms  to  compete  in  online auctions  for the
company's legal work.56
When  competing  for this work,  a law firm's prior relationship  with the
company  was  expressly  discounted.  Instead,  general  counsel  sought  to
break up existing relationships by requiring  firms to compete for every new
piece  of  significant  business  and  choosing  the  winner  based  on  some
combination of price and perceived  expertise of the particular lawyers  who
would be working on the matter.  "We hire  lawyers, not firms" became the
rallying cry of the  day, with  long-standing relationships  with outside firms
relegated to the graveyard of history.57
This shift in emphasis between the lawyer and the firm both reflected and
helped  to  spur  the  transformation  of  many  large  law  firms  from  the
relatively sleepy professional enclaves of the Golden Age to the twenty-first
century  cut-throat  competitive  businesses  that these  institutions  have  now
become.  These changes are familiar to anyone  with even a passing interest
in the legal profession,  and I will only briefly recount them here. 58  Suffice
it to  say  that  as  competition  for  clients  intensified,  many  firms began  to
compete aggressively for lawyers  as well.  Traditional taboos against lateral
hiring  of  associates-and  eventually  partners-were  discarded  as  firms
moved to poach talented lawyers  from their competitors, lawyers who were
expected to bring their clients with them  in tow.  As more  and more firms
competed  to hire the relatively  static  number of graduates  from  elite  law
schools,  while  trying  to  lure  away  "star"  associates,  partners,  and  even
whole  practice  groups  from  competitors,  compensation  levels  soared,
54.  See  generally Mary  C.  Daly,  The  Cultural, Ethical, and Legal  Challenges  in
Lawyering for a Global Organization:  The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY  L.J.
1057 (1997).
55.  See,  e.g.,  ROBERT  L.  NELSON,  PARTNERS  WITH  POWER:  THE  SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE  LARGE  LAW  FIRM  57-59  (1988);  Abram  Chayes  & Antonia  H.
Chayes, Corporate  Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277, 278 (1985).
56.  See Anthony Lin, Like Any  Vendor, Law Firms  Are Asked  To Compete for Business
on the Web, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2003,  at  1.
57.  See,  e.g., Daniel J. DiLucchio,  'We  Hire the Lawyer, Not the Law Firm  '-Really?,
LEGAL  INTELLIGENCER,  Jan.  29,  2009,  http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=
1202427822427&slretum=l&hbxlogin=l  (noting  that  "[t]his  statement  has  been  used  for
years, and will probably  continue to be used"  since "[t]his  is  what the general  counsel want
you  to  believe").  As  DiLucchio's  use  of "Really?"  at the  end  of his  title  implies,  he  is
skeptical  about  whether this  oft-repeated  claim  is  in  fact  true.  I return  to  his skepticism
below.
58.  For a catalogue of these familiar changes  during  the period between  1975  and 1995,
see  JOHN  P.  HEINZ  ET  AL.,  URBAN  LAWYERS:  THE  NEW  SOCIAL  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BAR
(2005).
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especially  for  "rainmaking"  partners  believed  to  control  important  client
relationships.  Firms that either did not or could not compete risked losing
lawyers and clients and, as the century  drew to a close, their very existence.
Collectively,  these  changes  have  substantially  altered  the  value
proposition  that  law  firms  made  to  their  corporate  clients.  Rather  than
being  "wise  counselors"  capable  of guiding  clients  through  the  complex
intersection  of  business  strategy  and  legal  rules,  outside  lawyers
increasingly  marketed  (and  I  use  the  word  advisedly)  themselves  as
specialists capable of deploying large numbers of highly skilled experts at a
moment's notice to handle the kind of emergencies that remain difficult for
in-house  lawyers  to handle effectively. 59  The  value proposition  offered to
associates  and partners  considering joining  firms  shifted  as well.  Rather
than  traditional  incentives  such  as  hands-on  training,  a reasonable  (albeit
never  certain)  chance  for  partnership,  and  collegiality,  firms  relied  on
money'and  prestige  to  entice  law  students  and  lawyers  to  join  their
organizations  and to compete to win the tournament of lawyers.60
Finally,  in  addition  to  breaking  up  the  bilateral  monopolies  between
companies and firms,  general counsel  sought to bifurcate  the two  parts  of
the lawyer's  role  as  well.  On  the  one  hand,  corporate  counsel  sought to
justify their importance  to  their clients  on the ground that  in  their role  as
sophisticated  diagnosticians  and purchasing  agents,  in-house  lawyers were
able  to  ensure  that  the  conduct  of  outside  counsel  in  fact  closely
approximated the agency model's ideal of a perfect congruence between the
principal's  interests and  the agent's actions.  In a competitive market  filled
with sophisticated  repeat  players,  the  argument  went,  outside  firms  have
little incentive to fail to seek their client's objectives.  Although these firms
undoubtedly  would  prefer  to  extract  the  highest  possible  price  in return,
these  same  market  conditions  suggest  that  in the  vast majority  of cases,
firms  that  significantly  overcharge  their clients  Will not be able to  escape
detection for very long.6t
On  the  other  hand,  general  counsel  argued  that  they  were  now  better
situated  than  outside  counsel  to  play  the  wise-counselor  and  gatekeeping
roles  that  law  firms,  because  of the  episodic  and  distant  nature  of their
dealings  with companies,  were  no longer  in  a position  to play.  Far from
signaling their lack of independence  (as law  firm partners had traditionally
claimed),62 general  counsel  argued that their location  inside  the  corporate
59.  See KRONMAN, supra note 25, at 271-314.
60.  For  an extended  discussion  of the  changing  incentives  for  associates and  partners
during this period, see David B.  Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament  of
Lawyers:  Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal  Labor  Markets of  Elite
Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV.  1581 (1998).
61.  See Wilkins, supra note 22,  at 824-25.
62.  Rosen,  supra note  50,  at  479  (noting  corporate  counsel  were  once  referred  to  as
"house counsel,"  "tame,"  and "kept lawyers"); see also Chayes  & Chayes,  supra  note  55,  at
277  (noting  that  in-house  counsel  was  typically  a  "relatively  minor  management  figure,
stereotypically  a lawyer from the corporation's principal outside law firm who had not quite
made the grade as partner").
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hierarchy  enabled  them  both  to  understand  the  client's  business  and  to
engage  in  risk  assessment  and  preventative  counseling  more  effectively
than lawyers in outside  firms.  General counsel  were therefore the  lawyers
who  should  be  entrusted  with the  role  of being  both  a  "partner"  to  the
business  in achieving  its  objectives  and  the  "guardian"  of the  company's
long-term reputation and values. 63
By  the  turn  of the  new  century,  this  "inside  counsel  movement,"  as
Robert Rosen has accurately  labeled the push for authority and professional
recognition  by general  counsel,  appeared  to have carried the day.  General
counsel  in  the  model  of  Ben  Heineman-indeed  many  were  literally
Heineman's  proteges-occupied  important  positions  in  virtually  every
major company  in the United States,  and a growing  number  outside of the
United  States  as  well.64  Outside  counsel  typically  report  to  the  general
counsel and are dependent upon these inside lawyers for crucial  information
about the client's goals.  Indeed, it is fair to say that the general counsel has
become the client  of the outside  law firm-leaving the top business people
to  be  represented  by  in-house  lawyers. 65  As  a  result,  even  critics  who
believe that outside  firms can no longer act as "lawyer-statesmen"  hold out
hope  that in-house  counsel  will  in fact  fulfill the "guardian"  role  that law
firms have largely vacated.66
But  a  funny  thing  happened  on  the  way  to  the  coronation.
Notwithstanding  a significant investment in building up in-house capacities,
many  companies  discovered  that  their  outside  spending  on  law  firms
continued  to escalate  throughout the  1990s  and into the  first decade  of the
twenty-first  century.67  Nor  were  all  of the  resources  being  devoted  to
monitoring  and controlling  law firms resulting  in increased levels of client
satisfaction.68  Finally,  in the wake  of the Enron-related  scandals  in 2001,
companies found themselves facing a new and more challenging regulatory
environment  in  which  enforcement  officials  were  increasingly  skeptical
about  the  ability  of corporate  officers  to detect  and  deter misconduct  by
their peers.
63.  Not surprisingly, Ben Heineman has been the most vocal  and articulate spokesperson
for this view. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr.,  Caught  in the Middle, CORP. CouNs., Apr. 2007, at
84,  84-89 (arguing that general counsel must be both "partners"  and "guardians").
64.  See Deborah  A. DeMott,  The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74  FORDHAM  L.
REv. 955,  960-61 (2005).
65.  See NELSON, supra note 55,  at 58.
66.  See KRONMAN,  supra note 25, at 283-84 (speculating  that in-house  lawyers may  be
able  to carry  on  the  lawyer-statesman  ideal  that outside  counsel  are no  longer  capable  of
performing).
67.  See Gina  Passarella, Corporate  Law Departments Hiring  More and Spending More,
LEGAL  INTELLIGENCER,  Sept.  27,  2006,  http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id =
1159261524562  (reporting  a  survey  by  the  consulting  firm  Altman  &  Weil  finding  an
average  growth  in  outside  legal  expenses  of  5.5%  among  responding  companies
notwithstanding a  19%  increase in hiring in-house  lawyers).
68.  Janet  L.  Conley,  GCs  'Can't Get No Satisfaction'from Outside Counsel, GC  S.,
Mar.  2006,  http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005449198  (reporting  a  senior
consultant from BTI as stating that "[slatisfaction with outside law firms  is 'particularly  low'
right now").
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As  a  result,  a  growing  number  of  companies  have  begun  to  rethink
whether  a spot-contracting model that simultaneously ruthlessly applies the
agency  model  to outside  firms  while  leaving  all  gatekeeping  duties to  in-
house counsel is the most effective way to meet their legal needs.  Although
it  is  too  early  to say  whether  the  movement  to  reevaluate  the  Heineman
bargain will result  in  as radical  a restructuring  of the relationship  between
companies  and law  firms as the one Heineman himself helped to introduce,
there  is  enough  evidence  that  an  important  change  is  underway  to  begin
asking the question what such a new relationship  might look like.
C.  A New Partnership?
Five  interlocking trends appear to be  reshaping the relationship  between
corporate  clients  and their  outside firms:  "convergence"  in the number  of
law  firms  a  company  is  likely  to  hire  (at  least  for  important  work);
"consolidation"  in the market for law  firms capable of handling  these kinds
of assignments;  "integration"  of personnel, systems,  and functions between
clients  and firms;  "corporate  redesign"  to replace top-down  hierarchy  with
teams comprised of both inside and outside  consultants;  and a new kind of
inside counsel "movement" that is reshuffling the ranks of corporate general
counsel.  Collectively,  these  trends  signal  an  important  shift  from  spot
contracting to a new partnership between clients and firms.
1. Convergence
Beginning in the mid-1990s,  a growing number of companies have begun
to  dramatically  reduce  the  number  of outside firms  to  whom  they  give  a
significant  percentage  of their  work.  DuPont  Chemical  Corporation  was
among the first to move in this direction.
Like most  large  companies,  DuPont spent  most of the  1970s  and  1980s
diversifying  its outside  counsel while  steadily beefing up its in-house  legal
department.  But beginning  in the  1990s,  the company  moved dramatically
in the opposite direction.  In just two years, DuPont reduced the number of
U.S. law firms to whom it gave significant business from 350 to 35.69  Two
of  the  company's  in-house  lawyers  explained  the  reasons  behind  the
company's change of heart in an article detailing a similar move in 2001  to
reduce the number of firms that DuPont used for patent and trademark work
internationally.  Like most  in-house  lawyers raised on the  spot-contracting
model, the  lawyers  concede  that they initially  "subscribed  to  the common
wisdom ...  that competition  between firms  in the same country worked to
our advantage in terms of fees and service."'70  As a result, by the late  1990s
the  company  had  more  than  300  outside  firms  handling  its  international
patent  and  trademark  work,  in  addition  to  sixty  in-house  lawyers  and
paralegals  whose  job  it  was  to  monitor  their  performance.  But  after
69.  See John Gibeaut,  The Outside Looking In, 90 A.B.A. J. 46, 49 (2004).
70.  John  E. Dull & David J.  Gould, DuPont's  Legal Experiment, IP WORLDWIDE,  Nov.
25,  2002, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id-900005533284.
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engaging  an outside  consultant,  the lawyers  realized that  this arrangement
ended up raising, rather than reducing,  the  company's  legal  costs.  As  the
lawyers explained,
[S]preading  patent  and trademark  work  among a  large  number  of firms
limited rather than Strengthened  our bargaining power.  Firms receiving a
relatively  small  amount  of work,  even  from  a  perceived  "prestigious"
client,  were  not  inclined  to  offer  discounts  or  give  close  management
attention  to the work....  Dealing  with  nearly  300  firms  [also]  made  it
difficult  for  the  DuPont  clerical  staff  to  establish  efficient  internal
procedures.  -Our bill paying practices were inconsistent and jeopardizing
relationships.
71
Worse  yet, the  lawyers  came  to believe  that  it  also  reduced  the  quality  of
the  legal  services the  company received.  "[W]e  learned  that the firms  had
little  incentive  to  cooperate  with  one  another  on  our  behalf by  sharing
information and collaborating,"  the lawyers  complained. 72  "We needed to
develop closer working relationships with all firms, not just the key ones,  to
ensure a good understanding of our business and IP strategies."73
To move beyond these difficulties, the international  group implemented a
"convergence"  program  that  was  even  more  radical  than  the  one  that
DuPont had gone through with respect to its U.S. firms.  In less than a year,
the company reduced the number of firms handling its international  work in
this area  from 300 to  48, with 28 of these handling  more  than 95%  of the
company's international  patent and trademark work.74
During the  last decade,  a growing number of companies  have  followed
the  DuPont  model. 75   In  a  survey  of  corporate  general  counsel  my
colleagues  and  I  conducted  at  Harvard  Law  School,76  for example,  as  of
71.  Id..
72.  Id.
73.  Id.
74.  Id.
75.  See Libby  Sander, In-House and Outside Counsel:  Building a Solid Relationship,
CHI.  LAW.,  Mar.  2006,  at  29  (citing  several  examples  of convergence,  including  Allstate
reducing  its  outside firms from  300-400 to  13  firms that would  handle 80%  to 90% of the
company's  work).  Even  those  skeptical  of the  value  of convergence  concede  that  it  is a
growing trend among  companies.  See Rees  W. Morrison, Put Eggs in One Basket?, LEGAL
TIMES (Wash.,  D.C.), Mar. 20, 2006, at 42 (acknowledging that "[flor  law departments  in the
past  decade,  convergence-that  is, consolidating  the number of outside firms used  in order
to  save  money-has been  all  the  rage").  I  will  return  to  some  of Morrison's  criticisms
below,  but  it  is  worth  noting that  even  he  advises  a  company  to  "concentrate"  .its  legal
spending by  "lavish[ing]  80 percent  of its outside-counsel  budget on  10 percent  of its  law
firms").  Id.  For  present  purposes,  the  difference  between  "concentration"  and
"convergence"  is largely  semantic with respect to the firms getting the 80%.
76.  In  2006,  a  group  of scholars  affiliated  with  the  Harvard  Law  School  Center  on
Lawyers  and  the  Professional  Services  Industry  conducted  a  study of how  large,  publicly
traded companies  purchase  legal  services.  Our  data  includes  (1)  detailed  interviews  with
forty-three  general  counsel of Standard  & Poor's  (S&P) 500  corporations  and  (2)  a survey
sent  to  CLOs  of all  S&P  500  companies  as  of December  31,  2006,  which elicited  a  28%
response  rate  (n=139),  for  a  total  sample  (interview  and  survey)  of  166  companies,
representing  a third of the  entire  S&P 500.  The survey  respondents'  companies  accounted
for  between  30%  to  40%  of the  S&P  500's  revenues,  assets,  and  employees.  After
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2003,  80%  of the companies  in our sample  reported that they gave 80%  of
their important  legal  work  to  twenty-five  or fewer law  firms,  with  almost
40%  of  companies  distributing  this  share  of  the  company's  important
matters  to  ten  firms  or  fewer.77  Although  this  trend  remains  unevenly
distributed  across  firms,  and  there  may  even  be  some  evidence  that the
overall  trend  toward  convergence  is  slowing,78  many  of  the  largest
companies  (and  therefore  the  most  prized  clients  for  firms)  continue  to
move  in  this  direction.  Thus  in  2005,  the  pharmaceutical  giant  Pfizer
invited  120  law  firms  to  compete  for one of twenty coveted  spots on the
company's new preferred providers list.79  Less than four years later, Pfizer
further slashed the number of law firms on the list to four.80
Moreover, the reasons companies  give for moving toward this model also
parallel  the  DuPont  experience.  Not  surprisingly,  cost  is  a  significant
factor.  By  concentrating  their legal  work  in  a smaller  number  of firms,
companies hope to leverage  their status as  a "trophy client"  to exact deeper
discounts and package rates.  Moreover,  as another  general counsel  in our
sample  emphasized, for many companies "predictability  is more important
than  the  magnitude  of  the  fee."81   General  counsel,  like  every  other
corporate  manager,  have  to ensure  that their  department's  spending  stays
within budgetary limits.  By facilitating "bundling" of cases and fixed fees,
many GCs believe that convergence  makes it easier to achieve this goal.82
The  trend  toward  convergence,  however,  extends  beyond  the  kind  of
commodity  work  where  price  is  likely  to  be  the  sole-or  even  the
predominate-criterion  for  selecting  counsel.83   Instead,  companies  that
comparing  both  interview  and  survey  respondents  and  nonrespondents  on  a  variety  of
metrics,  we  determined that  in  most  respects  the  two  subsamples  were  similar,  although
respondents  tended  to  be  larger  and  have  higher  demand  for  legal  services  than  did
nonrespondents.  For  a  complete  description  of the  study  and  a  summary  of  its  major
findings,  see Michele  DeStefano  Beardslee,  John C. Coates,  IV,  Ashish Nanda & David B.
Wilkins, Hiring Teams  from Rivals:  Theory and Evidence  on the Evolving Relationship  in
the Corporate Legal Market (June 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
77.  Id. at 21-22.
78.  Although  40%  of the  firms  in  our  sample  decreased  the  number  of law  firms
accounting  for  80%  of the  companies'  total  legal  spending  between  2003  and  2006, just
under  30%  increased  the  number  of  firms  in  this  category.  The  remaining  30%  of
respondents  remained  essentially  unchanged.  See  id.  I  return  to  the  reasons  why  many
companies may resist further converging their outside counsel relationships  below.
79.  Eriq Gardner,  Pfizer Litigators Endure Beast of a Beauty Contest, CoRP.  CoUNs.,
Oct. 31,  2005,  http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id=900005440167.
80.  Gina  Passarella,  What's To  Become  of Wyeth  Counsel After  Pfizer Deal, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 28, 2009, at 1 (reporting Pfizer consolidation).
81.  Confidential  Interview with General  Counsel (Apr.  1, 2008).  Of course, companies
care about the overall size of the fee as well. As  another GC  dryly noted, he had no interest
in  "buying  every  new  partner  at  the  firm  a  Jaguar."  Confidential  Interview  with  No.  7,
General Counsel, Investment Bank (Nov. 2, 2006).
82.  Passarella, supra  note  80 (describing how Pfizer has begun giving all of its work in a
given area to a single firm in return for a fixed fee).
83.  Indeed,  in  our  survey  we  specifically  asked  general  counsel  to  discuss  how  they
assigned  "important"  legal  work  where  price  was  not  the  overarching  determination.
Nevertheless, convergence remained an important theme.
2010] 2087FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
have slashed the number of firms who do the bulk of their outside work are
giving these preferred providers  access to "premium" work as well.  Indeed,
GCs recognize that this is one of the major incentives for high quality firms
to  enter  into  these  kinds  of  relationships.  As  a  result,  in  return  for
discounted fees and some  low-margin  work,  companies  promise  firms that
they  will  also  have  preferential  access  to  the  company's  more  lucrative
business.
84
With respect  to  this higher-value  work,  cost  is no  longer  the  dominant
factor.  Instead,  general  counsels  are  looking  for  firms  that will  provide
high quality  service.  But companies  mean  something different by "quality
service"  than  most  commentators-and  most  outside  lawyers-typically
think.  A recent  survey by BTI Consulting Group drives the point home.85
When asked  what  they  value  most  in  an  outside  firm,  the  overwhelming
plurality of general  counsel responded "client focus."  Not surprisingly, BTI
found  that  this  is  what  virtually  every  law  firm  believes  that  they  are
providing.86  But when  the consultants  asked  clients  and  law  firms  what
they  meant  by  "client  focus,"  they  received  very  different  answers.
Twenty-one  percent  of GCs, again  the overwhelming  plurality,  responded
that "client focus" means "understanding  our business." 87  Only  10%  of law
firm respondents  suggested  a similar understanding.  Instead,  21%  of law
firm  respondents  defined  "client  focus"  as  "doing  what's  best  for  the
client."  Only 3% of GCs offered this interpretation. 88  Although it may not
quite be fair to  say that clients are from Mars  and lawyers  from Venus, our
interviews  confirm  that  GCs  put a high premium  on finding lawyers  who
"understand  their  business." 89   An  increasing  number  are  attempting  to
ensure that their lawyers meet this goal through convergence.
Given  all  of these  factors,  it  is  not  surprising  that  convergence  has
become the buzzword for GCs in the United States, and increasingly abroad
as  well.90  Indeed,  as  the  DuPont  example  suggests,  the  trend  toward
84.  As  we  will  see,  in  most  cases  "preferential  access"  does  not  mean  a  guarantee,
particularly  for  "bet the company"  cases  or transactions  as  to which the  company  reserves
the right to seek out the "best" firm.
85.  Conley, supra note 68 (discussing survey).
86.  Id.; see also Robert  Eli  Rosen,  "We're All  Consultants Now":  How  Change in
Client Organizational  Strategies  Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate  Legal
Services, 44 Apiz.  L. REv. 637,  671-72 (2002)  (quoting  a variety of law firm websites  with
slogans that promise to put "Clients First").
87.  Conley,  supra note  68.  Although  this  is  obviously  still  only  a  minority  of
respondents,  as BTI suggests many  of the other answers  commonly  provided by GCs-e.g.,
responsiveness,  following  directions,  even  developing  an  early  strategy  for  resolving
disputes--can  fairly  be  viewed  as  connected  to the  client's overall  desire  to have  lawyers
who  understand how legal issues and disputes  fit into the client's overall business strategy.
88.  Id.
89.  As one  typical respondent put it, "they must understand  our business  and be able to
work well with our business people.  I generally select people that the business people trust.
We  might try different  firms on different  projects and the one that becomes  the most trusted
advisor  is the  one  that I  will use on  an  ongoing basis."  Confidential  Interview  with No. 2,
General  Counsel, Investment Bank (Oct. 4, 2008).
90.  See Rosen, supra note 86, at 665-66.
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convergence  has  been  even  more  pronounced  in  Europe.  In  perhaps  the
most  dramatic  case,  Tyco  International  recently  reduced  the  number  of
outside firms it uses in the U.K.,  Europe, and the Middle  East from 250 to
1-the  U.K.-based  firm Eversheds. 91  I will  return  to Tyco's  experience
below.  But  although  Tyco  may  be  the  most  extreme  example,  other
European  companies  are  following  suit.  The  Linde  Group,  for  example,
recently chose  DLA Piper  to handle all of its European  work,  with the rest
going to  four other  firms.  Similarly,  Honeywell  has  selected the  UK  firm
Lovells  in  much  the  same  manner,  while  Brady  Corporation  chose
Eversheds.92  Even  GE  is  moving to  reduce  substantially  the  200  firms it
currently uses in Europe.93
A quick look at the law firms that have been selected to play the lead role
in  these  new  arrangements  underscores  a  second  trend that has  helped  to
reshape  the  relationship  between  companies  and  outside  firms  during  the
last decade.  Eversheds,  DLA Piper, and  Lovells  are all international  firms
that have  expanded rapidly  since the  1990s and  can credibly  claim to have
something  approaching  a  global  footprint  (so  long  as  one  excludes  the
United  States  from  the  map).  Although  the  U.K.  firms  have  been  the
leaders  in international  expansion,  and indeed  now rank  among  the largest
firms  in the world-both Eversheds and DLA each have over 2000 lawyers
world-wide,  with  Magic  Circle  firms  like  Linklaters,  Freshfields,  and
Clifford  Chance  topping  the  scales  at  close  to  4000-their  U.S.  cousins
have  not been far behind, and of course  are  far ahead  with respect to their
coverage  in  the  United  States.  Collectively  this  wave  of  consolidation
among  the  world's  top  law  firms  has  in  turn  facilitated  a  new
rapprochement between companies and firms.
2.  Consolidation
By  any  measure  "[d]uring  the  last  three  decades,  large  law  firms  have
mushroomed in size and geographic  dispersion."94  In the  1960s, there were
only twenty law firms in New York City with more than fifty lawyers,  with
the largest, Shearman & Sterling, consisting  of 125  lawyers.95  By the turn
of the twentieth  century,  there were  more than  250  U.S. firms  larger  than
Shearman's  old size, with  more than ten  firms of over  1000  lawyers.  The
growth  since 2000 has  been even  more torrid-until,  of course, the  fourth
quarter of 2008.  In 2006,  the median size of the nation's 250 largest firms
had ballooned to over  500,  with more than twenty firms topping the scales
91.  See Richard  Lloyd, Firm Commitment:  How Tyco and Other Major Corporations
Are Redefining the Client-Law Firm Relationship in Europe, Focus EUR.,  Summer 2008, at
28, 28-32.
92.  Id. at 32.
93. Id.
94.  Marc  Galanter  &  William  Henderson,  The  Elastic  Tournament:  A  Second
Transformation of  the Big Law Firm, 60  STAN.  L. REv.  1867,  1882 (2008).
95.  SMIGEL, supra note 27, at 34  n.9.
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at  over  1000-and  four  breaking  the  2000-lawyer  barrier.96   By  some
estimates,  almost  10,000  lawyers-nearly  one  quarter  of all  law  school
graduates-were  expected to begin their careers in a large law firm in 2006.
Along with getting bigger, firms have  also been expanding in geographic
scope.  Since 2000, for example,  the 250 largest U.S.-based law  firms have
more  than  doubled  the  number  of lawyers  in  Europe  and  increased  their
headcount  in  Asia  by more  than  sixty  percent.97  U.K.-based  firms  have
been growing at an even faster pace.98  Moreover, much of this growth has
been  accomplished  through  merger  and  acquisition.  Until  recently,  law
firm  mergers  were  virtually unheard  of.  Between  2000 and 2008,  merger
activity  among  law  firms  increased  in  virtually  every  succeeding  year,
including  megacombinations  such  as  Washington  D.C.'s  Wilmer  Cutler
with Boston's Hale  and Dorr to  form WilmerHale  and New York's Dewey
Ballentine  and  its longtime  rival  LeBouef Lamb  Green  & Macrae  to form
Dewey LeBouef.99
The result  is that  large  global  companies  increasingly  interact  with  law
firms that  are  themselves  large  and  globalized.  Nor  is this  a coincidence.
When  asked  to explain  why  their  firms  have grown  so  rapidly  in  recent
years, firm leaders most often answer that they are simply responding to the
demands  of their clients. 1 00  Needless to say, the lack of agency implied by
this characterization overlooks  the firms'  own interest in pursuing a growth
strategy.  There  is plenty  of evidence  that  firms  are  growing  to  increase
their  profits  by  acquiring  new  clients,  and  indeed  whole  new  areas  of
practice.  Nevertheless,  even firms that are ruthlessly focused on increasing
profits have come to see  the importance of strengthening their relationships
with  their  most  important  clients. 101  As  a  result,  "premium  work  for
premium  clients"  has  become  as  much  of a  buzzphrase  for  law  firms  as
finding lawyers who "understand our business" has become for clients.
The U.K.  firm Linklaters  is a case in point. 0 2  As  my colleague  Ashish
Nanda  documents,  after  a period  of unprecedented  growth  between  2001
and 2004, in which the firm opened several new offices  and completed five
international  mergers,  Linklaters  found that  it was  falling  behind  its  U.S.
counterparts  in  profitability.  The  firm's  chairman  Tony  Angel  responded
96.  The NLJ 250, NAT'LL.J.,  Nov.  13, 2006, at S3.
97.  Lindsay Fortado, Steady Global Gains, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 23, 2006, at  1.
98.  See The Global 100, AM.  LAW.,  Oct. 2007, at Si.
99.  See June D. Bell & Aric Press, Law Firm Leaders Have Mergers on the Mind, LAW
FIRM  INC.,  Feb. 12,  2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1  170928976695  (discussing
the "merger momentum"  in large law firms).
100.  See Galanter & Henderson, supra note  94,  at  1882  (citing  increased demand  as  the
reason why law firms have  grown so dramatically over the last three decades).
101.  See, e.g.,  David Temporal, Beyond Client Care, AM.  LAW.,  July 2001,  at 65  (noting
that  "[a]t  many  firms,  it  is  typical  to  see  the  top  50  clients  generate  between  45  and  60
percent of the firm's income").
102.  The  following  description  is taken primarily from Ashish Nanda & Lauren Prusiner,
Linklaters (A):  Seeking Clear  Blue Water I (Harvard Law Sch. Ctr. on Lawyers & the Prof I
Sews.  Indus.,  Case Study No.  08-01,  2007).  Some of the information discussed  is from the
(B)  and (C) cases  that are not yet publicly available.
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by  instituting  a  dramatic  plan  to  increase  the  firm's profitability  and  to
place "clear blue water" between it and its competitors.  At the core of this
plan was a mandate to concentrate the firm's resources on serving its largest
and  most  important  clients.  In  an  internal  study, the  firm's management
had determined these  clients accounted  for a  disproportionately  large  share
of the firm's profits and that when  all costs  were fully factored in, the  firm
actually lost money on many of its smaller client relationships.10 3
The  firm  therefore  instituted  a  rigorous-and  in  the  eyes  of  many,
draconian-policy  to "prune"  its  client  list.  Lawyers,  and  indeed  whole
offices, serving smaller, more local clients were expressly told to drop these
matters and to refocus their efforts on providing  support for the firm's large
global clients.  Lawyers, and indeed whole offices, which were unable to do
so were  politely, but  firmly, asked to  leave  the firm. 104  The  result  was a
dramatic increase in the firm's profitability.  Although Linklaters's policy is
undoubtedly  more  drastic than  most,  in the  last two  years  its  strategy has
been  copied  to  a greater  or  lesser  extent  by  virtually  all  of the  top  U.K.
firms and by many U.S.  counterparts  as well.  Nor is this trend confined to
firms  like Linklaters that have  global  ambitions  and  seek only  to compete
for work at the top  of the corporate  food  chain.  As  companies shrink the
number of outside firms that they use and package even the legal work that
they  put  out  for  competitive  bid  in  ever-larger  bundles,  there  are  fewer
opportunities  for  firms  to  win  new  clients.10 5  At  the  same  time,  the
pressure  by even long-standing clients to  cut fees has  led many firms  to try
to increase revenues  by expanding the volume of work that they do for each
client.  Finally, the  expanded size  and geographic  scope of most law  firms
has generated a relentless  pressure in these institutions for partners to cross-
sell  the  firm's  services.  The  net  result  of all of these trends  has  been a
growing  awareness  among  firms  that  the  best  way  to  ensure  their
profitability  is  to  leverage  their  relationships  with  their  existing  clients.
This, in turn, has put pressure  on firms to find ways to improve the level of
service that they give to these increasingly important clients.
3. Integration
As companies and firms  have moved closer together, the boundaries that
have  traditionally  separated  lawyer  and  client  have  grown  increasingly
permeable.  Not  surprisingly,  companies  like  DuPont  have  been  at  the
forefront  of this  trend.  In  return  for  getting  on  the  company's  list  of
"preferred  providers,"  the  law  firms  that work for DuPont are required  to
103.  Michael  D. Goldhaber,  Touched by  an Angel,  AM.  LAW.,  Oct.  2007,  at  116,  118
(reporting  that  the  firm's  forty  biggest  clients  and  another  forty  preferred  global  clients
account  for fifty-two percent of the firm's billing).
104.  Id. at  118-19  (reporting  that "partners  who do not serve the  lucrative  cross-border
needs of priority clients  are superfluous"  and  documenting  that "125  partners left or retired
in the last four years").
105.  This also helps to explain why firms have increasingly sought to acquire new clients
by buying lawyers (and sometimes  firms) with large books of business.
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adopt common practices  and systems that allow the company to both easily
gain access to  its files and billing information and to create  virtual teams of
lawyers  across the network to work on the company's  matters.  To reinforce
these common practices,  the company meets regularly with various partners
from the  firms  on its  list to educate  them about DuPont's  issues and goals
and  to reinforce  the  need  to  work  collaboratively  to  solve  the company's
problems. 1 0 6
Many  law  firms  have  been  taking  similar  actions  to  restructure  their
practices  to  ensure better service to  their best clients.  Thus,  in addition to
being  organized  by  practice  specialty  and  geography,  many  firms  have
adopted  dedicated  "client  teams"  to  service  their  most  important  client
relationships. 107  In  addition  to providing  interdisciplinary  support,  these
teams  often take various  measures  to integrate themselves  into the  client's
business,  such as  bringing  in  businesspeople  from  the  client  to  teach  the
lawyers  about  the  company's  practices  and  competitive  position,  and
sending  lawyers  to  train  their  in-house  counterparts  and  business  leaders
about legal issues of particular relevance to the company. 1 08
Indeed, many  firms  are going  beyond  seminars  and  periodic  training  to
place  associates  (and  sometimes  even  partners)  to  work  full-time  in  the
legal  departments  of their  best  clients  for limited periods  of time.  These
"secondments"  have  been  popular  in  the  U.K.  for  some  time.1 09  Since
2000, however,  the practice has gained considerable  traction  in the  United
States as well."I0  Reverse transfers that allow in-house lawyers to spend six
months  or  a year working  in  the  office  of the  company's most  important
law firm  have  also begun to sprout  up.  And some  clients  and firms have
taken to jointly interviewing  law students that the firm intends to  hire as a
way of both getting the client's buy-in and as a means of signaling to new
recruits  the  importance  of  getting  to  know  the  client's  personnel  and
106.  Dull & Gould, supra note 70.
107.  See Rosen, supra note  86,  at  672  (noting  that consultants  now advise  law  firms  to
organize  themselves  "around  industries  rather  than  practice areas");  Peter  D. Zeughauser,
Optimal Organization,  AM.  LAW.,  Mar. 2001,  at 63  (noting the growth in "client  relationship
partners" in "forward looking" law firms).
108.  See  Rosen, supra note  86,  at  676  (noting  that  "[I]aw  firms  also  sell  added  value
through  improved  corporate  processes  by  selling  training");  see  also  Ross  DAWSON,
DEVELOPING  KNOWLEDGE-BASED  CLIENT  RELATIONSHIPS:  THE  FUTURE  OF  PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES  53 (2000) ("It is increasingly  common for corporate counsel to specifically request
knowledge transfer from their legal firms.").
109.  The  practice  began  in the  U.K.  as  a  way  for  U.K.  and  European  companies  with
relatively  small  general  counsel  offices  to  expand  their internal  legal  capabilities  without
having  to  invest  the  resources  in  hiring  lawyers  full  time.  As  the  process  became
institutionalized,  however, both companies and firms recognized  that it was also a good way
to build institutional  knowledge and trust.
110.  See Gina Passarella, Loaning Out Lawyers To Get a Bigger Piece of the Corporate
Pie, LEGAL  INTELLIGENCER,  Oct.  26,  2006,  http://www.law.con/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?
id=11617671191737  (describing  the  use  of secondment  programs  by  U.S.  law  firms  to
deepen their relationship with their best clients in an effort to increase business).
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business."'  Nor  is such collaboration  confined  to  the associate  level.  In
one of our interviews,  for example, the general counsel of a large brokerage
company  bragged  that  he  had  arranged  for  a  partner  who  had  done
important  work  for  the  company,  but  whose  firm  did  not,  to  move  to
another firm with which the company did substantial business. 112  Although
our  interviews  suggest  that  this  kind  of  aggressive  matchmaking  is
relatively  rare,  it  nevertheless  underscores  the  degree  to  which  the
boundaries  that  have  traditionally  separated  companies  and  firms  are
becoming increasingly porous.  As Robert Rosen explains,
Outside  counsel are  quick to  embrace outsourcing and porous borders
because these  organizational  strategies  can lead to more relational  work,
rather  than  one-shot transactions ....  This  allows  for  a "rich  two-way
knowledge  transfer  and  relationship  development  [as  the proponents  of
outsourcing  argue]  ...and  [the  client]  becomes  far  more  inclined  to
choose that law firm over others it knows less well."1 13
As  Rosen  goes  on to  explain,  this  trend  has been  facilitated  by  a  set  of
connected  trends in corporate  America that  encourage  companies to  invite
outside  "consultants"  inside  the  organization  to  be  a  part  of  corporate
decision making.
4.  The Boundaryless Organization
Rosen  argues  that  companies  have  implemented  four  interconnected
practices  that  have  fundamentally  changed  the  way  that  these  entities
contract  for,  and  utilize  the  services  of,  outside  professionals  such  as
lawyers:  downsizing,  outsourcing,  self-managing  teams,  and  porous
borders. 114  Throughout the  1990s,  companies shed workers in  an effort to
"reduce[]  bloated  bureaucracies"  by  eliminating  middle  managers  and
headquarters  staff.115  In place of these top-down  controls,  companies have
created "self-managing project teams" that are given wide discretion both to
define their own goals and  assemble expertise  from both inside and outside
the company to achieve their objectives. 116  The result, Rosen argues,  is that
companies  have  "shift[ed]  away  from  a  'transmission  belt'  delegation  of
powers  from  principal  to  agent  towards  one  that  emphasizes  'network
coordination"'  among  various  constituencies,  subject  to  an  overall
assessment of risks and rewards."
17
At the  same time, many  companies have also turned to outsourcing  what
were  once considered core organizational functions.  In addition to reducing
111.  Sheri Qualters,  Citigroup  Lawyers Toil at Law Firms, NAT'L L.J.,  Oct. 9,  2006, at 8
(describing a joint hiring program between Citigroup and three of its primary law firms).
112.  Confidential  Interview, General Counsel, Brokerage Company.
113.  Rosen, supra note 86,  at 670 (quoting  DAWSON, supra note 108, at  162).
114.  Id. at  641.  Rosen also argues  that these changes have  transformed  in-house  counsel
offices as well.  I return to these observations  below.
115.  Id.
116.  Id. at 643-47.
117.  Id. at 643.
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costs,  Rosen  argues  that  companies  see  outsourcing  as  a way  to  tap  into
expertise  and  experience  held  by  outsiders  who  interact  with  multiple
corporations.  As a result, "'the  strong boundaries that once  separated firms
have become  less distinct, while  . . . market transactions  have become more
intimate."  118
Rosen  argues  that  these  connected  changes  have  fundamentally
transformed  the  relationship  between  inside  and  outside  counsel.  In  the
heyday of the Inside Counsel Movement, powerful general  counsel like Ben
Heineman  aggressively managed the interactions between  outside firms and
the  company  with  the  goal  of 'reducing  both  the  cost  and  scope  of their
work.' 19  In  companies  that  have  been  redesigned  by  downsizing,  self-
managing  teams,  outsourcing,  and  porous  boundaries,  outside  firms  are
increasingly  being  invited  to  become  part of the  multidisciplinary  project
team that carries out the company's core  functions.  As Rosen concludes, in
the  modem corporation,  "relations  between  inside and outside counsel...
may be  summarized in one word:  'partnering." '12 0
Recent trends  in the  career  trajectories of in-house counsel  are likely  to
accentuate  these broader trends.
5.  Inside Counsel Movement
When we prepared to  send out our survey to general counsel  in the S&P
500, we  stumbled upon a surprising  fact:  a significant number of the chief
legal  officers  listed  in  the  most  recent  databases  we  could  find  were  no
longer  at their  companies.  In  a  separate  paper,  John  Coates  has  probed
further and discovered that contrary to the picture  conveyed by well-known
figures like  Ben Heinemann,  who spent  almost twenty years  with General
Electric,  turnover  rates  among  general  counsel  are  surprisingly  high.
Indeed,. in recent  years turnover among general  counsels  has  exceeded  the
rate  at which CEOs have departed their companies by almost 50%.121  Thus
in 2005,  nearly twice  as many  GCs turned over as CEOs (29% to  15%).122
Although there  are many  reasons  for these  departures,  a primary  cause  is
the development of a burgeoning  lateral market for GCs who  want to move
to similar positions in larger (and presumably better paying) companies.
High turnover rates among GCs are likely to increase the degree to which
companies  rely  on their  primary  outside  law  firms.  One  of the  principal
arguments  supporting  the  Inside  Counsel  Movement  was  that  in-house
118.  Id.  at  649  (quoting  Paul  DiMaggio,  Introduction:  Making  Sense  of  the
Contemporary Firm and Prefiguring Its  Future, in  THE  TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY  FIRM:
CHANGING  ECONOMIC  ORGANIZATION  IN INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVE  3, 4 (Paul  DiMaggio
ed.,  2001));  see also  JOSEPH  L.  BADARACCO,  JR.,  THE  KNOWLEDGE  LINK:  How  FIRMS
COMPETE THROUGH  STRATEGIC ALLIANCES  107-28  (1991).  I return to Badaracco's  analysis
below.
119.  Rosen, supra  note 50,  at 484-90.
120.  Rosen, supra  note  86, at 670.
121.  John C. Coates, IV,  CLO Turnover (unpublished research, on file with author).
122.  Id.
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lawyers  would  be  a  better  source  of  institutional  memory  about  the
company's  history and  practices  than outside  firms.  As lateral  movement
among  associates  and  even  partners  escalated  throughout  the  1990s,  this
argument gained additional currency.  As a result, companies  no longer felt
that they needed to have stable relationships  with their outside counsel  and
instead could  move  work  inside to  preserve  institutional  memory.  But  as
the careers of inside lawyers have become  similarly volatile, the pendulum
may be swinging back in the other direction.  When a company hires a new
general counsel-even one with previous experience in a similar position at
another company-that person will inevitably have a steep learning curve to
get  up to  speed on the  company's  legal  history  and preferred  method  for
doing business.  To fill in these  gaps,  the new  GC is likely to  look to the
accumulated  experience  and knowledge  of the  company's  primary outside
lawyers.  Similarly,  general  counsels  who  are  contemplating  making  a
move  may  fear  tampering  with  their  existing  primary  outside  counsel
relationships  for  fear  that  the  speculative  gains  in  cost  and  quality  of
bringing  in  a new  firm either  will not materialize,  or will prove  not to be
worth the time and energy that the GC would have to expend to disrupt the
status quo.
The fact that many  general counsels'  offices have downsized themselves
in recent  years reinforces  this tendency.  To be  sure, in-house  counsel  has
been  the  fastest  growing  segment  of  the  legal  profession  for  several
years, 123 but this overall  growth masks the  significant number of cuts that
have occurred  in many companies.  Rosen reports,  for example,  that  all  of
the  legal  departments  he interviewed  in the  mid-1980s  had  experienced  at
least  one  round  of downsizing  by the mid-1990s. 124  Similarly,  there  are
many  anecdotal  reports of companies  slashing their in-house  staffs  after a
merger  or other  consolidation in an effort  to  reduce  costs.125  To be  sure,
there are companies  like GE that continue to believe strongly in maintaining
(and indeed expanding)  their in-house  legal  staff.  But for every GE, there
are  many  others  who have  reduced the  number of inside  lawyers  or, at a
minimum,  dramatically  slowed the rate  of growth.  As  a result, there  is a
wide variation in the size  of general counsel offices among  even the largest
companies-with  close  to  thirty  percent  maintaining  relatively  modest
departments with fewer than twenty-five lawyers. 126  Teams of this size are
likely  to  manage  their  relationships  with  outside  counsel  significantly
123.  See HEINZ ET AL.,  supra note  58.
124.  See Rosen, supra note 86,  at 642.
125.  See Conley, supra note  68 (reporting that some "companies  are spending more than
ever on outside counsel  following budget cuts that have  forced GCs to slash their in-house
staffs by 40 percent over the past five years").
126.  See  In-House Tech  Survey,  CORP.  COUNS.,  Mar.  2007,  at  78,  78-81.  Although
accurate  numbers are difficult to come by, this survey of Fortune 500 companies  found that
almost  30%  had  fewer  than  25  in-house  lawyers  while  only  about  one  quarter  had
departments  over  100-and fewer than  5% with megadepartments  of 500 or more.  As this
indicates,  in this regard as in so many others, GE is an outlier.
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differently  than  Ben  Heinemann  managed  GE's  external  legal  service
providers from the company's  1000-plus lawyer in-house platform. 127
6.  A New Legal Keiretsu?
Collectively,  these  five  interlocking trends-convergence  of work  in the
hands of a limited number of "preferred"  firms,  consolidation of the  firms
themselves  through  merger  and  acquisition,  greater  integration  and
knowledge  transfer  between  companies  and  firms,  changes  in  the
organizational  structure  of companies that promote integration  and blur the
boundaries  between  the  inside  and  the  outside,  and  increasing  instability
and  contraction  in general  counsel  offices-are  spurring  the  creation  of a
new  working  partnership  between  companies  and  their  primary  outside
firms.  Although general  counsels  continue to  insist that they "hire  lawyers
not firms,"  in reality their  relationship  with their primary  firms  is a good
deal stickier than this standard slogan would suggest.
To be  sure,  this is not the  old fashioned  marriage  that firms  and clients
entered  into  during  the  Golden  Age.  Firms  that manage  to  make  it on  a
company's preferred provider list can lose their privileged status for reasons
of incompetence  or disloyalty.  Even if they perform well, most companies
still  put the  arrangement  up  for periodic  review  and  renegotiation.  And
firms  still compete  with  others  on the list for particular assignments,  or to
grow their share of the relationship.
More  fundamentally,  outside  firms  and  in-house  lawyers  still  actively
compete with each  other for both work and influence.  Companies compete
by  taking  their work  in  house  or by switching  (or  threatening  to  switch)
their business  to other  law firms.  Firms compete by selling the knowledge
they gain  through their representation  of a given company  to other  clients
and by "firing"  existing clients  in favor of new ones who  can provide more
lucrative work.
Finally,  firms  and  clients  are  engaged  in  a  fierce  war  for talent.  For
years,  companies  have  routinely  cherry  picked  the  best  associates  and
partners  working  in  their  primary  firms  to  join  their  in-house  staff.  In
recent years, it has become increasingly common for law firms to return the
favor  by  poaching  senior  in-house  lawyers  to  return  to  private  practice.
Although  these  personnel  exchanges  are  often  mutually  beneficial  in that
they  strengthen  the  ties  between  the  company  and  the  firm  (another
example  of  why  these  ties  are  increasingly  strong)  they  also  can  pose
competitive  challenges  for each party.  A company that hires a partner who
was  previously  handling  its  trademark  work may  no  longer need  to  send
this work outside.  Similarly, a company that loses a senior in-house lawyer
to one of its law firms risks seeing potentially valuable knowledge about the
127.  For a discussion  of some of the potential differences, see Beardslee et al., supra note
76.
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company's  internal  practices  and procedures  sold  to  competitors. 128  The
consternation  that many  firms  feel  when  general  counsel  berate  them  for
their  lack  of  diversity  while  at  the  same  time  hiring  away  their  most
promising  minority  lawyers  underscores  that  even  the  most  cooperative
exchanges  between  parties  and  firms  nevertheless  contain  an  element  of
competition.
Indeed,  it  is  precisely  this  paradoxical  element  of  simultaneous
cooperation  and  competition-"cooptition,"  to  use  a phrase  employed  by
management  scholars-that  defines  the  modern  relationship  between
companies  and firms.129  As a result, these  relationships  increasingly  have
come  to resemble  the  kind of strategic alliances  or partnerships that many
companies  have  entered  into  with  other  long-term  suppliers  in  order  to
achieve  common  objectives. 13 0  Like  the  partners  in  these  arrangements,
both corporations  and  law  firms  depend  on  each  other  to  provide  crucial
information  and expertise if the purposes of their cooperative venture-i.e.,
winning  the  case,  successfully  completing  the  deal,  etc.-are  to  be
achieved.  Corporations  depend  upon  their  lawyers  to  supply  specialized
legal  knowledge;  to  gather  information;  to  interface  with  competitors,
consumers,  and government  officials;  and to monitor and  mediate conflicts
within the  organization.  For their  part, firms depend  upon their  corporate
clients  to supply  accurate information  about corporate  goals and practices;
to  follow  the  firm's  instructions  on  matters  of legal  compliance;  and,  of
course,  to provide  the  firm  with  the capital  that  it needs  for its  survival,
including  reputational  capital  in  the  form  of referral  to  other  potential
clients.  In return for receiving these  goods, each partner demands  a certain
level of control  over the  other partners'  internal affairs.  As Richard Painter
argues,  in  their  roles  as  "monitors"  and  "dealmakers,"  outside  counsel
exercise  substantial  control  over the  corporation's  internal  affairs. 131  For
the  reasons  set  out  above,  corporate  clients  now  exercise  similar  control
over the internal affairs of outside firms.
The relationship  between Chrysler Corporation and its principal suppliers
in  the  mid-1990s  provides  an  instructive  analogy-and  as  I  will  argue
128.  Conflict of interest rules partially protect against this problem. See MODEL RULES  OF
PROF'L CONDUCT  R. 1.7 (1983).  However, much of what a company may be  afraid of losing
may  not be  covered by such  rules. See generally John S.  Dzienkowski, Positional  Conflicts
of  Interest, 71  TEX. L. REV. 457 (1993).
129.  See generally Claudia Loebbecke, The Future  of  Innovation ...  the Benefits of  Being
Realistic, in THE FUTURE  OF INNOVATION  (Bettina Von  Stamm &  Anna Triflova eds., 2009)
(discussing cooptition).
130.  See Gilson  et al.,  supra note  13,  at 447  (observing  that "an  interesting  set of firms
engages  in a process of iterative co-design,  in  which suppliers contribute  to the redefinition
of interface specifications  for new products by building on their experience  in manufacturing
existing  models" and that these methods  are today a familiar part of the new economy). See
generally BADARACCO,  supra  note  118.
131.  See  Richard  W.  Painter,  The  Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers  and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507,  520-53 (1994).
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below, a cautionary  one.132  After years of losing market share  to Japanese
firms,  Chrysler  undertook  a  detailed  benchmarking  study  of  Honda,
considered  then-and  now-to  be  one  of the  best-run  companies  in  the
world.  As a result of this review,  the  U.S.  car company  decided to try to
institute  some  of its  Japanese  competitor's  practices.  At the  core  of this
effort was a radical  transformation  of Chrysler's  relationship  with the parts
manufacturers  who constituted the firm's primary suppliers.
Chrysler,  like all of its U.S.  competitors,  was  organized functionally  by
specialty  and  developed  its products  in  a traditional  sequential  process  in
which Chrysler  engineers  designed  components  for its  cars  and  then  sent
them out for competitive bids  from all of its potential  suppliers.  Contracts
were  awarded  to  the  lowest  bidder  with  little  attention  to prior history  or
performance.  As a result, "the typical relationship  between Chrysler and its
suppliers was  characterized  by mutual  distrust and suspicion"  as each party
tried to extract  the maximum  gain  from what both sides  viewed  as a zero-
sum game. 1 33
.Honda's  organization  and  relationships  with  its primary  suppliers  were
very  different.  At the Japanese  company,  workers  were  organized around
multidisciplinary  product  development  teams  that  were  given  "cradle-to-
grave"  responsibility  for  all  aspects  of  the  development  of  a  vehicle.
Suppliers, who were  chosen primarily on the basis of their past performance
and  relations  with  the  company  as  opposed  to  price,  were  invited  to
participate  in these  product  development  teams  at  an  early  stage  and,  in
return  for continued high performance,  were promised long-term contracts,
typically  lasting  for the  life  of the  vehicle.  As  a  result, relations  between
Honda  and its  suppliers  were  characterized  by a  high  degree  of trust and
collaboration.
Beginning in  1989,  Chrysler began a campaign  to adopt  these practices.
The company changed its internal  organization  from functional  divisions to
cross-functional  teams.  At the  same time,  it cut the number of suppliers it
would  work  with  in  half and began  to  involve  them  early  in  the  design
process  by  exchanging  engineers  and  "presourcing"  responsibility  for
particular  components.  Suppliers  were  given  long-term  contracts  for the
life of the vehicle and beyond.  And while the company requested discounts
in return, prices were set specifically to ensure that  suppliers would be able
to achieve  reasonable  and  sustainable  profits.  As the  company's  president
made clear, "'All I want is your brainpower, not your margins.'"134
Most  radically  of all,  Chrysler  rolled  out  a  Supplier  Cost  Reduction
Effort  (SCORE)  under  which  suppliers  were  encouraged  to  provide
132.  The  following  account  is  taken  from  Jeffrey  H.  Dyer, How  Chrysler Created an
American Keiretsu, HARV.  Bus. REv.,  July-Aug.  1996,  at 42,  42-56.  For  a  description  of
the Japanese models  that Chrysler attempted  to copy,  see  Mari Sako, Supplier Development
at Honda, Nissan, and Toyota:  Comparative Case Studies of Organizational Capability
Enhancement,  13  INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE  281  (2004).
133.  Dyer, supra  note  132, at 43.
134.  Id. at 53 (quoting Chrysler president Robert Lutz).
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suggestions  about  how  Chrysler could  improve  its  processes.  In  order to
induce  suppliers  to  participate,  Chrysler  agreed  to  share  half  of  any
resulting cost savings with the company that made the suggestion.  In 1992,
Chrysler  made  SCORE  a formal  part  of its  supplier  rating  system,  along
with more traditional measures  such  as price, quality,  and delivery.  By the
mid-1990s,  SCORE  accounted  for  fifteen  percent  of  a  supplier's
performance  and  often made  the  crucial  difference  in  whether  a  supplier
would  be  able  to  expand  its  business  with  the  company.  Indeed,  the
program  became  so  successful  that  the  company  expanded  it  to  provide
incentives  for suppliers  to develop  ideas that  would reduce vehicle  weight,
warranty  claims,  and  complexity.  The  program  has  proven  to  be
enormously  successful,  rising from 875  suggestions worth a total of $170.8
million  in  its  first  year  of operation  to  5300  suggestions  generating  $1.7
billion in savings when the program was assessed in 1995.
More  generally,  by  moving  from  a  "logic  of  power,"  in  which  the
company  attempted to  reap maximum advantage  from  its leverage  over  its
suppliers,  to  a "logic  of embeddedness,"  in which the  company worked to
build a mutually cooperative  relationship  in which both parties would gain,
Chrysler was  able to dramatically  reduce  its overall costs  while  improving
both  the  speed  of  its  production  process  and  the  overall  quality  of its
cars. 135  Throughout  the 1990s, the company continued to find ways to give
"voice"  to  its  suppliers,  including  establishing  an  advisory  board  of
executives  from  its  fourteen  biggest  suppliers  and  holding  an  annual
meeting  with its  top  150.136  For their part,  suppliers  demonstrated  their
commitment  to the relationship  by creating  a common technology platform
with  the  automaker  and  establishing  dedicated  equipment,  systems,
processes,  and  staff exclusively  to  serve  Chrysler's  needs.  Although  the
automakers'  current  woes  are  well  documented,  as  recently  as  2007,
Chrysler's  collaborative  relationships  with its suppliers  were continuing to
produce impressive dividends.137
From  the  preceding  sections,  it  should  be  clear  that  the  evolving
relationship  between  many companies and their principal outside law  firms
135.  Id.  at  43  (noting  that  "[tihe  cost  of developing  a  new  vehicle  has  plunged  an
estimated  20%  to 40%"  at the  same  time  that the company  "has  managed  to produce  one
consumer  hit after another"  and "profit  per vehicle  has jumped from  an average of $250 in
the  1980s  to  . . . $2,110  in  1994").  On the  difference  between  the  logics  of power  and
embeddedness,  and  how  the  former  can  paradoxically  diminish  the  putatively  stronger
party's ability to extract value from an exchange relationship, see Gulati & Sytch, supra  note
14,  at  59-60.  As  a  Chrysler  manager  interviewed  by  the  researchers  summarized  the
difference  between  the  company's  orientation  before  and  after  the  new  initiative,  "The
thinking  used to  be here that  we'd like  to  see  a supplier  totally dependent  on us  and then
we'd have the thumb over them.  Now we recognize that neither extreme  is good."  Id. at 60
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136.  See Dyer, supra note  132, at  55; Helper & Sako, supra note  15,  at 79-80 (cataloging
measures  taken by U.S.  auto companies to give voice to their suppliers).
137.  See Gulati & Sytch, supra note  14.  As the authors  demonstrate, Ford also  pursued a
similar strategy with its major suppliers with similar effects. See also Helper  & Sako, supra
note  15,  at 80-82  (demonstrating  the correlation  between voice relationships  and improved
performance).
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has  come to take  on many of the  characteristics  of the American  Keiretsu
that Chrysler  forged  with  its  suppliers  in  the  1990s.  Although  there  are
clearly  differences  between  the  two  situations,  the  recent  engagement
between  Tyco  International  and the U.K.  law  firm  Eversheds  underscores
that the differences  are not nearly as great as one might suspect.
7.  The SMARTER Model 38
When  Trevor  Faure  took  over  the  legal  department  of  Tyco
International's  operations  for Europe,  the  Middle  East,  and  Asia  in  2004,
the  department  was  in  a  state  of  total  disarray.  Fresh  from  the  major
accounting  scandal  that nearly  destroyed  the parent  company,  Faure  was
given explicit  instructions  to  improve  the competence  and integrity  of the
legal  function.  To  achieve  this  objective,  Faure  instituted  a  systematic
examination  of how  the  company  was  spending  its  legal  resources,  both
internally  and  with  outside  firms.  What  he  quickly  discovered  was  that
notwithstanding  significant  increases  in  spending  on  both  internal  and
external resources,  the legal department was doing a poor job of managing
its known  legal expenses-and  an even worse job of providing the  kind of
comprehensive  legal  coverage  that  could  prevent  legal  problems  from
occurring in the first place.
Armed  with  this  knowledge,  Faure  developed  a  plan  to  reallocate  the
company's legal  spending in a manner that better protected  its interests.  At
the  core  of Faure's  strategy  was  a  proposal  to  achieve  the  ultimate  in
convergence  by  slashing  the  number of outside  firms  the  company  used
from 250 to a single provider.  After interviewing several  candidates, Faure
settled  on  the  2000-lawyer  U.K.  firm  Eversheds.  The  two-year  deal
covered  a  wide  range  of  work,  including  labor  and  employment,  IP,
compliance,  and  litigation.  All told, Eversheds  was  expected  to  gross  $20
million per year in fees.
Implementing  this plan, however, proved more difficult than either Tyco
or Eversheds  anticipated.  Indeed,  after the  first year,  Faure  almost pulled
the plug on the arrangement because Eversheds  had not yet learned how to
control  the company's  legal  costs.  For its part,  the  law  firm  claimed  that
the sheer volume of work-1000  live matters followed by  100 new matters
a  month,  spread  over thirty jurisdictions-was  simply  too much  for  even
such  a  large  global  firm  to absorb.  In  the  end,  however,  because  of the
significant  investment  that  both  parties  had  already  made  in  the  new
relationship, the company and the law firm chose voice rather than exit and
agreed to a new deal that brings the sides even closer together.
Specifically,  the  new  deal  makes  it  even  clearer  than  before  that  the
company and firm will share both the risks and the rewards  of Tyco's legal
138.  The  account  below  is  taken  primarily  from  a  series  of discussions  with  Tyco's
Trevor  Faure  in  connection  with  a  forthcoming  case  study  I  am  writing  on  the
Tyco/Eversheds  relationship  as  well  as Faure's recently  published  book on the SMARTER
Model. TREVOR FAURE,  T-fE SMARTER LEGAL MODEL:  MORE FROM LESS (2010).
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fate.  To accomplish this objective, the company and  the firm  have agreed
to a  set of benchmarks  for specific  kinds of cases.  For basic  "commodity
work," the  company  agrees  to pay Eversheds  for  10,000 hours  of work  at
reduced  rates.  If the  firm  exceeds  this  preset  number  of hours,  it  will
receive nothing  for the  first  1250 hours, and a dramatically  reduced rate for
any  hour thereafter.  If, on the other hand, the firm  is able to complete the
tasks  in  under  the  prescribed  amount  of time,  the  company  will  allow
Eversheds to bill for fifty percent  of the hours that it did not work up to the
10,000 hours agreed upon to achieve this objective.  For all litigation under
$1 million, the firm will receive  a twenty-five  percent  success premium on
top of its discounted fees for any case it wins-and will suffer a ten percent
penalty from its discounted rates if the  case is lost.  With respect to higher-
value litigation and transactional  work, the deal provides that Eversheds  be
paid  its  standard  fees  minus  a smaller  discount.  Finally, premium  work,
such  as  "bet-the-company"  litigation  and  structuring  transactions,  is
expressly  not  included  in  the  deal,  but  Eversheds  will  be  given  an
opportunity to compete  for these matters along with other firms.
The  most innovative  aspects  of the new arrangement  between  Tyco  and
Eversheds,  however,  fall outside  of these typical parameters.  These  terms
provide  that in addition to making money on the fees the company pays  it
for  its  work,  Eversheds  can  also  profit  if  the  firm  hits  a  number  of
additional  targets  designed by the  company to  further what  it considers  to
be important  objectives.  For example,  the deal  specifies that the  firm will
pocket  a bonus  in  excess  of $100,000  if the  firm  improves Tyco's  "client
satisfaction"  as  measured  by  a  survey  given  to  the  company's  senior
managers  every October.  The firm will also take home a six-figure bonus if
it meets certain  targets for diversifying its legal  and support staff.  Finally,
the  arrangement  contains  an  incentive  for Eversheds  to help  Tyco  avoid
getting into legal trouble in the first place.  The firm will take home another
six-figure  bonus if it is able  to reduce the  number of lawsuits  filed against
Tyco by fifteen percent over the number filed in the previous year.  To  give
Eversheds  the  chance  to  meet this target,  Tyco  promises  to  give  the  firm
access (at the law firm's expense) to Tyco's business processes  and people.
By providing  specific  rewards  for helping  the  company  to  achieve  its
own objectives,  Faure  hopes to create  a "win-win"  mentality  between  the
company  and  Eversheds.  As  he  told  The American Lawyer, he hoped  to
avoid  the  "winner-take-all"  mentality  that  typically  characterizes  the
relationship  between  outside counsel  and  firms and to create  a relationship
"that encourages  the right behaviors  from both sides." 139  As the  editors of
the magazine note, the result is a unique "two-way partnership [that] ties the
firm to the client but ...  [also]  ties the client to the firm."'140
As indicated above, the Tyco/Eversheds  deal  is indeed unique in both its
scope and innovation.  But it is also clear that other companies  are looking
139.  See Lloyd, supra  note 91,  at 31.
140.  Id.
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closely  at Tyco's experience.  Since news of Faure's  SMARTER model hit
the press,  a steady stream of general counsel have beaten a path to his door
to see if they can adopt some or all of his methods.  In 2008, Tyco's Trevor
Faure  was  named  "In-House  Lawyer of the Year"  by  The Lawyer, which
specifically  praised the company's creation of "win-win" incentives  such as
paying  the  firm  a  bonus  for  reducing  litigation  against  the  company. 141
Given  the  overall  trend  toward  convergence,  it  is  only  a  matter  of time
before  aspects  of Faure's  model  will  be  copied  by  other  companies. 142
Even  companies  that  do not  embrace all aspects  of the  SMARTER model
are increasingly exploring mechanisms to encourage  "risk sharing" by their
primary  law firms through mechanisms like "value billing"  and the delivery
of  "products"  that  standardize  templates  and  tools  in  ways  that  are
guaranteed to produce results. 143
Indeed,  in the  last few  years  an entire  industry  has  sprouted  up  to  help
companies and firms enter into collaborative  relationships  in which both the
benefits  and  the  costs  of managing  the  company's  legal  risk  are  shared
between client and  lawyer.  Consider,  for example,  eLawForum.144  Begun
as an online "meeting"  site designed simply  to put companies  with work to
give  out  together  with  firms  qualified  to  carry  out  these  assignments,
eLawForum  has  evolved  into  a  full-fledged  matchmaking  service  that
works with both companies  and firms  to bundle and price legal work in a
manner that  allows  an equitable sharing  of both risks and rewards  by both
clients  and firms.  eLawForum  works  with  clients  to  do the kind  of 360-
degree  review of their  legal problems and resources  that Faure  initiated at
Tyco and then, crucially, to share this assessment with a group of law firms
that the company has precleared  as being qualified to do the work.
Armed  with this knowledge,  the law  firms  then engage in a competitive
bidding process  for the  fixed  fee at  which the  law  firm will  undertake  the
representation.  After  an  initial  set  of bids  is  received,  eLawForum  then
works  with both  the  company  and  the  finalists  to  find  the  firm  that the
company  feels  will  do  the  best  job  for  the  best  price.  Although  the
company  is under  no obligation  to  accept  the  lowest bid-and often  does
not-the  agreed-upon  price  is almost  always  significantly  below what  the
company  had  historically  paid  for  the  services. 145  Once  the  basic  terms
141.  The  Lawyer  Awards,  LAWYER,  June  25,  2008,  http://www.thelawyer.com/the-
lawyer-awards-freshfields-scoopes-law-firm-of-year/133555.article.
142.  Indeed,  Faure will  soon be spreading the  gospel himself  In February  2009,  Faure
left  Tyco  to  become  the  worldwide  general  counsel  for  Ernst  &  Young.  I  return  to  the
implications of this move below.
143.  Rosen, supra note 86, at 677.
144.  Most of what follows  comes from Clayton Christensen's excellent case study  on the
company.  See Clayton  M.  Christensen  &  Scott  D. Anthony,  eLawForum:  Transforming
Legal  Services,  INNOSIGHT  (Innosight,  LLC,  Watertown,  Mass.),  Jan.  31,  2003,  at  1,
available  at http://www.innosight.com/documents/elawfonum.pdf.
145.  The  relationship  between  Unocal  and the  D.C. litigation  firm  Howrey  is  a case  in
point.  After  an  eight-round  bidding  process  conducted  by  eLawForum,  Unocal  hired
Howrey  to  handle  all  of its  environmental  litigation  for  five  years  for  a  fixed  fee  paid
quarterly  and  a variety  of incentives.  See  Heather  Smith,  The Fix Is In,  AM.  LAW.,  Nov.
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have  been  agreed  to,  eLawForum  then  works  with  the  two  parties  to
produce  a "joint venture  agreement"  that clearly  spells  out how  the work
will  be  conducted-including  the  rights  and  obligations  of each  party  to
provide  necessary  information  and  cooperation, 146  the  parameters  for
success,  and  how  the  risks  and  rewards  of the  work  will  be  divided.' 47
Similar services  are already in the works.' 48
Just like the keiretsu between  Chrysler and its suppliers, the goal of all of
these  arrangements  is the same:  to "encourage  collaboration  between client
and  law  firm"  in  ways  that  both  reduce  costs  and  improve  overall
performance.' 49  As one enthusiast put it,
"Rather  than have  the client wait until the  proverbial  brown stuff has hit
the  fan,  we get  involved  much  earlier,  often before  a  lawsuit  is  filed-
sometimes  immediately  when  a complaint letter  is sent,  or even  before,
when an issue  is identified.  This is not only helpful  for [the client].  It is
to our benefit as a firm to avoid mass litigation under this contract.' ' 5 0
It is also to the firm's benefit to keep the relationship  in place.  And, like it
or not, companies will often conclude that the same is true for them as well.
8.  Turning the Titanic
In the end,  the  growing  interdependence  between  companies  and  firms
makes it increasingly  difficult for either side to walk away from these new
relationships.  To  be  sure,  all  of  these  new  partnerships  contain  formal
escape clauses.  Companies  invariably reserve  the right to  scrap the deal  if
they  are  unhappy  with  the  firm's  performance. 151  And  even  if the  firm
2005, at 54.  Howrey  was not the lowest bidder  for the work.  Instead,  the firm, which had
represented  the oil  company  on insurance  and commercial  cases but  not  on environmental
litigation,  impressed  the  company's  general  counsel  with  its  "business-minded"  approach
that allowed the firm to tell the company "how they and we would make money"  on the deal.
Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146.  Clients typically promise to provide the firm with accurate  and complete information
about cases and outcomes  in a timely  fashion.  For their part,  firms promise not to "bait  and
switch" by ensuring that partners who say they will work on the client's  matters actually  do
so. See id. at 58; Christensen & Anthony, supra  note  144.
147.  For example,  in the Unocal/Howrey  deal, the two  parties will split any savings  that
Howrey  generates  by bringing in matters under the company's cost targets and will receive a
performance  bonus  for  every  twenty cases  that it resolves  under the  firm's historic cost of
$500,000  per case.  See  Smith, supra note  145,  at  57.  A  similar  deal negotiated  through
eLawForum  between  Tyco  International  and  Shook,  Hardy  & Bacon includes  six  different
opportunities for the firm to be paid a bonus for achieving  certain results. Id. at 58.
148.  For  example,  Legal  OnRamp  is  an  invitation-only  social  networking  site  that
connects  in-house  legal  departments  to  outside  lawyers.  See  Anna  Oberthur,  Virtual
Connections:  Lawyer-Only Sites Help Boost Online Networking, CAL.  LAW.,  Mar.  2008,
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=892326&evid=  .
149.  See Smith, supra note  145, at 58.
150.  Id. at  60  (quoting  the  relationship  partner  for  Morgan  Lewis  about  its  fixed-fee
contract with Cisco Systems  to handle all the company's  litigation for two years).
151.  See id. at  58  (noting that all of the contracts  arranged  by eLawForum  she reviewed
"include  provisions allowing the clients to end the arrangements  if they're unhappy  with the
work").
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performs  admirably,  the  arrangements  are  always  subject  to  periodic
renegotiation  and revision as was  done by Tyco  and Eversheds.  Finally,  in
all but sole source agreements  (and with respect to the most desirable work,
even  here  as  well),  firms  still  have  to  compete  with  other  preferred
providers  to  gain  a  larger  share  of the  client's  work.  Nevertheless,  the
collaboration,  knowledge transfer, and personal connections  that these deals
are designed to foster has made these relationships  a good deal stickier than
the  still too-often repeated mantra  "we  hire lawyers,  not firms" would  lead
one  to believe.  The  data from  our corporate purchasing  survey  bears  this
out.  Nearly  80%  of the general counsel in our sample  claimed that at most
they  had  terminated  an  important  law  firm  relationship  "once  or  twice"
between 2003  and 2006, with almost a third (31%)  conceding that they had
never  done  so  during  the  period.  Only  21%  claimed  to  have  terminated
such relationships  more  than  twice,  with  only  1% insisting that they  had
done so frequently.1
52
The fact that companies rarely terminate important  law firm relationships
should not be taken to mean that companies  are generally  satisfied with the
service  that  they  are  receiving.  To  the  contrary,  there  is  widespread
evidence  that  general  counsel  are  often  quite  unhappy  about  the  price,
quality,  and  overall  responsiveness  of the  work of their  outside  counsel.
Rather, as Tyco's Faure discovered,  the deeper and more multilayered these
relationships become, the harder-and riskier-they  are  to change.  As the
former  general  counsel  of a  major financial  firm  once  told  me,  changing
these  relationships  is  "like  turning  the  Titanic"-it  takes  an  enormous
amount of time and  energy, and while you are trying to do it there  is always
the chance that you'll hit an iceberg.
Whether we call these new arrangements  strategic alliances, partnerships,
or  a  legal  keiretsu,  it  is  evident  that  the  relationship  between  large
companies and their primary outside law firms  is increasingly being defined
by  the  kind  of  cooperative/competitive  relationships  that  have  become
ubiquitous  in  other  parts  of  the  new  economy. 153  It  is  worth  asking,
therefore,  how this new relationship  is likely to affect the profession's  core
values of client service and professional  independence.
II1.  PARTNERS  OR PROFESSIONALS?
Not  surprisingly,  the  parties  responsible  for  pressing  these  new
arrangements  do  not  see  themselves  as  promoting  a  new  model  of the
corporate  attorney-client  relationship-let  alone  creating  a  new  paradigm
152.  See Beardslee  et  al.,  supra note  76,  at  29;  see also Rees  W.  Morrison,  The  Truth
Behind Those  'Firings,'  LEGAL TIMES (Wash.,  D.C.), Mar.  19,  2007, at 44.
153.  As  Charles  F.  Sabel  and  Jonathan  Zeitlin  conclude  about  the  ubiquity  of  such
relationships  generally,  "Under  the  name  of Japanese  production  methods  (a  misnomer,
because they have become common knowledge  in manufacturing  and design), these methods
are today a familiar part of the new economy."  Charles F.  Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither
Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-firm Collaboration  in  the New Economy, 5
ENTERPRISE  & Soc'Y 388, 397 (2004).
2104 [Vol. 78TEAM OF  RIVALS?
for lawyer professionalism. 154  Nevertheless,  the changes  described in Part
II  are  likely  to have important  consequences  for how  lawyers understand
and carry out their various professional roles.  These developments,  in turn,
may have important implications for clients, lawyers,  and for the public.
Before proceeding, however,  a word of caution is in order.  As should be
clear  from the  discussion  above,  the  new model  of the corporate  attorney-
client  relationship  I am  describing  is  still  very  much  in  its  nascent  form.
There  is  very  little  solid  evidence  of exactly  what  is  going  on,  let alone
about  how  these  changes  are  affecting  the  conduct-and  even  more  the
professional  self-understanding--of  lawyers.  Moreover,  whether and how
the  new relationships that have been formed between  companies  and  firms
over the last decade will continue to develop  is contingent on many factors,
not  the  least  of which  are  developments  in  the  economy  and  the  overall
global  market  for  legal  services.  My  observations  in  this  section  will
therefore be both preliminary and speculative.  It is precisely because much
remains  to  be  determined,  however,  that  it  is  so  important  to  begin
considering these  consequences  today  while  there  is  still time  to  shape  an
appropriate response.
A.  Clients
At first  blush, it might  seem  superfluous  to discuss the  impact of these
new developments  on clients.  It is clients, after all, who have been pushing
for the change.  Moreover, as indicated above, the dominant theme over the
last  thirty years  has  been corporate  clients'  ability  to  reduce  dramatically
the information  asymmetries that used to characterize their relationship  with
outside counsel.  In such an environment, it would seem that there would be
little danger  that these  sophisticated parties will not get what they want.155
Indeed,  as  indicated  below,  in  the  minds  of most  commentators  the  real
concern  is whether corporate  clients will use these new relationships  to co-
opt law firms  in  a manner that allows them to further entrench  their power
and influence. 1 56
Nevertheless,  there  are  critics  who  have  raised  a cautionary  flag  about
whether,  notwithstanding  all  of  the  hype,  "convergence"-particularly
convergence  in  the  kinds  of  large  national  or  global  firms  that  are
154.  Indeed,  when  I called  eLawForum's  founder  to discuss  some  of the  issues  in  this
paper, he  professed  great surprise  that anyone would think  his  site had anything  to do with
professionalism  or ethics.  In this  respect  these  entrepreneurs  are  quite different  from the
leaders  of the  Inside  Counsel  Movement,  who  Rosen  describes  as  quite  self-consciously
engaged  in  a  project  to  increase  their  professional  standing  by  reorienting  the normative
understanding of the lawyer's role. See generally Rosen, supra note 50.
155.  I made this point fifteen years ago with respect to corporate clients'  ability to prevent
what  I then  described as "agency  delicts."  See Wilkins,  supra note 22.  Given the growth  in
the number and sophistication of in-house counsel since  then, this conclusion should be even
more true  today.
156.  For  the classic  formulation  of this  concern,  see  Marc Galanter,  Why  the  "Haves"
Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9  LAW  & Soc'Y REv.  95
(1974).
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increasingly  competing  for  this  kind  of work-is  in  the  best  interest  of
corporate  clients.  None other than Ben Heineman  has been in the forefront
of this  skeptical  group.  In a provocative  article  in  The American Lawyer,
Heineman openly  questioned whether global law firms promising "one-stop
shopping"  actually  "provide  the  claimed  superior  service,  quality,  or
price."'157  Heineman  raises many  trenchant  criticisms  about both  the  cost
structure  and the quality control of today's global law firms. 158  At the heart
of his  critique  is  what he  labels  as  a profound  "disconnect"  between  how
companies like GE think about productivity-achieving  more for less-and
the fact that too many law firms define  the term as meaning boosting profits
by increasing  leverage  and  raising  rates.  He  suggests that  "[u]ntil  the big,
global  firms candidly  address the  ultimate  issue of productivity  on  a 'total
cost'  (single price) per-matter basis, they will have a hard time being on the
same economic page as many corporate clients."' 159
Ironically,  it  is  precisely  because  many  GCs  agree  with  Heineman's
assessment that they have moved to institute the kind of partnerships I have
been  discussing.  As  indicated  in  Part  II,  one  of the  main  reasons  why
companies  are concentrating  their work  in a smaller number of firms is to
force these preferred providers to move toward fixed fees  and other similar
compensation  systems  in  which  both  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the
representation  are  shared  by  both  parties.  Similarly,  by  building  closer
connections  with their primary  firms, companies hope to be able  to monitor
attorney  performance  more  effectively,  thereby  reducing  the  danger  of
padding and waste.
More  fundamentally,  the  way  that  Heineman  frames  the  issue  begs  a
central question whether GCs who have decided to institute some version of
the model I have been discussing  see it as being at the core of what they are
trying to achieve.  For Heineman,  each legal  matter-"[a]n  antitrust  issue
under  China's  new  competition  laws,  environmental  due  diligence  when
purchasing  Russian  assets"-is  potentially  "critical  to  the  cross-border
transaction  and  require[s]  separate  counsel  with  special expertise."'1 60  But
for many  general  counsel,  such "bespoke  solutions,"  to borrow the  quaint
British  phrase Richard  Susskind uses  in his equally provocative  new book
The End of Lawyers?, are  no  longer what  they  are  seeking.' 61  As a  legal
consultant who  has worked  with many  companies  to consolidate  their  law
157.  Ben W. Heineman,  Jr., Bigger Isn't Better,  AM.  LAW., Nov. 2008, at 71.
158.  Among Heineman's  objections  are that  global  firms have an  inflated  cost  structure
that requires them to "bill until September"  in order to be profitable and that these firms will
inevitably  have a large "mediocre  middle"  and little or no common  culture that should make
companies  skeptical  of  the  firm's  quality  claims-particularly  across  specialties  and
geographies. Id. at 72.
159.  Id.
160.  Id.
161.  See RicHARD  SussKiND, THE END OF LAWYERS?  RETHINKING  THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 28-36 (2008).
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firm relationships  succinctly  put  it,  "A  relatively  small part  of a business
corporation's legal function requires that kind of star lawyer."'162
To be  sure,  some  legal work  is  in  fact the equivalent  of brain  surgery.
Not  surprisingly,  arrangements  like the  one  between  Tyco  and Eversheds
exclude this work  from the  deal,  although as indicated  above Eversheds  is
entitled to compete for this "premium work"  along with other firms.
163  But
it  is  also  surely  true  that  lawyers-even  many  in-house  lawyers-
systematically  overestimate  how  much  work  truly  qualifies  for  this
designation.  Moreover,  as Susskind  persuasively  argues, there  is a strong
tendency  for  legal  work  to  drift  inexorably  from  "premium"  to
"commodity"  over time.164  As a result, clients adopting a "risk assessment"
perspective  will  often view  lawyers  as  far more  fungible  than those  who
still think  of legal  services  as  fundamentally  bespoke.  For  these  clients,
having  lawyers  who  "understand  their  business"-particularly  how  the
business  measures  and  evaluates  risk,  including  legal  risk-may  be  far
more  valuable  than  technical  competence  or  skill.  Once  again,
sophisticated  corporate  clients  would  appear  to be  in  a  good  position  to
make these kinds of trade-offs. 165
There  is,  however,  an  additional  concern  that,  although  still  within  the
company's power to control, may nevertheless  be more  difficult for clients
to address  since by definition  it will only arise once  it is too late to correct.
As  indicated  above,  the interlocking  connections  between  companies  and
firms engendered under the new preferred  provider models mean that these
relationships  are  a  good  deal  stickier  than  the  prior  spot-contracting
arrangements.  As a result,  a company is  vulnerable  to being  caught  in the
lurch if one of its primary firms fails.  Such failures, although  still rare, are
nevertheless  happening  with  increasing  frequency,  particularly  in  the
current economic  environment.  In the last year alone, three major firms-
Heller  Ehrman,  Thelen  Reed  &  Priest,  and  WolfBlock-have  all  closed
their  doors,  and  by  almost  every  estimate  others  are  sure  to  follow.
Although  many  of the  partners  from  these  failed  enterprises-and  even
some  whole departments-have  moved  to  other firms,  the  whole point of
the  kind of strategic  alliance  about which  I have been  speaking  is that  its
value  extends  beyond  any  particular  lawyer  or group. 166  Companies  that
162.  See  Sander,  supra note  75  (quoting  Hildebrandt  International  consultant  Joel  F.
Henning).
163.  Although this work is not guaranteed,  Faure recently reported  to me that Eversheds
is now getting a significant percentage of this high-end work.
164.  See SUSSKiND,  supra note 161.
165.  The same  analysis applies  to the criticism that high turnover rates and poor internal
control  systems at  many large  law firms may  limit the benefit that  companies can expect  to
reap  from  convergence.  To  the  extent that companies  are worried  about these  problems-
which,  I should make  clear, I believe that they should be-they have the resources  at their
disposal  to  require  firms  to  take  appropriate  steps to  limit the  damage.  I  return  to  these
controls below.
166.  To  the  extent that  firms  create  dedicated  "client service  teams"  to  handle  a given
company's matters  across the entire range of the strategic partnership,  the client will be able
to minimize the lost value of the arrangement  if its "team"  moves en  masse to another firm
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partner  with  firms  that  fail  will  by  definition  lose  this  benefit.  As  the
"junior" partner in the team, however,  law  firms are even  more vulnerable
to this kind of dislocation.
B.  Firms
As  with clients,  it might  seem  self-evident  that the  law  firms  that enter
into these  preferred  provider  relationships  benefit  from  the  arrangements.
Clients  are the "mother's  milk" of law firm life.  Law firms  that enter into
long-term  relationships  with  clients  able  to provide  them  with  a  steady
supply of work would appear to have nothing to complain about.
In addition, firms can gain many other potential benefits that go beyond a
steady supply of fees.  One of the most important  promises that firms  make
to  those  whom  they recruit  is  that they  will provide  these  young  lawyers
with  excellent  training  in  the  skills  and  dispositions  that  they  need  to
become  accomplished  and  skilled  practitioners. 167   In  recent  years,
however, this promise has grown increasingly illusory.  The reasons  for this
trend are undoubtedly  multiple and mutually reinforcing.  Clients, weary of
an  ever-changing  cast  of  untrained-and  undoubtedly  relatively
unproductive-junior  lawyers  shuffling  in  and  out  of their  projects,  are
increasingly  unwilling  to pay  for  the  work of first-year  and  second-year
associates. 168  At the  same  time, partners  eager  to boost their  profits  per
partner  are  unwilling  to  absorb  this  cost  either.  The  result,  as  Ben
Heineman  and I have elsewhere  argued,  is a "lost generation" of associates
who  are  coming  of  age  in  law  firms  without  proper  supervision  or
training. 169  This is a disaster for both firms and clients.  Law firms (at least
until the current downturn) were shedding associates at prodigious rates-in
many  cases  up  to  twenty-five  percent  per  year.  Although  young lawyers
change jobs  for many reasons,  recent research  on the attitudes and  careers
of junior  associates  suggests  that  a perceived-and,  I  would  argue  real-
lack  of training  and mentoring  in large  law firms  is a significant  cause.170
in the event that the primary  firm  fails.  Indeed, this may  be one reason  why, as  I indicate
below,  our  survey  suggests  that companies  are  increasingly  looking  toward  the  "team"  or
"group"  as  the  important  focus  of  their  relationship  with  their  primary  outside  firms.
Nevertheless,  even if an entire client team moves  to a new  firm-an occurrence, needless  to
say, that is  surely not a given  in the  wake  of a law  firm  failure-there  are still likely  to be
costs associated with reestablishing the strategic partnership in the new firm.
167.  See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 60, at  1608-11.
168.  As  one general  counsel  flatly told us,  "We  finally told  all our firms that  we  would
not pay for first-year associates."
169.  See  Ben  W.  Heineman,  Jr.  &  David  B.  Wilkins,  The  Lost  Generation?, CORP.
CouNs., Mar.  2008,  at  104.  As I have  also  argued, this lack  of training  has a particularly
devastating impact  on black  and other  minority lawyers.  See David B.  Wilkins  &  G.  Mitu
Gulati, Why Are  There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An  Institutional
Analysis, 84 CAL.  L. REv. 493,  564-84 (1996).
170.  See generally RONIT  DINOVITZER  ET  AL.,  AM.  BAR.  FOUND.  &  NALP  FOUND.  FOR
LAW CAREER  RESEARCH  &  EDUC.,  AFTER THE  JD:  FIRST RESULTS  OF A NATIONAL  STUDY  OF
LEGAL CAREERS  (2004)  [hereinafter  DINOVITZER  ET  AL.,  AFTER  THE  JD  I]  (reporting  that
junior associates  in  large  law  firms were  dissatisfied with  the  training  and mentoring  that
they  received  and  that  dissatisfaction  in  these  areas  is  highly  correlated  with  a  lawyer's
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For their part, clients are  likely to have increasing difficulty finding trained
third-year  and fourth-year  associates-particularly  ones with  experience  in
handling  (and understanding)  their business-if most of the  talented  first-
year and second-year lawyers have already left.171
By giving  both clients  and firms  a stake  in  a long-term  relationship  in
which  both  sides  have  an  interest  in  the  other's  success,  the  new
partnerships  offer at least some hope of breaking out of this gloomy state of
affairs.  Once  they are freed from the tyranny of hourly billings,  clients not
only don't mind a young associate  sitting in on a deposition or listening in
on a phone call,  they applaud the process. 172  For their part, firms welcome
the  prospect of having a junior  lawyer interact with  the client or trained to
provide  an  important  service,  thereby  freeing  up  the  time  of  more
experienced lawyers to seek out other opportunities.
But as was the case with clients, law firms also face risks from these new
arrangements.  As the smaller  and more junior member of the partnership,
firms face substantially  more risks  from the failure  of their primary clients
than the other way around.  To see the magnitude of this danger, one needs
only to return to the Chrysler analogy.  As the bottom has  fallen out of the
auto market, the Obama Administration has come to realize that it had to do
more than bail out GM and Chrysler.  It also had to pump billions of dollars
into propping up their major suppliers. 173  Keiretsus link the fate of those in
the strategic alliance in good times and in bad-and the more successful the
alliance the  more difficult  it is for the parties to extract themselves  from its
grip.  This is particularly true for the supplier in an economy in which other
clients are already spoken for.
The recent tax-product  scandals  involving the accounting  firm of Ernst &
Young and the Dallas law firm of Jenkens & Gilchrist provide a cautionary
intention to leave  his or her current  employer within  two years).  We  are in the process  of
analyzing the data from the study's second wave (examining respondents'  careers after seven
or  eight  years  in  practice)  but  preliminary  results  appear  to  confirm  this  finding.  See
generally RONIT  DINOVITZER  ET AL.,  AM.  BAR.  FOUND.  &  NALP FOUND.  FOR LAW CAREER
RESEARCH & EDUC., AFTER THE JD II:  SECOND/RESULTS FROM  A NATIONAL STUDY  OF LEGAL
CAREERS  (2009) [hereinafter  DINOVITZER ET AL.,  AFTER THE JD II].
171.  Firms  can try to ameliorate  this  danger by  seeding their most promising  associates,
but  as  many  partners  will  now  concede-albeit  candidly-it  is  becoming  increasingly
difficult to  deliver on their promise of good  training  for even  their most valued  associates.
See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 60, at  1611-13.
172.  Indeed, in a particular  irony  it is likely that many of the associates who  leave  firms
will wind up working  in the  law departments of the very kind of companies that refused to
train them in the first place.  Although general counsel  will certainly reply that they  will be
able to weed  out those who  have  actually  been trained  at the point where they  seek to hire
these law firm  refugees,  the  difficulty  of gaining access  to the private  information  about a
given recruit's quality held by firms-information that neither the recruit nor the firm (or the
headhunter) has any incentive  to disclose-should  make companies less than sanguine  about
their ability to make accurate judgments ex post.
173.  David  Kiley,  Billions for  Auto  Suppliers'  Bailout,  BUS.  WK.,  Mar.  19,  2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/mar2009/bw20090319_960219.htm
(reporting  that  "[tihe  Obama  Administration  on  Mar.  19  created  a  $5  billion  fund  that
guarantees  payments to  struggling auto  suppliers,  especially  those tied to providing  parts to
General Motors (GM) and Chrysler that are facing the possibility of bankruptcy").
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tale. 174  By  all accounts,  the accounting and  law firms  worked side by side
developing and marketing a string of tax products that the IRS  subsequently
determined  to be sham transactions whose  sole purpose was to help  clients
avoid paying taxes.  Indeed, if anything Ernst & Young was arguably more
culpable  since  it designed the schemes  and reaped most of the profits  from
the  sale  of the  products.  Jenkens's  contribution  was  mainly  to  produce
prepackaged  opinion  letters  blessing  the  deals  for  a  fee.  Yet  when  the
house of cards  came  tumbling  down  and  the  IRS  came  calling,  Ernst &
Young  was  allowed  to pay a  fine-albeit  of several  million  dollars-that
many knowledgeable  observers  considered  to be  little more than  a  slap  on
the wrist.  Jenkens,  on the other hand, was driven out of business. 175  Why?
After  the  demise  of  Arthur  Andersen  the  government  deemed  Ernst  &
Young, like GM and Chrysler, too big to fail.176  A 300-lawyer regional law
firm, Jenkens had no similar protection.
Even  less catastrophic  changes  in  a client's  fate  can place  the law  firm
supplier  in  a  strategic  alliance  at risk.  The  Howrey/Unocal  deal  is  again
instructive.  Notwithstanding  delivering  results  that  thrilled  its  corporate
partner,  Howrey  ultimately  lost  its  preferred  provider  deal  when  Unocal
was acquired by Chevron, which already had its own law firm relationships.
Indeed,  even  if ownership  remains unchanged,  the  closer a firm gets to  its
corporate  partner,  the  more  the  client  is  likely  to  view  the  firm  as  an
extension  of its  own  legal  staff.  Although  obviously  beneficial  to  a  law
firm in many  respects,  such closeness  can also exact a price  on the  firm's
other  client  relationships  as  "preferred"  clients  seek  to  prevent  "their"
lawyers  from  serving  the  preferred  clients'  business  competitors,  even  in
circumstances  where no formal conflict exists or is likely to materialize. 177
174.  See  Milton  C.  Regan,  Jr.,  Taxes  and  Death:  The  Rise  and Demise  of Jenkens  &
Gilchrist (2008)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See generally Tanina Rostain,
Sheltering Lawyers:  The  Organized  Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23  YALE  J.  ON
REG.  77 (2006).
175.  See  Tax  Shelter  Users  Reach  $75  Million  Settlement  with  Firms  That  Gave  Bad
Advice  (Jan.  13,  2005),  http://www.lawcash.com/attomey/3229/emst-young-international-
lawsuit.asp.
176.  KPMG  avoided  indictment  in  2005  for  similar reasons  for  conduct  that  was  even
more egregious. See Robert  Schmidt & Otis Bilodeau, KPMG May Avoid Indictment As  U.S.
Pushes  Settlement,  BLOOMBERG.COM,  Aug.  4,  2005,  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=10000103&refer=us&sid=aAysChTpuW6E  (quoting  several  Justice  Department
officials as saying that they  would not indict  the firm for fear of "eliminat[ing]  thousands  of
jobs and reduc[ing]  the number of major accounting firms to three").
177.  As  one  general  counsel  stated  in  a  remark  typical  of what  we  heard  from  many
others, "We  used  [another  firm]  because  [our main firm]  had a  conflict.  We  were  pissed.
We'd expect from our major providers that when taking on a matter if it's crystal clear we're
going to need help  too  that they  don't take  the matter ....  [Hiopefully someone  from our
law firms would call  us and tell us and ask us  if we want to engage them before they accept
with a competition."  Confidential  Interview  with  No.  1, General  Counsel, Investment Bank
(Oct. 5, 2006); see also Heineman, supra  note  157,  at 73 (noting the importance of firms not
being  on  the  other  side  of the  client  in  sensitive  policy-level  disputes).  For  a  general
discussion of the increasing  importance  of business or positional conflicts,  see Dzienkowski,
supra note  128.
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Indeed,  law  firms that  enter  into these  kinds  of relationships  should  be
prepared  for  their  client-partners  to  begin  looking  into  many  of  their
internal  practices  and  procedures.  Traditionally,  general  counsels  have
shown remarkably  little interest in the internal management or practices  of
the  law  firms  they  employed.  In  our  survey,  for  example,  few  general
counsels  rated  such  factors  as  the  firm's  compliance,  compensation,  or
ownership  structures as more than "somewhat important"  in awarding  legal
work.178  But there are signs that this complacent attitude may be changing.
In  2007,  for example,  Wal-Mart  began  asking  the  firms  on  its  preferred
provider  list  whether  the  "partners"  working  on  the  company's  matters
actually  have  an  equity  stake  in  the firn. 179   Similarly,  the  head  of the
Association of Corporate  Counsel called  for firms to push back against the
2007  salary increases  for first-year  associates and to begin inquiring about
hours bonuses  and other practices  that arguably  encourage  lawyers  to run
the meter. I 8°
As clients invest more in their relationships  with their primary law firms,
these questions  are bound to increase.  One  can already see  the trend with
respect to  companies  that have recently  had to terminate  an important  law
firm relationship.  As indicated above, such terminations  are relatively rare.
When terminations do occur, however, these actions  appear to be positively
correlated with a company's  increased  interest  in internal  law  firm quality
control systems.  Thus,  among  firms in our  survey that had not terminated
an  important  law  firm relationship  in the past three  years, more  than fifty
percent  of GCs  said that  a firm's "quality  control  systems" were  not very
important  in determining whether  a given firm would be hired.181  Among
those  who  had  more  frequent  terminations,  however,  the  opposite  was
true-almost two-thirds rated a law firm's quality control  systems as being
an important  factor in the  company's legal  purchasing  decisions.  Whether
experiencing  a recent  termination causes  companies to be  more  concerned
with quality control, or companies that have this orientation are more likely
to  be disappointed  with the  level of service  they are  receiving  from their
law firms, 182 this evidence  suggests that at least some  clients are beginning
to  draw  the  link between  a firm's internal  practices  and the  quality of its
work product.
The  fact  that  clients  are  beginning  to  look  more  carefully  at  a  firm's
internal structure and practices may end up being a boon for law firms.  As
many  commentators  have  observed,  law  firms  are  probably  the  worst
178.  See Beardslee et al., supra note 76, at 25.
179.  See Sam Shulz,  Wal-Mart Puts Foot Down on Rising Legal Fees, LAw360, Nov. 2,
2007, http://www.law360.com/articles/39210.
180.  See Aric Press,  A Long Time Coming, AM.  LAW.,  Dec.  2008, at 96 (reporting on the
Association of Corporate Counsel  initiative);  see also Michelle  Madsen,  Wal-Mart Memo
Slams  Associate  Pay-Hikes,  LEGAL  WK.,  Nov.  9,  2007,  http://www.law.com/jsp/
PubArticle.jsp?id=900005495581  (reporting  that  Wal-Mart  was  refusing  to  pay  increased
rates based on higher associate salaries).
181.  See Beardslee et al., supra  note 76.
182.  Our survey does not allow us to tell in which direction the causation arrow points.
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managed  multibillion-dollar  businesses  in  the  world.  Providing  these
organizations  with an incentive to invest in internal compliance procedures,
therefore, could potentially lead to important benefits  that might help firms
avoid situations  like the one that sank Jenkens. 1 83 Indeed, recent empirical
work  confirms  that  firms  that  adopt  internal  compliance  mechanisms  are
less  likely  to  commit  certain  kinds  of ethical  violations. 184  As  I  argue
below, avoiding such situations benefits the public as well as firms.
It  is  important to  concede,  however, that  the implications  of the kind  of
increased  scrutiny  and  control  by  clients  that  these  new  strategic
partnerships  tend to produce  may not always be  so  benign  for the broader
public  purposes  that  lawyers  as  officers  of  the  legal  system  are  also
supposed to serve.
C.  The Public
In  what  has  become  one  of the  most  iconic  moments  from  the  U.S.
savings  and  loan  (S&L)  crisis  of the  late  1980s,  Judge  Stanley  Sporkin
famously  asked  "[w]here  were  [the  attorneys]"  and  "[w]hy  didn't  any of
them  speak  up  or  disassociate  themselves  from  the[se]  transactions?" 185
These questions highlight the central tension in the traditional conception of
the lawyer's role.  In addition to being zealous advocates for the interests of
their clients, lawyers are  also supposed to play a broader gatekeeping role in
which  they  both  counsel  their  clients  to  conform  their  conduct  to  legal
standards  and  refuse  to  cooperate-and  in  extreme  cases,  even  blow  the
whistle-when  their  clients  seek  to  engage  in  conduct  that  undermines
these standards.  As  we  find  ourselves  in  the  grip  of the  latest round  of
corporate scandals that have made the  S&L debacle look like petty larceny,
it is fair to ask whether the new partnerships being forged by companies  and
their outside lawyers  are  likely to undermine the ability of lawyers  to play
this crucial gatekeeping role.
There  is  certainly  reason  to  be  concerned  that  it  may.  As  Reineir
Kraakman  argued  nearly  a  quarter  of a  century  ago,  whether  lawyers  or
other professionals are able to act as gatekeepers depends  crucially upon the
characteristics  of the market  in which  these  intermediaries  operate. 186  As
183.  Elizabeth  Chambliss  and  I  first  articulated  this  position  in  2002.  See  generally
Elizabeth  Chambliss & David B.  Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General
Counsel and Other Compliance Specialists in  Large Law Firms, 44  ARiz.  L.  REv.  559
(2002).  Chambliss has gone on to become the most articulate defender of this position. See,
e.g.,  Elizabeth Chambliss,  The Professionalization  of  Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84  N.C.
L. REv.  1515,  1552-72 (2006); Elizabeth  Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority
(2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
184.  See Christine  Parker  &  S.  Mark,  Regulating  Law  Firm  Ethical  Infrastructure:  An
Empirical Assessment  of the Potential  for Management  Based Regulation  of Legal  Practice
(2009)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file  with  author)  (testing  Chambliss  and  Wilkins's
claims about the value of internal compliance procedures  in a sample of Australian  law firms
and finding  a  statistically significant  correlation  between  procedures  adopted  and avoiding
certain kinds of misconduct).
185.  Lincoln Sav.  & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901,  920 (D.D.C.  1989).
186.  See Kraakman, supra note  16.
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indicated  above,  this market  has  been  moving steadily  in  the  direction  of
transferring  power from  lawyers  to  clients.  Moreover, to borrow William
Simon's  evocative  phrase,  there  is  now  an  active  "market  for  bad  legal
advice"  in which clients  actively  shop  for lawyers who  are willing to give
them  legal  opinions  that  can  help  to  insulate  them  from  liability  or
criticism.187   As  the  market  for  legal  services  becomes  increasingly
competitive,  there  is  a  danger that  lawyers  will  find  it difficult  to  refuse
such requests.
More  to the point of the current discussion,  convergence  may very well
increase  this  danger.  As  John  Coffee  notes,  one  of  the  factors  that
distinguishes  external  gatekeepers  such  as  law  firms  from  their  internal
counterparts  such  as  in-house  counsel  is  that the  former  have  numerous
clients  and,  therefore,  are  less  likely to  be  beholden  to  anyone.  But  the
more a company concentrates  its legal work in a single law firm, the larger
the  potential  loss  of  this  client's  business  will  loom  in  the  law  firm's
decision making-particularly  in  a world in  which other clients  are  doing
the  same thing  with their  preferred  providers.  Indeed,  it  is precisely  this
hope  of becoming  a  "star"  client  that has been one  of the most  important
drivers  of the current convergence  boom.  It is certainly plausible  to expect
that clients  who enter into such arrangements  will expect those who  serve
them to treat them with the unquestioning  deference  that "star"  status often
affords.
Indeed, more  may be at stake  than simply an  increased danger of client
pressure.  The switch  to  a "partnering"  ethos  among  outside counsel  may
threaten the very professional self-conception that made  lawyers want to act
as gatekeepers  in  the first place.  As  Robert  Gordon  succinctly  notes,  no
gatekeeping  regime  can  survive unless  lawyers  have  a  strong desire to  be
independent  from  their clients. 188  Although  one  can  certainly  argue  how
much lawyers have ever displayed this desire in fact-let alone been willing
to  act  on  the  basis  of  their  status  as  independent  professionals  in
circumstances  where  their  clients  were  pressuring  them  to  do
otherwise' 89-awyers  who  have wanted to embrace this mantle  have been
aided by a professional  ethos that sharply differentiates  law  from business.
But  as  Robert  Rosen  argues,  the  more  lawyers  become  enmeshed  in  the
client's  business,  the  more  they  are  likely  to  take  on  a  view  of
"independence"  that  stresses  the  importance  of protecting  the  client  from
187.  See William  H.  Simon,  The Market for Bad Legal Advice:  Academic Professional
Responsibility Consulting  as  an  Example,  60  STAN.  L.  REv.  1555,  1556-58  (2008).
Although  there  has  been  heated  criticism  of Simon's  contentions  about  the  conduct  of
academic  ethics advisers,  no  one has seriously  challenged his  basic  claim that clients often
demand that their lawyers bless transactions with little or no legal merit.
188.  See generally Gordon, supra  note 3.
189.  See  id. at  34;  see  also  Robert  L.  Nelson,  Ideology, Practice, and Professional
Autonomy:  Social Values and Client Relationships  in the Large Law Firm, 37  STAN. L. REv.
503  (1985)  (discussing how corporate  lawyers  have beliefs similar to their clients).  But see
Gordon,  supra note  17;  William  H.  Simon,  Babbit  v.  Brandeis:  The  Decline of the
Professional  Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REv. 565 (1985).
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competition  and regulatory oversight, as opposed to  encouraging the client
to  comply  with  legal  and  policy  norms. 190  Recent  empirical  research
suggests  that  this may  have already  happened  to  many  inside  lawyers. 191
By instructing outside lawyers to become "partners" with their major clients
who  are  encouraged  to  see  their  primary  value  as  helping  client  teams
deploy  legal  knowledge  to  maximize  competitive  advantage,  the  new
strategic  alliances between  companies and firms risk turning "independent"
lawyers  into just another consultant serving business ends. 1 92
There  is  clearly  merit in these  concerns.  Indeed,  as  I will  argue below,
this  is  precisely  why  it  is  unhelpful  and  unwise  for  scholars  and
professionals  interested  in  maintaining  the  lawyer's  gatekeeping  role  to
either  ignore these  developments  or to  leave them  entirely to  the realm  of
private  ordering.  Nevertheless,  before  we  bemoan  a world  in which "we
are  all consultants  now,"  it is important to  see that  strategic alliances  don't
so much  eliminate the space  for gatekeeping  as  reorient  its dynamics.  One
can  begin to see  this point by  remembering  the prevailing  account of why
outside  lawyers  were  increasingly  unable  to  play  their  traditional  "wise
counselor"  role during the  heyday of the In-House  Counsel  Movement.  In
that not-so-distant past, many  commentators  laid the blame  for the  decline
of the  "lawyer  statesman"  on the fact that partners  in law  firms no  longer
had  sustained  relationships  with  their  corporate  clients  but  were  instead
only brought in to  handle discrete transactions,  often  at the last minute. 193
As  a result, these  critics asserted, lawyers  no longer had the opportunity to
get  to  know  their clients'  business  in  a manner that  would  allow  them to
function  like  the  trusted  advisors  of old. 194  Moreover,  by  shifting  work
around  among  many  firms,  corporate  clients  were  able  to  play  these
competing  advisors  against  each  other  while  ensuring  that  no single  firm
knew  enough  to  be  able  to  detect  or  deter  the  misconduct. 195  As  John
Coffee evocatively puts it, "Monogamy  has thus given way to polygamy, as
the  corporation flirts with  many outside counsel"  thereby  "[providing]  less
190.  See Rosen, supra note  86.  I discuss the difference  between these  two  meanings  of
"independence"  in Wilkins, supra note 22, at 853-73.
191.  See  generally Robert  L.  Nelson  &  Laura  Beth  Nielsen,  Cops,  Counsel, and
Entrepreneurs: Constructing  the Role of  Inside Counsel in Large Corporations,  34 LAW &
Soc'y REv.  457 (2000).
192.  Rosen, supra note 86, at 671-75.
193.  See, e.g.,  KRONMAN, supra note 25.
194.  See  id. at  271-314.  Many  contemporary  commentators  continue  to  echo  this
sentiment. See, e.g.,  COFFEE,  supra note  16,  at  194-95 (noting that the relationship  between
law  firms and their corporate clients  is now "less  intimate, ongoing or fully informed than is
the relationship between the same corporation  and its outside auditor").
195.  See COFFEE, supra note  16,  at 226; see also DENNIS  F. THOMPSON,  POLITICAL ETHICS
AND  PUBLIC  OFFICE 40-65  (1987)  (describing  the difficulties created  by  situations in which
there are  "many hands").  As I explain below,  this is precisely  what Charles Keating  did in
the  famous Lincoln Savings & Loan case  that  gave rise  to  Judge  Sporkin's  lament  about
"where  were  the  lawyers?"  that began  this section. See supra note  185  and accompanying
text.
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shelter ...  within the firm for the independent professional  who resists the
client."
196
The  new partnering  models provide  a hedge  against these  dangers.  As
indicated  above,  the  whole point  of these  new  arrangements  is to  ensure
sustained  contact  between  the  company  and  its  primary  outside  firms.
Although  rarely  monogamous  (with  the  notable  exception  of Tyco  and
Eversheds),  convergence  dictates that these arrangements  will not have the
characteristics  of speed dating  inherent  in  the  old  spot-contracting  model
either.  Lawyers who  work in these  new  arrangements  therefore  have  the
potential  to  see the big picture in a way that their colleagues  in firms  with
more  transactional  relationships  with their  clients will  have  a harder  time
doing.
Moreover  as  the  Tyco/Eversheds  deal  underscores,  partnering
relationships  often  provide  incentives  for  firms  to  assist  companies  in
reducing  their overall  legal costs by recommending  measures  that help the
company prevent legal problems  in the first place.  Thus, Tyco  has agreed
to  pay  Eversheds  a  six-figure  bonus  if  it  successfully  reduces  lawsuits
against the company below historic levels. 197  Such a payment is pure-profit
for the firm and  also  a significant benefit to  the company,  which not  only
saves  the  cost  of  legal  fees,  potential  damage  awards,  and  (frequently
overlooked)  managerial  distraction,  but  also  stands  to  gain  significantly
from increased customer satisfaction and overall goodwill.' 98  As the recent
multi-million dollar fines paid out by Siemens  Corporation for violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act underscore,  the cost of failing to prevent,
or  at a minimum  detect,  illegal conduct  by company  employees  can have
consequences  for the bottom line that far exceed the cost of legal  fees. 199  It
should  go  without  saying  that  preventing  illegal  actions  by  company
employees also benefits the public and the rule of law generally.2 00
Moreover, the long-term nature of these new  strategic partnerships  gives
each  side  an  incentive  to  invest  in the long-term  health of the  other.  As
indicated above, clients and firms who enter into these arrangements remain
distinct entities-and, more  importantly, in significant respects competitors.
As  the  Chrysler example  underscores,  a cooperative  relationship  between
such quasicompetitors  will only succeed if each side can credibly  signal that
196.  COFFEE, supra note  16, at 230.
197.  See  Steve  Hoare,  Comeback  Kid,  LAWYER,  May  26,  2009,  http://www.the
lawyer.com/comeback-kid/132978.article.
198.  Significantly,  prevention  also benefits  the self-interest  of general  counsels  who  are
constantly  trying  to  get  management  to  see  that their  value  lies primarily  in reducing  the
company's  exposure  to  risk. See  COFFEE,  supra note  16 (describing GCs  as  being good  at
prevention even though they are not really independent).
199.  See  David  Crawford  &  Mike  Esterl,  Siemens Pays Record Fine in Probe:  $800
Million Settlement Will End U.S. Bribery Case  for German Conglomerate,  WALL  ST. J., Dec.
16,  2008,  at B2.
200.  It is  possible  that  firms  may  try  to reduce  lawsuits  by  helping employees  to hide
misconduct rather than by eliminating  it.  This is, however, a risky strategy for both the firm
and the company since if the misconduct is eventually detected, the potential exposure could
increase dramatically  because of the perceived cover-up.
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it will use  the power that it will  inevitably gain over the other party during
the course of the relationship responsibly.201  As Benjamin Gomes-Casseres
argues,  such  relationships  depend  upon  partners  exercising  "mutual
forbearance"  by  which  "they  forgo  short-run  opportunistic  actions  in  the
interest of maintaining the  relationship, which they expect  will yield long-
run benefits."
2 0 2
To achieve these  long-term benefits,  both parties must remain  "healthy"
in every  sense  of the  word.  As  indicated above,  at a minimum this means
that both the  client and the  firm must remain  economically viable.  But as
leading  thinkers  in both business and the professions underscore,  the long-
term health and viability of either a company  or a professional  service  firm
depends  upon more  than  dollars.  To  survive  and  prosper,  both  kinds  of
organizations  must  also have legitimacy among  all of their respective  core
constituencies both inside and outside the organization.
For companies,  this means maintaining  a strong culture  of integrity that
will  allow  the  organization  both  to  attract  and  retain  top  talent  and  to
engender  trust among  consumers  and regulators. 2 0 3  Indeed,  according  to
one of the most respected voices in business, the more challenging the times
the more  important  it  is for a company to  have  a strong  set of core values
that  it adheres to even in the face of economic uncertainty. 2 0 4  The  same is
true  for  law  firms.  Although  the  firms  surely  need  to  be  profitable  to
survive  in  today's competitive  culture,  they  also  must credibly  signal that
they  exemplify  strong ethical  values  if they want  to attract  and  retain the
best  lawyers.  This  was the  central  value  proposition  trumpeted  by  firms
during the Golden  Age.205  Although much has  changed since those times,
201.  See  BENJAMIN  GOMES-CASSERES,  THE  ALLIANCE REVOLUTION:  THE  NEW SHAPE  OF
BUSINESS  RIVALRY  95 (1996)  (arguing  that alliance partners must "walk a fine  line between
rivalry and collaboration").
202.  Id. at 35.
203.  Ben Heineman has been one of the most ardent and articulate defenders  of this view.
See  BEN  W.  HEINEMAN,  JR.,  HIGH  PERFORMANCE  WITH  HIGH  INTEGRITY  1  (2008)
("[C]ontemporary  corporations  should strive  to fuse high performance  with high integrity-
the twin goals of capitalism.").
204.  See  Jennifer  Reingold,  Jim  Collins:  How  Great  Companies  Turn  Crisis into
Opportunity, FORTUNE,  Feb.  2,  2009,  at  48,  50  (quoting  Collins  as  arguing  that  what
distinguishes  companies  that succeed  is that they  have core  values  that explain  "why  it  is
important  that [the  companies continue to]  exist[]"  and that "[t]he  more challenged  you are,
the more you have to have your values").  Collins goes on to give  the example of Proctor &
Gamble during  the depression:  "One of the  things that was very distinctive  about P&G...
was that they said a customer will always be able to depend on the fact that a product is what
we  say  it  is-we  will  always  build  our  reputation  on  quality.  When  they  were  under
pressure to start cutting corners or use cheaper ingredients,  they just didn't do that."  Id.  It is
important  to note  that Collins is,  as  the article  describes,  a highly  respected  "management
guru" whose books Built to Last and Good to Great  have sold more copies than any others in
the  genre. Id. at  49.  As  a  result,  whether  or not his diagnosis  of what makes  companies
succeed  in  difficult times  is  in fact  true,  it  is likely  to  be  very influential  among  business
leaders.
205.  As a particularly effusive advocate of this view put it,
[Large law firms provide] an exceptional opportunity to acquire a liberal  education
in modem  government  and  society.  Such partnerships  are likely in the  future, as
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evidence  from  a  study  of  recent  law  school  graduates  suggests  that
maintaining a core commitment to values such as craft and professionalism
are still  central  to recruiting  and retaining top  talent.2 0 6  In the absence  of
this commitment  to some  distinctive notion of lawyer-professionalism,  it is
difficult  to  see  why  ambitious  young  women  and  men  should  go  to  law
school, or if they do, pursue a legal career, as opposed to a potentially more
lucrative career in fields such as investment banking or private equity.207
Lawyers  can, and should, play a central  role in maintaining  a company's
core values.20 8  Indeed, many general  counsels assert that this is at the core
of what they  do.209  But as many  commentators  have  noted, although their
position  inside the  company  gives  general  counsel  unique  access  to,  and
understanding  of, the company's  core  values,  it  also  can  make  it  difficult
for  these  captive  lawyers  to  distance  themselves  from  the  business
imperatives that can lead these values to be corrupted for short-term gain. 210
Outside  counsel,  therefore,  can  and  should  play  a  role  in  helping  their
internal  counterparts  to  counteract  this  pressure.  By  ensuring  that  a
company's primary  outside  counsel have both access  to  and a  stake  in the
company's  long-term future, the new strategic partnerships  described above
make  it more  likely that  firms will  have  both the  incentive  and ability  to
play this supportive role.
they  have  in the past,  to prepare  and offer  for public  service  men exceptionally
qualified  to  serve.  The very  nature  of such  a partnership  permits  a  man  to do
more,  not  less  civic  work,  and  permits  him,  as  a  true  officer  of the  court  and
responsible citizen,  more readily to enter public service  for various  periods and to
serve  society to his full professional capacity.
ARTHUR  H.  DEAN,  WILLIAM  NELSON  CROMWELL  1854-1948:  AN  AMERICAN  PIONEER  IN
CORPORATION,  COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL  LAW 86 (1957).
206.  See  DINOVITZER  ET AL.,  AFTER THE  JD I, supra note  170 (reporting that the primary
reason  reported  by  respondents  for  why  they  went to law  school was to  have  a "satisfying
career"  as opposed to high salaries or prestige).
207.  I have elsewhere  called this the paradox of professional  distinctiveness.  In order  to
compete  both with each other and with  other professionals,  law firms  are under tremendous
pressure  to  become  more  "business-like."  But  if they  become  too  much  like  any  other
business  then  those  seeking  only  money  will  rationally  move  to  alternative  careers  with
shorter  qualification  standards and potentially much higher  returns. See generally David  B.
Wilkins, Partner,  Shmartner!  EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown  & Wood,  120 HARV. L. REv.
1264 (2007).  Of course, whether alternative careers  such as investment banking will remain
more  lucrative  than  practicing  law after the  current  economic  collapse  remains  to be seen.
See Nate  Raymond, Former UBS Banker, Tired of Bonus Politics, Heading to Linklaters,
AMLAW  DAILY,  Apr. 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/former-ubs-
banker-tired-of-bonus-politics-joins-linklaters.html  (describing  the  decision  by  a  former
Cravath  partner who left that firm in 2005  to join UBS to leave the investment bank  in 2009
and join the U.K. law firm Linklaters).
208.  See  Painter, supra note  131,  at  520-53  (noting  the  substantial  power  that outside
firms have in structuring the internal dynamics of their corporate clients).
209.  See Heineman, supra note 63.
210.  See  Rosen,  supra note  86,  at  658  (noting  that  because  inside  lawyers  work  on
business  teams,  legal  work  is  done  in  a  "managerial  frame"  creating  a  danger  that these
lawyers  will view  themselves as just  another  consultant who  "add[s]  value"  and not  as "a
carrier of independent  professional judgment").
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The Tyco/Eversheds  deal  is  once  again instructive.  When Trevor Faure
took  over  the  legal  department  in  2004,  Tyco  had just  emerged  from  a
series of ethics scandals that nearly destroyed the company.  Faure therefore
viewed  restoring  the  company's  core  values  and  instilling  a  culture  of
compliance  to be among his highest priorities.  At the same time, Faure had
to ensure that the company was able to return to profitability  so that it could
survive  in an  increasingly competitive  marketplace  in which  its reputation
had  been shattered.  To  accomplish  these  twin  objectives,  Faure  and  his
legal  team  developed  a  series  of  training  courses  about  the  difference
between  "sinning"  and  "winning"-and  the  importance  of  obtaining
customized  legal advice  in  differentiating  between  the  two  in  close  cases.
To  be  effective,  however,  the  lessons  learned  in  this  training  had  to  be
reinforced in  the business managers'  dealings with both inside and  outside
lawyers.  Faure  therefore  required  Eversheds  to  engage  in  a  range  of
activities  designed to  facilitate the development  of a common set of values
and  approach  between  the  company  and  the  firm.  Specifically,  Faure
wanted  to  ensure  that  when  business  managers  were  confronted  with
difficult  ethical  challenges  they  had an  incentive  to  seek advice  from  the
outside lawyers, and that the advice they received would be consistent with
the  company's  policies  and  values.  To  achieve  this  objective,  Eversheds
was required as part of the deal to give managers thirty minutes of free legal
advice  on  any  matter  when  requested;  to  develop  and  update  a  set  of
policies,  templates,  and  checklists  on  key  legal  and  ethical  issues  facing
each of the company's businesses;  to participate in Tyco's legal department
training  and  to  include  the  company's  inside  lawyers  in  its  training;  and
eventually to  take over the  function of training  business clients  on matters
of law  and company  policy.  Although  the  firm  was not  directly  paid  for
any of these services,  the fact  that it would  receive  a significant bonus  for
both improving  customer satisfaction  and reducing  the number of lawsuits
against the company gave the firm an incentive  to take these responsibilities
seriously-and,  equally  important, to press the  legal department  to ensure
that it was doing the same.
One  can  see  a  similar  set  of incentives  with  respect  to the  stake  that
companies  have  in the long-term reputational  health of their outside  firms.
Corporations  need more from their lawyers than simple economic viability.
They also  seek to appropriate the legitimacy that  lawyers receive  by virtue
of their status  as  officers  of the  legal  system.  Society  has  given  lawyers
broad,  and  in many  instances  exclusive,  access  to  one  of society's  most
precious and important resources-the  law.  In return, lawyers  are expected
to use their power in ways that benefit, or at  a minimum do not subvert,  the
public  interest.  Notwithstanding  the  public's  ambivalent  attitude  toward
lawyers,  this  social  bargain  gives  the profession  a privileged  status  in  the
eyes  of state  officials  and,  in  many  cases,  the  public  as  a  whole.  This
legitimacy  is one of the benefits corporations receive when they hire outside
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firms.211 In order to maintain this privileged  status, however,  corporate law
firms must not be  seen as  consistently  undermining the public  purposes of
the law.  Corporations,  therefore, have a stake in ensuring that law firms do
not  squander  this  valuable  resource  by  placing  the  firm's  short-term
economic gain above its long-term interest in its own legitimacy.
Return again to the Tyco/Eversheds  agreement.  In addition to providing
Eversheds  a bonus  for reducing  the number of cases  against the  company,
the deal  also specifies  that the firm will receive a bonus if it achieves  certain
diversity  targets.212   The  fact  that  elite  firms  are  almost  as  racially
segregated  today  as  they  were  at  the  time  of  Brown  v.  Board  of
Education213  in  1954  stands  as  an  important  critique  of the  profession's
adherence  to  the  core-legitimating  norm  of  "Equal  Opportunity  Under
Law."214  Even if law firms are willing to  forgo this legitimacy for the sake
of short-term  profits,  corporations  have  a stake  in helping  firms  resist this
destructive  impulse.  For  it  is  only if law  firms  can continue  plausibly  to
hold themselves  out as legitimate protectors  of public  norms that the  long-
term  cooperative  venture  between  these  firms  and their  corporate  clients
will succeed.  This connection between demography and legitimacy helps to
explain why diversity  initiatives  have managed  to obtain  so much traction
in  the  organized  bar.  Indeed,  in  the  decade  since  I  first  drew  this
connection,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  companies  have  been  more  willing  to
intervene  in the internal practices  of law firms in the diversity  area than  in
almost any  other aspect of a firm's business with the exception of its billing
practices.
215
Experience  in the  diversity area, however,  also underscores  the potential
danger of relying too heavily on private market incentives to achieve public
goals.  As I have  argued  extensively  elsewhere, the movement to shift the
justification  for efforts to diversify the legal profession  from the civil rights
paradigm  of "separate  is  inherently  unequal"  to  a market-based  paradigm
based  on  the  claim  that  "diversity  is  good  for business"  is  fraught  with
peril.216  By their very  definition, market-based  diversity arguments tie the
211.  Indeed,  in the  eyes of many, corporate  firms have been the principal beneficiaries  of
this  legitimacy. See KRONMAN,  supra  note 25,  at 273 (arguing that "[flor  a hundred years the
large  corporate firm has been  the principal standard-bearer  of the  lawyer-statesman  ideal in
the sphere of private practice").
212.  Hoare, supra note 197.
213.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
214.  See LUBAN,  supra note  3, at 252-56  (arguing that "Equal  Justice  Under Law"  is the
legal profession's core legitimating  ideal).
215.  See,  e.g.,  Kellie  Schmitt,  Corporate  Diversity Demands Put Pressure on  Outside
Counsel,  RECORDER  (S.F.),  Dec.  28,  2006,  http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?
id=900005470357.  Needless  to  say,  one  can  certainly  question  how  effective-or  even
sincere-many of these efforts  have been.  I return  to the issue of effectiveness  below.  But
as damning  as  this evidence  is,  it  remains  clear that companies-and  increasingly  firms-
believe it is important to be seen as being committed to this issue.  Firms that are not seen as
committed risk losing legitimacy with core constituencies.
216.  David B. Wilkins, From "Separate  Is Inherently Unequal" to  "Diversity  Is Good  for
Business ":  The  Rise  of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
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achievement  of diversity  goals to the  logic  of the marketplace.  That logic,
however,  is likely to be a good deal less hospitable to diversity  as a profit-
maximizing  goal-and  a  good  deal  more  troubling  in  its  normative
implications-than  those  who  promote  this  shift  typically  acknowledge.
Thus,  while  many companies  claim to  value diversity, when  the chips  are
really on the table  far fewer are prepared  to make  it an important  criterion
when  selecting  outside  counsel  in  important  cases.21 7  Moreover,  in  those
cases  where  companies  do  see  a  clear  business  justification  for  hiring
minority lawyers  it is often in situations-for example,  when  looking for a
lawyer to defend the company against an employment discrimination suit-
that raise  troubling  implications  for both the lawyers  involved  and for the
overall goal of promoting equality.  The bottom line is that too much  focus
on  the  bottom  line  runs  the  risk  of  promoting  the  appearance  of  a
commitment to diversity at the expense of producing real results.
The  danger  is  that  the new  partnering  model  between  clients  and  firms
will have  similar  consequences  with  respect to  professional  independence
generally.  As  Robert  Rosen  worries,  companies  that  seek  to  integrate
lawyers  into  their  business  functions may  only  value  the  "appearance  of
'independence"'  as opposed to  any real  commitment  to public purposes  or
detachment  from  client  aims.218  Clients, after  all,  want  to  minimize risk,
not  wholly  eliminate  it.  As  a  result,  lawyers  who  come  to  identify  too
closely  with  business  teams may  begin to  "approach  managing  legal risks
with non-compliance  as  a viable option" '219  More  fundamentally,  even  if
one  concedes  that  both  clients  and  firms  have  a  mutual  interest  in
preventing  misconduct  and  reducing  risk,  there  is  a  danger that the  "risk
management"  perspective  that  this  shared  interest  engenders  will
paradoxically  diminish  "a  lawyer's  individual responsibility  for  making
moral choices  about his role in law and  society,"  inducing "a kind of moral
apathy" that will ultimately "hobble[] professional  independence." 220
As  I  indicated  at  the  outset,  there  is  merit  to  these  concerns.
Nevertheless,  as  even  the  harshest  critiques  of this  approach  concede,
"[r]isk  management  forces  attention  to  [the]  practical  consequences  of
professional  responsibility  decisions,  at  least  insofar  as  consequences  are
Corporate  Bar, 117 HARV.  L. REv.  1548  (2004); see also Beardslee et al.,  supra note  76,  at
29.
217.  See Wilkins, supra note 216,  at 1575.  Our research on corporate  counsel bears  this
out.  Although  many  general  counsels  told us  that diversity  was  important to them  in  our
qualitative  interviews,  in  the  survey  itself  this  factor  was  ranked  by  most  GCs  as
"unimportant" when making important legal purchasing decisions.
218.  Rosen, supra note  86, at 649.
219. Id. at 660.
220.  Anthony  V. Alfieri,  The Fall of  Legal Ethics and the Rise of  Risk Management, 94
GEO.  L.J.  1909,  1939  (2006);  see also Milton  C.  Regan,  Jr.,  Risky Business, 94  GEO.  L.J.
1957,  1966  (2006) (arguing  that "conceptualizing  ethics as  a matter of avoiding  liability can
influence  [personal]  dispositions,  attitudes,  and  motives,  and,  therefore,  how  someone
exercises  her  discretion");  William  H.  Simon,  The  Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge:
Virtue and Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J.  1985  (2006).
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measured  by  liability."'221   Indeed,  as  the  defenders  of  this  approach
emphasize,  policies  and  practices  that  institutionalize  the  process  of
uncovering,  evaluating,  and  minimizing  risk  are  essential  to  combat  the
organizational  dynamics  that both contribute  to  individual misconduct  and
restrict  the  ability  of lawyers  to  act  as  independent  gatekeepers. 222  To
understand  why,  it  is  necessary  to  look  more  closely  at  the  relationship
between risk, ethics, and rewards  in the kind of strategic partnerships being
forged by companies and firms.
IV.  THE ETHICS AND ENFORCEMENT  OF PROFESSIONAL ALLIANCES
Like  Tyco  and  Eversheds,  when  companies  enter  into  long-term
relationships  with key  suppliers,  their respective  rights and  obligations  are
typically defined by contract. 223  Because alliance partners are entering  into
an  ongoing  relationship  that  will  inevitably  change  over  time,  however,
these  agreements  tend  to  be  open-ended,  containing  "gaps"  that  must  be
filled in at a later date by some form of joint decision making.224  Although
alliance partners  often  develop  institutional  arrangements  to  resolve  these
unexpected  events  or  to  renegotiate  difficulties  in  performance, 225
ultimately  the  success  of the  collaborative  venture  depends  upon  their
ability to nurture  and maintain  an ethical value, namely trust.226  Ethics, in
addition  to  economics,  is  therefore  at  the  core  of  these  arrangements.
Defining  the  ethical  norms  that  should  govern  these  ventures-and  the
connection  between  these  norms  and  the  standard  conception  of  legal
ethics-is therefore  critical in evaluating whether the move to this new kind
of partnership  between  companies  and  firms  will  promote  or  undermine
professional  independence.
227
221.  Simon, supra note 220, at  1987.
222.  See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management:  Complementary Visions
of Lawyer Regulation, 21  GEO.  J.  LEGAL  ETHICS  95,  96  (2008)  (arguing  that  "far  from
'undermin[ing]  the aspirational tradition of legal professionalism,'  as suggested by Professor
Alfieri,  risk  management  is  actually  about  institutionalizing  precisely  those  values,  and
giving  them  concrete  form"  (alteration  in  original)  (quoting  Alfieri,  supra note  220,  at
1939)); see also Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 183.
223.  For an excellent  description of the contractual  problems caused by these  new forms
of alliances and the complex ways that customers and suppliers attempt to work around these
problems, see generally  Gilson et al., supra note  13.
224.  See GOMES-CASSERES,  supra  note 201,  at  34-35; see also Gulati & Sytch, supra  note
14,  at 41  (arguing that  "relationships characterized  by high joint dependence foster a culture
of  'mutual  reliance'  in  which  exchange  partners  exhibit  a  decreased  proclivity  for
opportunistic  behavior"  (citing  OLIVER  E.  WILLIAMSON,  THE  ECONOMIC  INSTITUTIONS  OF
CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS,  RELATIONAL  CONTRACTING  190 (1985))).
225.  The  Tyco/Eversheds  deal,  for  example,  was  scheduled  to  run  for  two  years,  but
because  significant  problems arose in the  first year,  in part because  neither party  had  fully
anticipated  the difficulty  of shifting all of the company's work  in such a short space of time,
the  parties  renegotiated  important aspects  of the deal  after the  first year. See  Lloyd, supra
note 91,  at 31.
226.  See generally Ranjay  Gulati,  Does Familiarity  Breed Trust?  The Implications of
Repeated Ties for Contractual  Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD.  MGMT. J.  85  (1995).
227.  As  Gilson  underscores,  to  maintain  these  relationships  requires  a  complex
combination of normative and structural elements that  are "more formal  than 'relationships,'
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Although defining appropriate ethical values is therefore necessary, as we
have learned  from  long  experience  in the  field of legal  ethics,  it  is  rarely
sufficient  to  ensure  compliance  with  appropriate  ethical  norms.  Ethical
duties  must  be  reinforced  through  institutional  mechanisms  that promote
and monitor compliance-and include  a realistic threat of sanctions if those
norms are routinely violated or ignored.  Enforcement as well  as aspiration,
therefore,  must be  a part of any plausible  regime  of professional  ethics.228
Once again, understanding the range of actual-and potential-enforcement
mechanisms,  both  public  and  private,  is  critical  to  reaching  an  overall
judgment about the implications for the  ideal of professional  independence
of the move toward strategic  alliances between companies and finns.
Each  of  these  dimensions--ethics  and  enforcement-are  large  and
complex,  and  what  follows  neither  catalogs  the  full range  of possibilities
nor purports to develop a definitive account on either topic.  Instead, I want
to suggest why neither ethics  nor enforcement  concerns provide  an a priori
reason  to  oppose  strategic  alliances  between  companies  and finns  and to
suggest some avenues  for using both of these  domains  to help  ensure that
the  movement  that  appears  to  be  taking  place  in  this  direction  will  not
unduly  undermine  the  legitimate  purposes  of professional  independence,
and may even promote these goals.229
A.  The Ethics ofAlliance
The idea that companies and  firms must  learn to trust each other if they
are to forge an effective  partnership might at first blush seem not to require
but  designed  to  facilitate  learning  among  collaborating  peers  by  means  much  less formal
than hierarchical  ordering."  Gilson et al., supra  note  13,  at 446.
228.  The classic text on the relationship between  norms and their enforcement  is Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private  Law Adjudication, 89 HARv.  L. REV.  1685  (1976).
For  my  application  of Kennedy's  insight  about  the  relationship between  the content  of a
norm  and its enforcement to legal ethics,  see Wilkins, supra note  22,  at  809-12 (discussing
the  connection  between  "content"  and  "compliance"  arguments  in  legal  ethics).  See also
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv.  L. REv. 468, 481  (1990).
229.  I  use  the  qualifier  "legitimate"  advisedly.  There  is  a  long  history  of  lawyers
speaking as if "professional independence"  is  a good unto itself. See, e.g.,  KRONMAN,  supra
note  25,  at  109-62  (arguing  that  the  ideal  that  lawyers  should  be  "statesmen"  who  are
sympathetic but ultimately detached from the  aims of their clients  is ultimately grounded in
the professional moral  development of lawyers themselves).  But while the legal profession
cannot survive  unless those  who  enter  into  it fmd their careers  satisfying-a  nonfrivolous
question in today's profession-the content of professional norms  cannot rest solely (or even
largely) on  what is good for lawyers.  See Wilkins, supra note  27,  at 472  (making this point
with respect to Kronman's book).  Given that the bar has often used the ideal of professional
independence  as  a sword to defeat the  kinds of external  regulation that  might actually  give
corporate  lawyers the incentive to resist the improper demands of their powerful clients, we
should be particularly  careful about uncritically accepting arguments  of this kind as a reason
not to explore the types of ethical and regulatory  alternatives described below.  On the bar's
use of independence  arguments  to restrict public  participation  in the development  of ethical
norms,  see  Deborah  L.  Rhode,  Why  the  ABA  Bothers:  A  Functional Perspective on
Professional  Codes, 59  TEX.  L. REv.  689,  690-92  (1981).  For a more  detailed  analysis of
how external  enforcement  can promote  independence  from  clients,  see Wilkins, supra note
22,  at 863-73.
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any  adjustment  in  ethical norms.  After all,  the  traditional  model  of legal
ethics  is expressly premised on encouraging  a trusting relationship  between
lawyers  and clients. 230  For anyone  who  has  been paying  attention  to the
actual  relationship  between  clients  and  law  firms  of late,  however,  it  is
painfully  evident  that there  is a significant  gap  between  the  ideal  and  the
actual when it comes to mutual  trust.  Ironically, this is particularly  true in
the corporate sector, where theory would  suggest that the interests of client
and firm  would be  most  aligned.231  Although  inside and  outside  lawyers
are not quite  Hatfields  and McCoys, these  two parts of what is purportedly
a  common  profession  have  become  increasingly  distant  and  antagonistic,
often  communicating  through  dueling  pronouncements  from  their
respective bar organizations. 232  Communication  at the micro  level is often
not much better, with clients accusing  their law firms of treating them as if
they were  a money tree just waiting to be shaken down and firms feeling as
though  their  clients  are  continually  demanding  them  to  give  unsecured
loans  with  no  intention  of  ever  paying  them  back.233   The  result  is
relationships  every  bit  as  mistrustful  and  adversarial  as  those  that
characterized  the relationship  between Chrysler  and its suppliers  before  it
moved to the keiretsu model.234
To  move  beyond  this  impasse  and  create  effective  collaborative
relationships,  companies  and  firms  will  have  to  develop  what  Gomes-
Casseres  calls "relationship  capital"  by honoring their  stated commitments
and  adhering  to  norms  of "fairness"  and  "reciprocity. '235  Although  the
parties  can achieve  a good deal of what  is required by  contractual  means,
230.  See, e.g.,  MONROE  H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING  LAWYERS'  ETHIcS
§ 5.01,  at  129 (3d  ed. 2004)  (arguing that legal ethics  is premised on the clients'  need to be
able to trust their fate to their lawyer).
231.  See  JOHN  P.  HEINZ  &  EDWARD  0.  LAUMANN,  CHICAGO  LAWYERS:  THE  SOCIAL
STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BAR  380  (1982)  (characterizing  the  corporate  sector  of the  bar as  a
"patronage-type  occupation  ...  where corporate clients to a large degree dictate the  nature of
the work done").
232.  Note, for  example, the  competing positions taken by the  American Bar Association
and the American  Corporate  Counsel Association  on the  issue of multidisciplinary  practice
in  the  late  1990s.  See  ANDREW  L.  KAUFMAN  &  DAVID  B.  WILKINS,  PROBLEMS  IN
PROFESSIONAL  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  A  CHANGING  PROFESSION  651-66  (4th  ed.  2002)
(discussing this debate).
233.  Compare Smith,  supra note  145,  at  58-60  (quoting  Cisco's  general  counsel  as
lamenting  that the  firms the company  used before  moving to  its current  preferred  provider
relationship  "shed  crocodile  tears  when  they  heard  we got sued"),  with Nathan  Koppel  &
Ashby Jones,  "Billable  Hour" Under Attack:  In Recession, Companies Push Law Firms  for
Flat-Fee Contracts, WALL  ST.  J.,  Aug.  24,  2009,  at  Al  (noting  that  the  shift  by  some
companies  to  flat  fees  "could  further  squeeze  earnings  at  top  law  firms"  and  quoting  a
partner  complaining  that  "'a  client  can't  expect  to  have  the  absolute  best  team of [trial]
lawyers  from a firm, and have the  lawyers give up  all the other work they  could be doing  on
a regular-fee basis, to work  18  hours a day for months of time on a flat-fee engagement').
234.  One  final anecdote:  my colleagues at  Harvard  Law School  and I were  considering
designing  a joint executive education  program for lawyers  from both  law firms and general
counsel  offices but abandoned the  idea when  too many  general counsels  indicated  that they
would not come to such an event.
235.  See GoMES-CASSERES,  supra  note 201,  at 87.
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for  example  by  moving  to  fixed  fees,  supporting  the  broader  normative
aspects  of the relationship  discussed  in the proceeding  section will require
ethical as well  as  contractual  support.  This,  in turn, will require revisiting
the standard principal-agent conception of the attorney-client relationship.
As indicated above, in theory the agency model gives clients near plenary
control  over  the  terms  and  conditions  of the  lawyer-client  relationship.
Although  this  helps  to  ensure  loyalty  by  lawyers,  it  raises  significant
problems  for  developing  and  preserving  a  relationship  of mutual  trust-
particularly  one  that  incorporates  public-regarding  commitments  on  both
sides.
236
Consider  the  client's  unqualified  right  to  dismiss  a  lawyer  for  any
reason.237  This right  is a natural  outgrowth of the agency model.238  It also
hands corporate clients  a potent sword to pressure  lawyers  into engaging in
risky  or  unethical  conduct.  In  the  infamous  Lincoln  Savings  and  Loan
debacle,  for  example,  Charles  Keating  deftly  used  this  authority  to  put
pressure  on  lawyers  from  the  law  firm of Kaye,  Scholer,  Fierman,  Hayes
and Handler  not  to question  his  actions regarding  the  management  of the
thrift.  Thus,  when  the  law  firm  initially  handling  the  regulatory  audit
insisted that Lincoln disclose certain questionable  transactions to regulators,
Keating fired that firm and brought  in Kaye  Scholer.239  The  lesson was not
lost on lawyers  at the  newly hired  firm, who vowed  to avoid the "situation
of mutual distrust and animosity" that was  caused by the prior firm's tough
stance  regarding  Keating's  questionable  practices. 240  To  make  matters
worse,  under the  governing  ethical  rules  applicable  at the  time,  the prior
firm not  only had no power to contest the  dismissal on grounds  of public
policy,  but  was  equally  powerless  to  disclose  what  it  almost  certainly
236.  Jack Coffee  cites exactly this  problem  as the reason  for dismissing  legal  ethics as a
plausible foundation  for establishing an effective  gatekeeping role for corporate counsel:
Because  legal ethics at its core  views  the attorney  as a client-serving  professional
who is  not permitted  to dominate  the relationship  (and because  market conditions
make it  unlikely  that lawyers  could  do so  today),  legal ethics does  not hold out a
practical  remedy  for  gatekeeper  failure.  One  must therefore  look  beyond  legal
ethics  and the moral exhortations  it provides to find a realistic  means to empower
the attorney as gatekeeper.
COFFEE,  supra note  16,  at  229.  The  fact that the move  toward  strategic  alliances between
lawyers and  firms alters the  market conditions  that  inhibit gatekeeping  implies that  a move
away from the client-serving agency model might actually produce real results.
237.  See MODEL  RULES  OF PROF'L  CONDUCT  R. 116  cmt. (1983)  (noting that a  client has
an unqualified right to fire his or her lawyer "at any time, with or without cause").
238.  See Henry,  Walden & Davis  v. Goodman,  741  S.W.2d  233,  236  (Ark.  1987)  ("The
relationship  between  the  attorney  and  his  client  must be  based  upon  the utmost  trust  and
confidence  ....  The exercise  of the  right to discharge  an attorney with  or without cause
does not constitute a breach of contract because  it is  a basic  term of the contract  implied  by
law into it by reason of the nature of the attorney-client relationship ....  ).
239.  See generally William  H.  Simon,  The Kaye Scholer Affair:  The Lawyer's Duty of
Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23  LAW  & SOC.  INQUIRY  243
(1998).  For my own take on the case, see Wilkins, supra note 4.
240.  See  Wilkins,  supra note  4,  at  1208  n.256  (quoting  an  internal  Kaye,  Scholer
memorandum).
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suspected  to  be  criminal  or fraudulent  conduct by Lincoln-even  to  Kaye
Scholer.
241
Nor was this the only  way in which  Keating  sought to exploit his power
as principal in Lincoln's relationship  with its lawyer-agents.  In addition to
holding  the  sword  of Damocles  over  Kaye  Scholer's  head,  Keating  also
assiduously  controlled  the  information  that was given  to any of the many
firms representing the thrift.  As a result, no single law firm working for the
thrift-let  alone  any  single  lawyer-had  a  complete  understanding  of
Lincoln's practices,  thereby making  it easier  for Keating  to hide his illegal
conduct.  Reports  about  the  conduct  of company  officials  at  Enron  and
WorldCom  suggest that Keating was  far from  alone in using this power to
ensure that legal  work is sufficiently  fragmented  such that no one  can take
the  long  view  and  "the  broader  interests  of  the  corporation  . . . go
unrepresented. '242  Although  critics of these  practices  have urged  lawyers
to reject  this  kind of narrow  framing,243  as John  Coffee  accurately  notes,
such  calls  "exist  in  considerable  tension  with  traditional  legal  ethics,"
which,  consistent  with  the  agency  model,  gives  clients  sole  authority  to
define  "the  objectives  of  representation."244   Consequently,  as  Coffee
concludes, in many recent scandals the problem is not so much that lawyers
were  at the  scene of the  crime but  chose  to look the  other way, but rather
that "lawyers  were nowhere near the  scene  of the crime,  thereby  enabling
others to orchestrate the fraud.
' 245
To  move  beyond  this  state  of  affairs,  it  is  necessary  to  construct  an
account  of legal  ethics  that  helps to  place  lawyers  in a position  to  detect
client misconduct-and  to  give  them  the  power  to  try  to  deter what  they
see.  Structurally,  as indicated  above,  the  new  strategic  alliances  between
companies  and firms are likely to place lawyers in a better position to be  at
the "scene  of the crime"-or better yet, the place where the  crime  may be
241.  See  MODEL RULES  OF  PROF'L  CONDUCT  R.  1.6  (1983)  (providing that a lawyer may
only breach confidentiality to prevent a future crime involving death or serious bodily harm,
or in a dispute with the client or in a proceeding involving the lawyer's representation of the
client);  see also PHILIP B.  HEYMANN  & LANCE  LIEBMAN,  THE  SOCIAL  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF
LAWYERS:  CASE  STUDIES  193-95  (1988)  (describing  the  infamous  OPM Leasing  case  in
which a lawyer who resigned because he disdovered  evidence that his client was engaged in
a  massive fraud  felt  compelled  by  the confilentiality  rules  not to reveal  what  he  knew  to
successor  counsel).  Ironically, the successor  lawyer involved  in OPM was none other than
Peter  Fishbein,  who  subsequently  was  the  lead  lawyer  for  Kaye  Scholer  in  the  Lincoln
Savings & Loan case.  I discuss  the changes  to Rule  1.6  and other related rules  that would
have  altered what would have  been permissible  for lawyers  in the  Lincoln and OPM  cases
below.
242.  See COFFEE, supra note 16,  at 225-26.
243.  See, e.g., Robert  W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?:  The  Corporate  Counselor
After Enron, 35 CONN.  L. REV.  1185  (2003).
244.  See  COFFEE, supra note  16, at 226 (citing MODEL RULES  OF  PROF'L CONDUCT  R. 1.2
(2003)).  As Coffee goes on to say, "If the organization  as client wants to use outside counsel
in a narrow fashion, asking  them only technical  questions and structuring the relationship  so
that  outside  counsel  is  neither  invited  nor  equipped  to  provide  'holistic'  advice,  the
organization  would seem entitled to do so." Id.
245.  Id. at 231.
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averted-than the spot-contracting  model manipulated  by Charles Keating.
But  if the  lawyers  are  to  utilize  their  newfound  knowledge,  the  ethical
restrictions  that discourage  them from doing so ought to be removed.  The
logic  of embeddedness  that  characterizes  these  cooperative  relationships
suggests  that  parties  should  not  engage  in  deception,  coercion,  or  other
forms of pressure tactics designed to force  the other partner into violating a
legal or  ethical  duty.246  To  the extent  that a company  has  breached  this
ethical  duty  to  its  outside  firm,  there  would  seem  to  be  little  reason  to
reward it for transgressing  such a fundamental part of the joint relationship.
Although a contrary rule surely raises difficult questions about how such an
obviously strained  attorney-client  relationship  will  be  managed,  courts  do
not  hesitate  to  compel  lawyers  to  continue  representing  clients  in
circumstances  where  the  lawyer does  not  want  to  continue  because  of a
disagreement  with  the  client.247  At  a  minimum,  the  logic  of these  new
relationships  suggests that clients  should pay  some  penalty  for dismissing
an attorney for failing to breach one of the lawyer's own ethical duties.
Indeed, one can see the recent changes in the confidentiality  rules enacted
by  the  American  Bar  Association  as. nodding  in  the  direction  of
acknowledging the  fundamental  unfairness of the traditional  agency model
in a world in which lawyers  are almost as vulnerable to client manipulation
as the other way around.  After steadfastly resisting the imposition of all but
the  most  minimal  gatekeeping-let  alone  whistle-blowing-duties,  the
ABA  amended  the  Model  Rules  in  2002  and  2003  to  give  lawyers
significantly greater latitude to  disclose client  fraud.  Thus, Model Rule  1.6
governing  confidentiality  has  been  changed  to  allow  lawyers  to  disclose
information  when  reasonably  necessary  to  prevent  a  client  from
"committing  a  crime  or  fraud  that  is  reasonably  certain  to  result  in
substantial  injury  to  the  financial  interests  or  property  of another"  or  to
"prevent,  mitigate  or rectify"  financial injury  "that is reasonably  certain to
result  or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud. '248
In both of these instances, however, the lawyer can only blow the whistle if
the  client  has used  the  lawyer's  services  in  furtherance  of the criminal  or
fraudulent  conduct.249  In  other  words,  clients  like  Charles  Keating  who
involve  their  lawyers  unknowingly  in  their  fraudulent  schemes,  or  who
246.  See  Gulati  &  Sytch,  supra  note  14,  at  61  (emphasizing  that  the  logic  of
embeddedness  is mediated by the amount  of "joint action"  between the parties  and that this
factor significantly  "contributes  to the enhanced performance  of the relationship as  a whole
and its increased value-generating potential").
247.  See Bd. of Prof 1 Responsibility  of the  Supreme  Court of Term.,  Formal Ethics  Op.
96-F-140  (1996)  (refusing  to  allow  a  lawyer  appointed  to  represent  a  minor  seeking  an
abortion  to  resign  because  the  lawyer  was  morally  opposed  to  the  procedure  under  any
circumstances).  Given  that  corporate  clients  are  sophisticated  repeat  players  who  must
operate every  day in relationships that are less than ideal, the argument that the rule allowing
clients  to  fire  their  lawyers  for  any  reason  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  client's  right  to
effective  legal representation rings hollow in the face of cases that require  individual lawyers
with strong moral objections to do otherwise.
248.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.  1.6(b)(2)-(3)  (2007).
249.  Id.
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dismiss  their  lawyers  for  failing  to  cooperate  in  further  misconduct,  risk
empowering  their former advisers  to disclose the fraud  in order to  protect
themselves  from  the  deleterious  consequences  of  their  client's
overreaching.
250
The  amendments  to  Model  Rule  1.13,  which  governs  the  duties  of
lawyers  who  represent  "organizational"  clients  such  as  corporations,
arguably  go  even  further.  Beginning  in  2003,  lawyers  who believe that a
corporate  manager  has  acted  or  is  about  to  act-or  refuse  to  act-in  a
manner  that  constitutes  "a  violation  of  a  legal  obligation  to  the
organization" or that may result in a "violation of law that reasonably might
be  imputed  to  the  organization"  are  given  three  interlocking  protections
against  being  ensnared  in  the  client's  wrongdoing.  First,  the  lawyer  is
required  to  report what  he knows to "higher  authority  in the organization,
including, if warranted  ...  to the highest authority that can act on behalf of
the  organization  as  determined  by  applicable  law."25 1  Secondly,  if that
authority  "insists  upon  or  fails  to  address  in  a  timely  and  appropriate
manner" conduct that the lawyer believes is "clearly a violation of law" and
is "reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,"  the
lawyer "may  reveal" whatever information  the lawyer "reasonably believes
necessary  to  prevent  substantial  injury"  to  her  organizational  client.252
Finally,  a  lawyer  who  "reasonably  believes  that  he  or  she  has  been
discharged"  or forced to withdraw for reporting conduct under either of the
above  two  provisions,  "shall  proceed  as  the  lawyer  reasonably  believes
necessary to assure that the  organization's  highest authority is informed  of
the  lawyer's  discharge  or  withdrawal." 253   Collectively,  these  three
provisions  both  require  that  lawyers  ensure  that  their  real  client-the
"organization"  (at  least  as  represented  by  the  board)-is  aware  of any
potential misconduct by corporate  managers  or employees that  might harm
the organization's  real long-term interests, while  giving them at least some
leverage  against  retaliation by those  who might be  tempted to  ignore the
lawyer's advice or punish him or her for trying to give it.
To be sure, these reforms continue to leave the heart of the agency model
in  place.  None  of these  changes,  for  example,  alter  a corporate  client's
fundamental  right  to  exclude  lawyers  from  the  venues  where  important
decisions are made or to strategically manipulate the information the lawyer
receives.  A  complete  account  of  the  ethics  of  lawyer-client  strategic
alliances  would have  to define  client obligations  as well  as  lawyer  rights.
250.  Of course,  if the  lawyer  did know  about  the  fraud  (or turned  a  blind  eye  under
circumstances  in  which  such  knowledge  can  reasonably  be  inferred)  and  continued  to
actively assist the client, he or she would not only be guilty of violating the ethics  rules but
(most likely) the  substantive  law as well.  See MODEL  RULES OF  PROF'L CONDUCT  R.  1.2(d)
(2007)  ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist  a client,  in conduct that the
lawyer  knows  is  criminal  or  fraudulent  .... ").  I  return  to  the  question  of how  the
substantive law regulates  lawyer conduct below.
251.  Id. R. 1.13(b).
252.  Id. R.  1.13(c).
253.  Id. R.  1.13(e).
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To  begin  to  articulate  such  an  account  of  "client  ethics,"  however,
necessarily  requires moving  beyond the  domain of legal ethics.  Whatever
their other virtues,  the  Model  Rules  of Professional  Conduct  cannot  bind
nonlawyers.  Although  one  can  try  to  infer  client  duties  from  either  the
general moral commitments that all members of society  share, or the  special
responsibilities that corporations  owe to society, any system that purports to
bind credibly  companies  to  adhere  to norms  of trust and reciprocity  with
law  firms  that  acknowledge  that  lawyers  have  public  duties  to  the  legal
framework as well as private obligations to clients will inevitably require an
engagement with substantive law.254
B.  Regulating  Reciprocity
Even the modest progress that the  profession has  achieved since 2002 in
moving away from a completely  client-centric  agency model of legal ethics
toward  one  that gives  lawyers  at  least  some  tools  to  protect  themselves
against  client  opportunism  can  be  traced  to the  threat  of state regulation.
The  rules  permitting  lawyers  to  disclose  contemplated  or  completed
financial  frauds  were proposed  as  part  of the  original  text  for the  Model
Rules  of  Professional  Conduct  in  1981,  only  to  be  repeatedly  and
vociferously  voted down  for almost twenty years.  Only the public  outcry
over  Enron  and  related  scandals  and the  threat  of the  imposition  of even
more  fulsome  reporting  requirements  by  Congress  galvanized  the  bar  to
adopt these provisions.  Indeed,  the ABA's  House of Delegates refused  to
impose  mandatory  "up-the-ladder"  reporting  requirements  in  Model  Rule
1.13  until the beating of the wings of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act (SOX)  made
it painfully clear that  in  the absence  of some  amendment,  the profession's
entirely discretionary  version  of that  rule  would  soon be  rendered  entirely
superfluous.  Even  then,  the  bar  adopted  a  version  of Rule  1.13  that  is
significantly weaker than the statutory duty imposed by SOX.
2 55
It  is  not surprising  that Congress passed rules  of conduct creating  more
stringent  gatekeeping  duties on lawyers than the profession was inclined to
254.  See COFFEE,  supra note 16,  at 372 (arguing that regulation  will be required to allow
gatekeepers  to  function  in  a  world  where  they  can  "demand  fuller  disclosure,  to  report
misconduct  up  the  ladder,  and  to  search  for  information  the  corporation  wanted  not  to
disclose").  For my prior analysis  of the  limited  ability  of "general  moral"  and "corporate
social  responsibility"  arguments  to  generate  robust  ethical  duties  by  clients  to  promote
diversity in law firms, see Wilkins, supra  note  11,  at 868-75.
255.  Although  the trigger  for  up-the-ladder  reporting  under  SOX is  notoriously murky,
the Act nevertheless  sets  an objective  standard for  defining  the lawyer's  duties  in this  area.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.  107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as
amended  in scattered sections of 15  U.S.C. (2006));  SEC Rule,  17  C.F.R. § 205.2(e)  (2009)
(mandating  up-the-ladder reporting if there is "credible evidence, based upon which  it would
be  unreasonable  . . . for  a  prudent  and  competent  attorney  not  to  conclude  that  it  is
reasonably  likely  that  a material  violation has  occurred").  Model  Rule  1.13,  on  the other
hand, still requires that the lawyer has actual knowledge  of a material violation before he  or
she is required  to report  conduct to a higher authority in the organization.  MODEL  RULES OF
PROF'L  CONDUCT  R.  1.13  (2007);  see also id. R.  1.0(0  (defining  "knows"  as  "denot[ing]
actual knowledge of the fact in question").
2128 [Vol.  78TEAM OF  RIVALS?
impose on itself.  The bar is well  aware  that what I  have elsewhere  called
"institutional  controls,"  such  as  SEC  enforcement,  are  far  more  likely  to
detect  a  lawyer's  violation  of  public  gatekeeping  duties  than  the
profession's  own  disciplinary  system,  and,  even  more  importantly,  to
impose  significant sanctions when violations  are brought to the surface. 256
Indeed,  this  realization  helps  to  explain  the  curious  phenomenon  of bar
leaders  actively  lobbying  against  the  SEC's  proposed  rule  requiring  a
lawyer who discovers that his corporate client has used his work product  to
engage in criminal  or fraudulent  conduct to make  a "noisy  withdrawal"  in
which the lawyer  expressly disavows  his prior work product,  even though
such  conduct  is  arguably  already  permissible  in  approximately  forty
states.257  The question  remains,  however, whether  these  and other  recent
statutory  attempts  to  regulate  lawyer  conduct  can  play  a  positive  role  in
encouraging  lawyers  to  take  their  public  gatekeeping  roles  seriously,
notwithstanding the  fact  that the developments  described  in this paper  are
likely to  place  outside counsel  in long-term  relationships  with clients that
blur the traditional boundary between law and business.
Although  the  evidence  is both  preliminary  and  mixed,  there  is  at least
some indication  that these  regulatory  changes  are having  a positive  effect
on  lawyer  independence.  Tanina  Rostain,  for  example,  reports  that
interviews with ten general counsels from large companies revealed a much
higher commitment by respondents to assert "jurisdiction over questions of
legal risk" and to embrace broad gatekeeping duties than reported  in earlier
studies.258  Although  Rostain  is  careful  not to  read  too  much  into these
findings  given  both  the  small  sample  size  and  the  many  factors  that
potentially  distinguished  her  respondents  from  those  involved  in  prior
studies,  she  nevertheless  finds  support  for  the  view  that  SOX  has
empowered  general counsel  to play a more  active  role  in gatekeeping.  As
one respondent summarized,
"[Directors  and  senior managers]  are  afraid  of going  to jail.  It  is very
effective in that way, in my view.  It is almost to the point where you have
to  bend  over  backwards  not  to  be  shrill.  And  when  you  play  the
compliance  card, make  sure  you mean  it  because you  are  going to  stop
these  guys in their tracks  ....  Once  you say compliance,  you are  very,
very empowered.  The thing about Sarbanes-Oxley that I don't  like... I
think  it is overkill  in  a variety  of areas,  but the  power  ...  to mandate  a
culture of compliance is very strong."259
256.  See Wilkins, supra note 22, at 835-38.
257.  See COFFEE, supra note  16, at 221-23  (describing the bar's successful  efforts to beat
back this rule).
258.  See  Tanina  Rostain,  General Counsel  in  the Age  of Compliance:  Preliminary
Findings and New Research Questions, 21  GEO. J. LEGAL  ETHICs  465, 473  (2008).  Rostain
compares  her results to the relative unwillingness by general counsels to act as "cops"  found
in  studies  conducted  by  Nelson  and Neilsen  and  Robert  Rosen  in  the  1990s  and  1980s
respectively.  See generally Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 191; Rosen, supra note  50.
259.  Rostain, supra note  258,  at  489  (quoting  the  general  counsel  of a  medical  device
company).
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Surveys  of the  attitudes  of general  counsel  after  the  passage  of the  Act
appear  to  support  this  conclusion,  as  does  the  fact  that  many  companies
increased their spending on outside counsel during this period.260
This  dynamic  highlights  a  key  feature  of  the  current  approach  to
regulating  corporate  conduct.  In  addition  to  setting  out  mandates  and
penalties,  contemporary  regulatory  schemes  governing  corporate  conduct
employ  incentives  to  encourage  companies  to  create  internal  compliance
regimes  that  diffuse  regulatory  norms  throughout  the  organization.  As
Rostain  explains,  in  these  new  regulatory  schemes  "[c]orporations  are
expected to install controls-including  ethics codes,  self-audit mechanisms,
compliance  training,  whistleblower  protections,  and  the  designation  of
compliance personnel-at every organizational  level to minimize the risk of
unlawful and unethical behavior."'261
These  regulatory regimes make  it clear that responsibility  for compliance
will  be jointly  shared  among  lawyers,  managers,  and  other professionals
who possess relevant technical  competence  or expertise.  The growth of the
kind  of  strategic  alliances  between  companies  and  law  firms  discussed
above further  highlights that the "lawyers"  involved in helping  to establish
and operate these  new compliance  mechanisms will come from both  inside
and  outside the  company.  All  of this underscores  the  need  to  develop  an
account  of how these  diverse  professionals  can  collaborate  in  ways  that
further,  rather  than  frustrate,  the  public  goals  underlying  these  new
compliance systems.
John  Coffee, for example,  proposes  that companies  be required  to  have
their  annual  and  quarterly  disclosure  documents  reviewed  by  an
"independent"  attorney  from  outside  the  company,  who,  "after reasonable
inquiry,"  would  then  be  required  to certify  that  the  disclosures  were  not
materially  misleading.2 62  Lawyers  who  failed  to discharge  this  new  duty
competently  under  Coffee's  proposal  could  be  sued  under  the  securities
laws for aiding and abetting their client's fraud.263
By highlighting how regulation  can  be used to impose  duties on  clients
that  in  turn  support  the  public  gatekeeping  responsibilities  of  outside
counsel,  Coffee's proposal  is a  step  in the right direction.  But in trying to
"restor[e]  the  principal-agent  relationship  between  lawyers  and investors"
260.  See Martin C.  Daks,  Compliance, Not Legal Fees, Named as GCs'  Chief  Concern,
N.J. L.J.,  Nov.  1, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1  162289115195
(reporting  that  in a  survey  of general  counsel  in  169  companies,  eighty-six percent  listed
"'keeping  track of company  activities that might have  legal implications"'  as  their  number
one concern); see also Conley, supra note  68 (reporting that "GCs-buffeted by regulatory
changes  from  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act,  an  increasingly  risk-averse  corporate  environment
and CEOs who want cost containment  and more value  from in-house  law departments-are
turning to outside lawyers with greater frequency").
261.  Rostain, supra note  258,  at 480.  Examples  of this new regulatory approach  can be
found  in  fields  as  diverse  as  environmental  protection  policy  to  antiterrorism  and
employment  discrimination regulation. See id. at 466-67.
262.  See COFFEE, supra note  16, at 231.
263.  Id. at 351.
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by  creating  a  special  role  for  "disclosure  counsel," 264  while  keeping  the
traditional  "hired  gun"  model  of  the  lawyer-agent  endorsed  by  Lord
Brougham  in  place  for  the  rest  of the  company's  counsel,  Coffee  risks
minimizing the effectiveness of the former while exacerbating the problems
of  the  latter.  Although  companies  would  presumably  have  to  share
information  with their disclosure counsel, these  same clients would have no
incentive  to do  so  with all of the other lawyers  involved in the  company's
complex compliance  machinery.  Nor would the hired-gun agents have any
power or  incentive to protest  this fate.  Indeed,  it is  entirely possible  that
Coffee's  proposal  could  drive  the  vast majority  of lawyers  not  acting  as
disclosure  counsel to give up their gatekeeping roles altogether while at the
same  time  encouraging  the  company  to  treat  their  disclosure  counsel  as
little more than an agent of the government who the company should regard
in the same way that it views the SEC.
265
Moreover,  as  important  as the goal of ensuring  proper disclosure  under
the securities laws is to the overall functioning  of our market economy, this
is hardly the only place where we want lawyers to act as public gatekeepers.
As indicated above, the new regulatory focus on compliance has resulted  in
the  creation  of  numerous  gatekeeping  regimes.  It  is  difficult  to  see,
however,  how  Coffee's  proposal  could  be  replicated  across  all  of these
diverse  regulatory  domains.  Should  Congress  seek  to  create  a  dedicated
"compliance  counsel"  in  every  instance  in  which  the  statutory  scheme
contemplates  public gatekeeping?  If so,  how would these new compliance
specialists  interact  with each  other, and with  lawyers  not in this role who,
according  to Coffee,  would  continue  to  operate  under Brougham's  hired-
gun  agency  model?  As  others  have  noted,  there  is  already a  burgeoning
industry  of "law  consultants"  claiming  to assist companies  in defining and
implementing  these  new  compliance  mandates.266  Although  creating  a
separate  "compliance  counsel"  might  prevent  the  legal  profession  from
losing  market  share to  these  new  competitors  (many of whom, as Rostain
notes, are themselves lawyers)  it might also entrench  the kind of turf wars
that will  only  work to  obscure  the  fundamental  purpose  underlying  these
264.  Id.  at 347-52.
265.  Although any proposal to create  a class of specialists with enhanced responsibilities
for gatekeeping runs the risk of diminishing the importance that lawyers not in this role place
on these public  duties,  Coffee's proposal  seems particularly  likely to produce this result.  A
law  firm  general  counsel,  for  example,  is  specifically  charged  with  interacting  with  the
firm's  partners  and  associates  in  order  to  remind  them  of their  individual  professional
obligations.  See  generally Davis,  supra note  222.  Coffee's  proposal,  on  the  other hand,
seems to contemplate  that disclosure  counsel, who  by definition will come  from a different
law  firm  than  the  other  lawyers  working  for  the  corporation,  should  perform  their  role
independently  without  seeking  to  influence  what  the  company's  other  lawyers  are  doing.
Indeed,  given that disclosure counsel would  be assuming all of the  risks of nondisclosure,  it
may  even be difficult to get lawyers  to assume this new role since malpractice insurance  and
other related costs would  likely be quite high.
266.  See  generally  CHRISTINE  PARKER,  THE  OPEN  CORPORATION:  EFFECTIVE  SELF-
REGULATION  AND  DEMOCRACY  (2002);  Tanina  Rostain,  The  Emergence  of  "Law
Consultants,  " 75 FORDHAM  L. REV.  1397  (2006).
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regulatory  schemes-that  achieving  effective  compliance  is  the  joint
responsibility of legal and business professionals.  To achieve this goal it is
necessary to move beyond a regulatory focus that assumes that gatekeeping
duties are the sole responsibility of a single actor.
CONCLUSION:  WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE-COMMUNITY  OR
CHAOS? 2 67
As  I  write  this  article,  the  market  for corporate  legal  services  is  being
radically  transformed-or  at  least  so  it  seems.  Law  firms  have  shed
associates-and  even  partners-faster  than  GM  has  laid  off autoworkers.
And perhaps  in a harbinger of GM's  fate, many brand name law firms have
already  shuttered their doors and more are almost certain to follow.
If anything,  fate (or to be  more accurate,  greed) has  been even less kind
to many of the clients  who  have traditionally  supported these  legal  giants.
There  are  no  investment  banks  anymore  (unless  you  count  Raymond
James),  and  there  has  been  a  precipitous  decline  in  the  deal  market that
these former trophy clients helped to support.
Needless  to  say, I  do not  pretend to  know  where  all of this is  heading
even in the next six to twelve months, let alone in the next five to ten years.
My  guess  is  that  nobody  does.  Specifically,  although  it  appears  that we
have  reached  a  significant  fork  in  the  road  that  could  bring  about  a
fundamental restructuring  of the Cravath model  of the  large  law firm,  it is
wise  to  remember  that  reports  of the  model's  demise  have  been  greatly
exaggerated  in  the  past.268  Nevertheless,  it  does feel  like  the  ground  is
shifting in important ways.  I close by saying a few words about what these
changes might portend for the legal keiretsus discussed here.
First,  it  seems  likely  that  the  contraction  in  both  client  and  law  firm
markets  will  accelerate  many  of  the  trends  cited  above.  Even  those
companies who survive  the downturn  intact are  going to look aggressively
for places to cut costs.  The legal  department, with its high fixed costs and
indirect  contribution  to the  bottom  line,  is likely  to be  a prime candidate.
Although  all  of the  headlines  have  been  about  law  firm  layoffs,  many
companies  have already begun  downsizing their  general counsel offices  as
well.269  As in-house  legal  offices shrink, companies  are likely to  become
even more dependent upon their relationships with outside firms.
Consider,  for  example,  the  "Value  Challenge"  initiative  recently
launched  by the American  Corporate Counsel Association  (ACC).  Based
on a series of off-the-record  discussions between companies  and  firms, the
Value  Challenge  seeks  to  "reestablish  trust  and  improve  [the  attorney-
267.  With apologies to the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
268.  The  consulting  firm  McKinsey  & Company  famously  wrote  a  report  in  the  late
1990s predicting that Cravath would no longer exist as an independent firm by the turn of the
century.  We all know how that one worked out.
269.  See  Lynne  Marek,  Layoff Pain Migrates In-House, NAT'L  L.J.,  Mar.  23,  2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202429290561  (reporting attorney  layoffs  at  Hyatt,
Cigna, eLoyalty, Motorola, Yahoo!,  and even GE).
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client]  relationship,  on both  sides" by  assuring "an  adequate  flow of work
so  that  outside  lawyers  understand  the  client  better  and  can  be  more
efficient  in what they do,"  while at the  same time "get[ting] junior lawyers
better trained"  and  creating  incentives  to  "better budget  and manage  costs
and  staffing."270  To  further these  goals,  clients  and lawyers  are  asked to
sign  a "Covenant"  under  which both  sides  agree  to  undertake  affirmative
duties to  create  a new  mutually productive partnership  between  companies
and firms.  Companies  are  asked to take  a number of measures,  including
"[d]efin[ing]  our objectives  in the engagement"  and "[p]rovid[ing]  training
opportunities  for  your  associates,"  designed  to  signal  the  corporation's
"[u]nderstand[ing]  our relationship  is built on mutual trust"  and to  "[h]elp
nurture  an  enduring  relationship  with  the  firm,  not  just  individual
lawyers." 271  Outside  counsel,  in  turn,  is  asked  to  promise  that  it  will
"[l]earn  your business and  strategic objectives,"  "[u]se  the most appropriate
staffing"  to  "[s]eek  to reduce  our  costs creatively  and  constantly,"  and to
"[w]ork  hard to retain  and reward  personnel  that  embrace  these  concepts,
and ensure  every member working  on your project  walks this talk. '272  As
the  blog  entry  from  Sun  Microsystems  general  counsel  Mike  Dillon,
featured  prominently  on the  ACC's home  page for  the  Value  Challenge,
makes clear, the fact that "we are in the early stages of a seismic shift in the
traditional  cost and delivery  model  for legal  services"  will only  accelerate
the  need for the kind of commitments by  both clients  and  firms  set out  in
the "Covenant.
273
Secondly  although  many  law  firms  will  undoubtedly  try  to  resist  the
move  to flat  fees and other similar  initiatives proposed by client initiatives
like the "Value  Challenge,"  in the end many will come to realize  that they
have  little  choice  but to  do whatever  it takes to  solidify  and  deepen  their
relationships  with their primary  clients.  As the  number of such "trophy"
representations  shrink-along  with  the  legal  budgets  of those  clients  who
remain-a  spot  on  a  company's  preferred  provider  list  will  become  as
precious as  it is rare.  Law  firms are likely to compete  aggressively for the
honor.
Tyco  and  Eversheds  are  a  case  in  point.  In the  fall  of 2009,  the two
parties  agreed  to  renew  their  exclusive  deal  for  another  two  years.
Although  the  deal omits  many of the performance  bonuses and  incentives
contained  in  the  original  deal,  instead  relying  on  a  mix  of  fixed  and
discounted  fees, both  sides have  made  clear that this transition  is a sign  of
the  strength,  rather  than  the  weakness,  of  their  joint  relationship.  As
Eversheds's managing partner stated when announcing the new deal,  "'It is
270.  See ASS'N OF CORPORATE  COUNSEL, ACC VALUE  CHALLENGE:  BRIEFING  PACKAGE 3
(2009),  available  at  http://www.acc.com/valuechallenge/resources/upload/ACC-Value-
Challenge-Briefing-Package.pdf.
271.  Id. at 4.
272.  Id.
273.  The Legal  Thing:  Notes  from a General Counsel, http://blogs.sun.com/dillon/  (June
18,  2009,  15:53 EST).
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a reflection of the maturity of the relationship between Eversheds  and Tyco
and  a  benefit  of  information  that  we  now  have  that  the  bonus-related
elements  have  been taken  out.  Both  sides  are  happy  about  delivery  and
have been able  to structure the contract accordingly."' 274  For its part, Tyco
underscored  the  company's  commitment  to the  relationship  by  expanding
significantly the number of "major projects"  that Eversheds  will undertake
for the  company  and  giving the  firm  the  exclusive  right  to handle  all  of
Tyco's  intellectual  property  work.27 5  Faure's  departure  undoubtedly  had
something  to do with the  fact that  some of the contract's  more  innovative
incentive mechanisms  have been dropped.276  It is  also clear, however, that
these  provisions  had already  accomplished  a good  deal  of their  intended
effect.  In  the  previous  two  years,  Eversheds  met the  contract's  goal  for
improving  customer  satisfaction  and  exceeded  the  target  for  reducing
litigation  filed  against  Tyco.277  Although  one  can  debate  whether  this
success  obviated the  need for the kind of win-win  incentives built into the
original  deal,278 the  fact that  both  parties  were  willing not  only to extend
their keiretsu-like relationship,  but  expand  it,  is  yet another  indication  of
how  the  tightening  of  the  legal  market  is  likely  to  encourage  both
companies  and  firms  to  build  and  retain  similar  kinds  of  partnering
relationships.
Although  such  intense  competition  could  easily  further  suppress  the
willingness  of firms  to  carry  out their public  gatekeeping  responsibilities,
the increased regulatory  scrutiny that is certain to follow on the heels of the
current  crisis  will  push  against  this  natural  tendency.  Companies  in  the
274.  Claire Ruckin, Tyco and Eversheds Overhaul Relationship  and End Bonuses, LEGAL
WK.,  Nov.  5,  2009,  http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/news/1561035/tyco-eversheds-
overhaul-relationship-bonuses  (quoting Bryan Hughes, Chief Executive, Eversheds).
275.  Id. (reporting  that  "major  projects"  will  constitute  60%  of the  work  Eversheds
handles  for  Tyco under the new agreement-up  from  20%  under the initial  deal  in 2007-
and that Eversheds will now handle all of the company's intellectual  property work).
276.  See  id. (noting  that  the  bonuses  were  introduced  in  2008,  "with  former  general
counsel Trevor Faure then describing them as 'pure added value for pure profit').
277.  Id. (noting  that Eversheds had  hit the  client satisfaction and  exceeded the litigation
reduction  target);  see also Eversheds,  The  Groundbreaking  Tyco/Eversheds  Relationship
Continues,  http://www.eversheds.com/uk/Home/about-us/how  weworkwith  you/case-
studies.page (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (reporting that "Tyco has been pleased with a 27 per
cent reduction in legal spend and an astonishing 60 per cent drop in the number of disputes it
has had to endure in its litigation portfolio").
278.  In  a conversation  with  the author  about  why  the  incentives  he  had  negotiated  had
been  dropped in  the new  deal,  Trevor Faure  indicated  that Evershed's  success  in  meeting
these initial targets indicated  that there may no longer have been a need for further incentives
of this kind.  Although this may  be a plausible explanation, the fact that the diversity targets
were also omitted even though Eversheds failed to meet this goal suggest that it may not be a
complete  explanation. See Ruckin, supra note  274  (reporting  that Eversheds  failed to  meet
the  diversity  target);  see also  Eversheds,  supra note  277  (quoting  David  Symonds  from
Tyco's legal  department  as  stating,  "I  thought  the previous  contract  was  complicated"  and
that "'bonus'  is  a  dirty word at the  moment," particularly  to business  people).  Even those
who  ultimately  decided  to  modify  the  agreement,  however,  conceded  that  the  original
incentive  scheme  "served  a purpose in  that it has driven the right behaviours."  Id. (quoting
Symonds).
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financial services industry are about to face the kind of regulatory onslaught
not seen  since  the New  Deal.  And just like  that historic  period,  this new
environment  will  ultimately  be  a boon  for lawyers-particularly  lawyers
who can  help  companies  credibly  signal  to  regulators and the public  that
they are operating  in a manner that will not threaten  to drive the proverbial
bus, as  President Obama likes  to refer  to the  economy,  into a ditch  again
anytime  soon.279  In  such  an  environment,  it  is  at  least  plausible  that
independence  could become the new cool.  Indeed,  since  some of the new
regulatory  attention  is  bound  to  be  directed  toward  sharpening  the bar's
gatekeeping  duties,  lawyers  are likely to  have  a personal  stake  in insuring
their-and their client's-rectitude.
Needless  to  say, there are likely to  be other  less happy consequences  as
well.  Law firms that are squeezed for cash are less likely to devote some of
these  scarce  resources  to causes  that they  still think of as  charity, such  as
pro  bono  and  diversity-particularly  if shell-shocked  law  students  and
associates  stop  inquiring  about  these  issues.  Given  that  the  attention
devoted  to these  issues even in good times is relatively  low, this could be a
substantial blow.
Even here,  however,  there  is the potential  for a  silver lining.  In a tacit
recognition  of the  important role that pro bono and diversity  have  come to
play  in  defining  the  legitimacy  of  the  attorney-client  relationship,  the
ACC's "Value  Challenge  Covenant"  specifically calls  on clients  and firms
to  both maintain  and  support  their  own,  and  each  other's,  pro  bono  and
diversity efforts. 280  Moreover, to ease the pain of deferred  start dates  and
mandatory  furloughs,  many  firms  are  giving  their  erstwhile  associates
stipends  to work in public  interest  or government jobs  while partners  wait
to  see  if the  Obama  stimulus  package  can jump-start  the  corporate  legal
market.281   Some  of  those  who  take  advantage  of  this  option  will
undoubtedly like their public jobs and stay.  Most, however,  will probably
decide to return to the firms that have furloughed them-but hopefully with
a  renewed  commitment  to  public  ideals  to  go  along  with  their  new
understanding  of the  reality  that even  the  safest  choices  may be  less  safe
than one has been led to believe.
This movement between public and private is, of course, simply the latest
(if unexpected)  manifestation of the increasing volatility of legal careers.  In
the After the JD study,  we  found that even after  two to three  years,  many
young lawyers  had not only changed jobs but also moved across sectors.282
279.  See Peter Sher,  Lessons  for U.S. Corporate  Law Firms  from the  Great  Depression
(2009)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file with  author)  (documenting  how  many  of today's
leading law firms rose to prominence during the Great Depression by displaying a flexibility
to  changed circumstances  that allowed  them to take advantage of the regulatory  and market
reforms  of the New Deal and speculating that there will be  similar winners  emerging out of
the current crisis).
280.  ASS'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 270, at 4.
281.  Stephanie  Chen,  For Jobless Lawyers, Plan B  Includes Good Works,  CNN.coM,
Apr. 13,  2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/03/16/lawyer.layoff.public/index.html.
282.  DINOVITZER  ET AL.,  AFTER THE JD I, supra note  170, at 53-54.
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Our  preliminary  analysis  of Wave  II  suggests  that  this  trend  has  only
accelerated as the class of 2000 moves toward early middle age.283
The  fact  that  lawyers  are  likely  to  move  across  sectors  with  greater
frequency  in the coming  years, however,  raises an important  challenge  for
the kind of analysis  I have presented here.  The model of the attorney-client
relationship  I  have been exploring  is  based  on the  particular  dynamics  of
the relationship  between  large  companies  and  equally  large  law  firms.  In
the  prevailing  sociological  account,  these  actors  constitute  a  distinct
"hemisphere"  of  legal practice  that  is  separate  from  what  these  theorists
charmingly called the "personal  plight" sector of the bar.284  But as lawyers
increasingly  move  across  this  divide-often  repeatedly-we  will  have  to
rethink  whether  the  jurisdictional  boundaries  between  different  areas  of
practice,  and  different kinds of client relationships,  will continue  to hold-
and if not, what to make of it.
The  same point can be made  about law firm boundaries.  In our study  of
how corporations purchase  legal services, we  found a surprising willingness
for  companies  to  treat  the  "team"  or  "work  group"  as being  even  more
important  than  either  the  firm  or  the  individual  in  deciding  how  to
administer punishment when it is disappointed in the services it receives on
a particular matter.285  If this trend continues, the important  unit of analysis
might  shift  significantly-undermining  the  ability  of  "companies"  and
"firms" to forge the kind of cooperative relationships examined here.
As  I  indicated  at the  outset,  developing  a model  of the  attorney-client
relationship that adequately accounts  for these rapidly moving changes  is a
large and difficult task, and I certainly make no claim to have  delivered the
last word here.286  Instead,  I will simply plead that no plausible  account of
legal ethics  can avoid  these vexing  questions.  The  nature  of the lawyer's
role inevitably places  those who occupy this position  at the  intersection  of
competing  normative  and  institutional  worlds-law,  business,  policy,
family,  and  nation.  It  is  up to those  of us  who  have  the  luxury to  think
about these issues  at  some remove  from the  front lines to help those in the
trenches-and those  who depend on lawyers to  carry  out both their public
and  their  private  duties-to  navigate  among  these  competing  domains
without either being crushed,  or,  to return for  one  final time  to Brougham,
"involv[ing]  [the] country in [too much] confusion."287
283.  DNOVITZER  ET AL.,  AFTER THE JD II, supra note  170.
284.  See HEINZ & LAUMANN,  supra  note 231,  at 72  n.  11.
285.  See Beardslee et al., supra note 76.
286.  For my prior punting of this issue, see Wilkins, supra note 228.
287.  2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (New York, James Cockcrofi  & Co.  1874).
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